scholarly journals Economic Peace Revisited: Coercion and Democracy

Author(s):  
Dawid Walentek

Scholars have argued whether democratic peace also holds in the realm of economic sanctions — whether there is an economic peace. Substantial amounts of evidence have been gathered both for and against economic peace and findings have been extremely sensitive to changes in research design. This article provides a new insight, with the use of the updated TIES data set and improved methodology, into the topic of economic peace. It find that democracies are more likely to issue economic sanctions and that there is no economic peace. In fact, democracies are more likely to sanction one another. The article indicate that lack of economic peace is consistent with the public choice approach to economic sanctions. It also argue that the exercise of power among democracies has been rechannelled to economic coercion.

2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert B. Siegel

One of the more recent “hot button” issues in our field is that of outsourcing all or some human resource (HR) functions whether by fee for service or contract. Advocates from the field of Public Choice Economics assume and, in many cases, economically substantiate the case for privatization of governmental functions.1 Even though these economists demonstrate an underlying anti-government bias, their basic argument with supply of government services is “that agencies should compete to provide citizens with goods and services instead of acting like monopolies under the influence of organized pressure groups.”2 Responsiveness to the needs of individual citizens (or to governmental units to be served by staff agencies, for that matter) is best obtained by competing within markets, with the result of economic choices by clientele between competing services. From this market environment economies in resource allocation and efficiency and effectiveness in operations are said to result. Public Choice Economists would also include simulation of market forces by introducing competition, possibly within the same department, governmental jurisdiction, or between other public, profit or nonprofit providers.3 This essay departs from an article by Robert J. Agresta.4 He argues for an extension of the Public Choice approach from one of “citizen-customers being empowered to select freely among providers of a service—whether it is schools or health care (with vouchers) or groceries (with food stamps)—and have control over the resources needed to acquire the service…”,5 to the same market relationship between central administrative (staff or auxiliary staff) agencies and the line units to which they provide services. While Agresta writes of building choice into any line-staff relationships, this article is concerned with HR service supply alternatives and alternative modes for their delivery.


Author(s):  
Mario Ferrero

In the last twenty years, Christian history has attracted the effort of a number of economists, challenged by the fact that the mainline churches are among the longest-lasting institutions in world history. This chapter covers the subset of that research that, while part of the broader field of the economics of religion, more nearly falls within the public-choice approach, dividing it into main topics: doctrine and theology, Catholic saint-making, the working of the papacy as an institution, religious orders, and church leadership and governance. It is shown that the essential analytical tools of this research have been the classic public-choice models of collective decision-making, bureaucracy, dictatorship, rent-seeking, and clubs. The conclusion reviews neglected topics and modeling approaches that show potential for further progress.


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