scholarly journals Analisis Penerapan Skema Fully Funded pada Sistem Pensiun Pegawai Negeri Sipil di Indonesia

Author(s):  
M. Zikri Eka Pratama

The implementation of fully funded pension scheme for civil servant retirement in Indonesia is one of the government solutions to reduce the burden of pension expenditure on the state budget. However, to implement such a scheme, the government deemed it necessary to prepare an appropriate governance model in order to achieve the goal of fully funded scheme. The government needs to pay attention to several issues related to the implementation of a fully funded scheme, namely the issue of pension fund management, contributions, investment, regulations and risks. By distributing questionnaires and interviews to key stakeholders, the extent of government readiness to implement a fully funded pension scheme could be evaluated, based on which it was found that the government does not have readiness to adopt the fully funded pension scheme and several tasks remain to be accomplished. Abstrak Penerapan skema fully funded pada sistem pensiun Pegawai Negeri Sipil di Indonesia merupakan salah satu alternatif yang akan diambil oleh pemerintah guna mengurangi beban belanja pensiun Pegawai Negeri Sipil pada Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (APBN). Namun untuk menerapkan skema tersebut, pemerintah dipandang perlu untuk menyiapkan suatu tata kelola agar tujuan dari penerapan skema fully funded ini dapat tercapai. Pemerintah perlu memperhatikan beberapa hal terkait rencana penerapan skema fully funded, yaitu masalah pengelola dana pensiun, iuran/ kontribusi peserta, investasi dana pensiun, peraturan, dan risiko. Dengan melakukan penyebaran kuesioner dan wawancara kepada narasumber, dalam penelitian ini dievaluasi sejauh mana kesiapan Indonesia dalam menerapkan skema fully funded pada sistem pensiun pegawai negeri: yang mana pemerintah tidak memiliki kesiapan untuk mengadopsi skema ini dan terdapat hal-hal yang harus dilakukan terkait dengan implementasi tersebut.

2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
KIRK MANN

This article explores some of the emerging tensions in the management of welfare in Britain. The success of Labour's proposals for welfare reform, particularly retirement pensions, hinges on their ability to promote the idea of the consumer citizen and to undermine traditional ideas of citizenship rights. However, managing this transition – including the presentation of ideas and the management of consumers – has not been straightforward. While the Government presents retirement as a matter of lifestyle choice, welfare ‘consumers’ are demanding more of their providers and are regularly disgruntled with the response.Simultaneously, pension providers are expressing reservations about their ability to manage aggrieved consumers. Furthermore, they believe pension fund management has been politicised, and their scope for discretion reduced by regulation, while technical and scientific developments in terms of portfolio management and risk assessment have changed the working practices of those in the pension industry. These tensions between consumers, providers and legislators may generate further dissatisfaction with the balance of rights and responsibilities being hotly contested.


Author(s):  
Giorgio Consigli ◽  
Vittorio Moriggia ◽  
Elena Benincasa ◽  
Giacomo Landoni ◽  
Filomena Petronio ◽  
...  

Omega ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 127-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vittorio Moriggia ◽  
Miloš Kopa ◽  
Sebastiano Vitali

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEORGE PENNACCHI ◽  
MAHDI RASTAD

AbstractThis paper presents a model of a public pension fund's choice of portfolio risk. Optimal portfolio allocations are derived when pension fund management maximize the utility of wealth of a representative taxpayer or when pension fund management maximize their own utility of compensation. The model's implications are examined using annual data on the portfolio allocations and plan characteristics of 125 state pension funds over the 2000–2009 period. Consistent with agency behavior by public pension fund management, we find evidence that funds chose greater overall asset – liability portfolio risk following periods of relatively poor investment performance. In addition, pension plans that select a relatively high rate with which to discount their liabilities tend to choose riskier portfolios. Moreover, consistent with a desire to gamble for higher benefits, pension plans take more risk when they have greater representation by plan participants on their Boards of Trustees.


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