Christopher A. Shrock, Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 286-292
Author(s):  
Hannes Ole Matthiessen
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Secondary Qualities

Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Secondary Qualities

Thomas Reid, the father of Common Sense, champions Direct Realism against the Problem of Secondary Qualities. Direct Realism holds immediate objects of perception, like rocks and desks, to be objective and physical. But the Problem of Secondary Qualities argues that some perceptual properties—colours, smells, sounds, tastes, and heat—must be subjective or mental, because science offers no place to them in the physical world. This new reading of Thomas Reid on primary and secondary qualities shows how Reid supports Direct Realism, answers the Problem of Secondary Qualities, and maintains a healthy optimism about science and reason.

Review of Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities by Andrew Shrock

Locke Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Alastair Crosby
Keyword(s):  
Recent Book ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Secondary Qualities

A review of Andrew Shrock’s recent book, Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2018).

Locke and the “Ancient Hypothesis”

1975 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-48
Author(s):  
David Palmer
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The Mind

John Locke sometimes claims in An Essay Concerning the Human Understanding that secondary qualities are qualities of bodies and not simply ideas. Few commentators, however, have taken that claim seriously. This is at least partly because Locke also claims that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the secondary qualities of bodies and the commentators have taken these two doctrines to be irreconcilable. In this paper I shall briefly present the traditional reasons for thinking the two doctrines incompatible, and then present Locke's neglected attempt to reconcile these two claims.Thomas Reid in his Philosophical Works tries to explain the traditional interpretation of Locke's claims about the nature of secondary qualities. In doing so he cites an “ancient hypothesis“:… the mind, like a mirror receives the images of things from without, by means of the senses; so that their use must be to convey the images into the mind.

Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities

1978 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 207-218
Author(s):  
Arthur R. Greenberg
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
New Science ◽  
Secondary Quality ◽  
Cognitive Operations ◽  
Quality Distinction

In recent years renewed interest in Thomas Reid's philosophy has led to fruitful discussion of Reid's theories of sensation and perception. Although certain aspects of these topics can be discussed without setting out Reid's version of the primary-secondary quality distinction, the ultimate evaluation of Reid's work on both sensation and perception requires discussion of his views on primary and secondary qualities. Current Reid literature virtually ignores this important topic. This paper is an attempt to remedy this situation. In addition to setting out Reid's position on primary and secondary qualities I will discuss Reid's curious relation to the New Science of his day and will explain how Reid thought he could reintroduce the primary-secondary quality distinction despite Berkeley's attacks on the doctrine.In both of his major works, An Inquiry Into The Human Mind (1764), and Essays On The Intellectual Powers Of Man (1785), Thomas Reid was intent upon examining the philosophical problems of human knowledge. In the Inquiry perception received his exclusive attention. In the Essays other cognitive operations were examined as well. The impetus for these investigations was provided by Reid's negative assessment of the achievements of his philosophical predecessors.

Thomas Reid on the Improvement of Knowledge

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock
Keyword(s):  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Social Progress ◽  
Francis Bacon ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Traditional Religion ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Isaac Newton ◽  
Religion And Ethics ◽  
Compare And Contrast

Thomas Reid often seems distant from other Scottish Enlightenment figures. While Hume, Hutcheson, Kames, and Smith wrestled with the nature of social progress, Reid was busy with natural philosophy and epistemology, stubbornly loyal to traditional religion and ethics, and out of touch with the heart of his own intellectual world. Or was he? I contend that Reid not only engaged the Scottish Enlightenment's concern for improvement, but, as a leading interpreter of Isaac Newton and Francis Bacon, he also developed a scheme to explain the progress of human knowledge. Pulling thoughts from across Reid's corpus, I identify four key features that Reid uses to distinguish mature sciences from prescientific arts and inquiries. Then, I compare and contrast this scheme with that of Thomas Kuhn in order to highlight the plausibility and originality of Reid's work.

The Legacy of Reid's Common Sense in Analytic Epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Mark Boespflug
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
The Common

The common sense that heavily informs the epistemology of Thomas Reid has been recently hailed as instructive with regard to some of the most fundamental issues in epistemology by a burgeoning segment of analytic epistemologists. These admirers of Reid may be called dogmatists. I highlight three ways in which Reid's approach has been a model to be imitated in the estimation of dogmatists. First, common sense propositions are taken to be the benchmarks of epistemology inasmuch as they constitute paradigm cases of knowledge. Second, dogmatists follow Reid in taking common sense propositions to provide boundaries for philosophical theorizing. Inasmuch as philosophical theorizing leads one to deny a common sense proposition, such theorizing is stepping outside of the bounds of what it can or should do. Third, dogmatists follow Reid in focusing heavily on the problem of skepticism and by responding to it by refusing to answer the demand for a meta-justification that the skeptic wants.

Thomas Reid on Causation and Scientific Explanation

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Barrantes ◽  
Juan M. Durán
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
The Common

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the (common sense) idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's ( Cobb 2010 ) and Benbaji's ( Benbaji 2003 ) interpretations of Reid's views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation.

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