At the Margins of the Global Market

Contemporary scholars debate the factors driving despotic labour conditions across the world economy. Some emphasize the dominance of global market imperatives and others highlight the market's reliance upon extra-economic coercion and state violence. At the Margins of the Global Market engages in this debate through a comparative and world-historical analysis of the labour regimes of three global commodity-producing subregions of rural Colombia: the coffee region of Viejo Caldas, the banana region of Urabá, and the coca/cocaine region of the Caguán. By drawing upon insights from labour regimes, global commodity chains, and world historical sociology, this book offers a novel understanding of the broad range of factors - local, national, global, and interregional - that shape labour conditions on the ground in Colombia. In doing so, it offers a critical new framework for analysing labour and development dynamics that exist at the margins of the global market.

THE USE OF CHILD'S AND WOMEN'S LABOR AS A SOURCE OF REPLENISHMENT OF LABOR IN THE MINING PLANTS OF THE URALS AT AN EARLY STAGE OF THE GENESIS OF CAPITALISM

The article deals with the issue of the use of children and women there, their number in metallurgical plants, mines and gold mines of the Urals at an early stage of the emergence of capitalism. The methods of both economic and non-economic coercion of young children and women are investigated. The study examines working conditions, working hours, wages, food, housing conditions, and the state of medical care.

EU will support Vilnius in its row with Beijing

Headline LITHUANIA/CHINA: Economic coercion

Hard and Invisible Bricks in the Wall: An Empirical Investigation on Gender, Caste, and Health Among Migrant Brick Workers in South India

The current cross-sectional study is on the pathetic and excruciating conditions of employees in the brick industry conducted using a mixed-method approach in selected kilns from the four Districts of Karnataka State, South India. India is the country producing the highest number of bricks after China. Economic coercion is pushing the massive poor, especially the women labourers to engage in hard physical labour to survive. This study has explored that labourers in the brick industry are being exploited and excluded in voluminous ways. Caste plays a predominant role while hiring, wage fixation, and assigning the job at kilns. Women labour is being devalued in the name of the traditional and irrational social construction of gender. Sexual exploitations, low payment, restless work, harassment, absence of labour laws, are common here. It is found that rigid intergenerational occupational mobility into unorganised sectors among lower-caste people, as well as intra/intra-community social networks, among brick workers, are being called into question. We conclude that this is the time to think about the ‘National Register of Interstate Migrants’ and ‘National Mission to the Brick Industry’ in the context of the post-economic situation of COVID-19.

Reputation or Interaction: What Drives Cooperation on Economic Sanctions?

This article studies cooperation on multilateral economic sanctions. Despite low effectiveness and sanction-busting, multilateral economic sanctions are a popular tool of foreign policy. We explore an instrumental approach to sanctions and develop a game theory framework where sender states face a collective action problem when coordinating multilateral coercion. We indicate that cooperation can be achieved through repeated interactions and reputation. We test empirically the two mechanisms with the TIES data on economic sanctions and adherence to past sanction regimes and the Correlates of War data on membership in International Organisations. Our results indicate that reputation is a strong predictor of cooperation on multilateral economic coercion. The effect of repeated interaction appears conditional on reputation; states with poor reputation mediate its effect through repeated interaction.

Economic Peace Revisited: Coercion and Democracy

Scholars have argued whether democratic peace also holds in the realm of economic sanctions — whether there is an economic peace. Substantial amounts of evidence have been gathered both for and against economic peace and findings have been extremely sensitive to changes in research design. This article provides a new insight, with the use of the updated TIES data set and improved methodology, into the topic of economic peace. It find that democracies are more likely to issue economic sanctions and that there is no economic peace. In fact, democracies are more likely to sanction one another. The article indicate that lack of economic peace is consistent with the public choice approach to economic sanctions. It also argue that the exercise of power among democracies has been rechannelled to economic coercion.

US trade policy extends Trump's themes but adds nuance

Significance Biden's campaign promise of 'trade policy for the middle-class' remains far from fully formed. There is as much continuity with the course of his predecessor as there is divergence, although the tone and execution are different. Impacts The White House let its Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) from Congress lapse on July 1 and shows no intent to renew it. The expiry of the TPA puts a US-UK trade deal on indefinite hold. 'Unionised worker-centric trade policy' would be the best interpretation of Biden's 'trade policy for the middle class'. The myth that 'globalisation destroys US jobs' will continue to resonate as loudly with many Democrats as it does with Trump Republicans. Using trade as a means of economic coercion for political ends may be expanded to advance climate and environmental goals.

Roadmap for the Development of Competition in Science and Higher Education as a Tool to Eliminate Barriers to the Growth of Competitiveness of Russian Science on Global Markets

The issues of the negative impact of monopolization of global intellectual property markets on the practice of competition between Russian scientific and educational organizations and the competitiveness of Russian science and education are considered. The problem of “office slavery” of Russian scientists and its negative impact on budgetary financing of science are formulated. To eliminate these barriers, it was proposed to adopt in the form of an act of the Government of Russia a Roadmap for the development of competition in science and education, the draft of which was prepared with the participation of the author by a working group of the FAS Russia and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Roadmap proposes to abandon the practice of economic coercion of Russian scientists to publish the first scientific results obtained primarily in foreign journals, indexed, first, in the WoS. At the same time, it was proposed to create based on Scientific Electronic Library eLIBRARY.RU (based on an agreement or reorganization) an open international abstract database of scientific data with the allocation of national segments of the participating states. The conditions for the formation, financing, operation and use of the resources of this base are proposed to be determined by an open intergovernmental agreement of the Russian Federation. To overcome the negative impact of the monopolization of global markets for scientific results by a narrow circle of commercial organizations, the author proposes to adopt the Declaration, and then the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Scientific Results (Science Convention).

Migration and Economic Coercion

Sender costs of economic sanctions exacerbate the enforcement problem associated with multilateral coercive measures. When third-country sanctioners share strategic interests with the target state, they have commercial and diplomatic incentives to defect from multilateral sanctions arrangements. In addition to these well-documented sender costs, this article argues that migration pressure from the target state has become an important consideration for potential sanctioners. Economic sanctions often increase the economic distress on the target country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Countries hosting a large number of nationals from the target country face a disproportionately high level of migration pressure when sanctions increase emigration from the target country. Therefore, policymakers of these countries oppose economic sanctions on the target country as an attempt to preempt further migration. Analyzing the sanctions bills in the European Parliament from 2011 to 2015, we find empirical support for our prediction.