Neo-Pyrrhonism, Empiricism, and Scientific Activity

Pyrrhonism involves the inability to defend claims about the unobservable world, or, more generally, about what is really going on beyond the phenomena (SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 1994). As a result, the Pyrrhonist is not engaged in developing a philosophical doctrine, at least in the sense of defending a view about the underlying features of reality. The issue then arises as to whether the Pyrrhonist also has something positive to say about our knowledge of the world, while still keeping Pyrrhonism. In this paper, I develop a positive neo-Pyrrhonist attitude, indicating that we can use this attitude to make sense of important aspects of science and empirical knowledge. To do that, I explore the connection between this revived form of Pyrrhonism and contemporary versions of empiricism, in particular constructive empiricism (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980, 1989, 2002, 2008). Although constructive empiricism is not a form of skepticism, there are important elements in common between constructive empiricism and Pyrrhonism. The resulting form of Pyrrhonism suggests that there is something right about the original stance articulated by Sextus Empiricus, and that suitably formulated it provides an insightful approach to think about empirical knowledge (PORCHAT PEREIRA, 2006, for the original inspiration behind neoPyrrhonism).

Can the Skeptic Search for Truth?

Sextus Empiricus associates the Pyrrhonian stance with the activity of inquiry or investigation. In this paper, I propose to examine the skeptic’s involvement in that activity because getting an accurate understanding of the nature and purpose of skeptical inquiry will make it possible to delineate some of the distinctive traits of Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy. I defend the minority view among specialists according to which (i) Sextus describes both the prospective Pyrrhonist and the full-fledged Pyrrhonist as inquirers into truth, and (ii) the full-fledged Pyrrhonist can, without inconsistency, engage in truth-directed inquiry.

Pyrrho and Pyrrhonism

The chapter argues that Pyrrho and ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism (specifically, Sextus Empiricus) are plausibly interpreted as accepting a self-cultivation philosophy, though in somewhat different senses and with some qualification. For both, the existential starting point is an emotionally troubled life rooted in beliefs about the world, and the ideal state of being is a life of tranquility without these beliefs and guided by appearances. It is difficult to say what spiritual exercises Pyrrho thought were needed to achieve the ideal state: perhaps learning his philosophy and habituating ourselves to follow it. However, for Sextus, employment of skeptical arguments was the primary exercise. Since neither Pyrrho nor Sextus supposed we could make assertions about the specific nature of things, neither had a philosophy of human nature in a straightforward sense. Nonetheless, presentations of their outlooks betray some perspective on this (e.g., about the relationship between absence of belief and tranquility).

Pyrrhonism and the Value of Law

The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian (as she/he is described by Sextus Empiricus) considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First (1), we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But (2) Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes (Pyr.) 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians (Math.) 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. (3) The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy.

Horoscopes of the Moon: Weather Prediction as Astrology in Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos

Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos is not usually considered as a meteorological text. I examine the sections of the Tetrabiblos that deal with weather prediction and argue that Ptolemy considers it part of astrology. I show that the way Ptolemy categorises weather prediction differs significantly from other Greco-Roman writers, including Cicero (On Divination) and Sextus Empiricus (Against the Astrologers). I argue for these conclusions: first, that Ptolemy considers weather prediction to be part of astrology – i.e., a scientific practice which includes giving an account of the causes of phenomena with reference to the stars; to give such an account for the weather requires a practitioner to go beyond the observation and cataloguing of weather signs. Secondly, I argue that understanding weather prediction as astrology means that the distinction between horoscopic and general astrology is more fluid than is sometimes thought. Finally, I will show that Ptolemy’s views on weather prediction provide a case study for his view of astral causation.