Are Humean Beliefs Pyrrhonian Appearances? Hume's Critique of Pyrrhonism Revisited
2012 ◽
Vol 10
(2)
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pp. 183-198
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The aim of the paper is to reassess Hume's handling of scepticism in its Pyrrhonian form. I argue that, contrary to what Hume declares, his own philosophy comes close to what Sextus Empiricus sets out as the essential moments of the Pyrrhonian [Formula: see text], at least in one crucial respect: I contend that Hume's conception of belief is in line with precisely the type of doxastic state which Sextus ascribes to the Pyrrhonian sceptic as appropriate for ‘following appearances’. Then I show that if such an affinity is established, Hume's attack against Pyrrhonism, launched in Enquiry XII, Part 2, is rendered toothless.
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2012 ◽
Vol 156
(3)
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pp. 1285-1301
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2019 ◽
Vol 29
(1)
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pp. 189-202
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2017 ◽
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2019 ◽
2011 ◽
pp. 113-141
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