scholarly journals A New, Better BET: Rescuing and Revising Basic Emotion Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel D. Hutto ◽  
Ian Robertson ◽  
Michael D. Kirchhoff
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Martin

The goal of this study was to determine if emotional expressions at the end of swimmers’ 2016 Paralympic races varied according to medal won and if their race wins and losses were close or not close. Using FaceReader software, videos of 46 races of medal-winning Paralympic (M age = 24.6; SD = 5.4) swimmers’ faces (78 males and 60 females) from 22 countries were analyzed. Silver medalists were angrier and sadder than gold medalists and angrier and more disgusted than bronze medalists. Swimmers who swam slower than their 2015 best time were angrier than Paralympians who swam faster. Paralympians who finished lower than their 2015 world ranking had more neutral emotions and were less happy than Paralympians who finished higher. Gold medalists who narrowly defeated silver medalists were less happy and more fearful than gold medalists who won easily. Bronze medalists with close wins had fewer neutral emotions and were happier, less angry, and more surprised than bronze medalists with not-close wins. All medalists with close wins were more surprised than medalists with easier wins. Bronze medalists with close losses to silver medalists were happier and less angry than bronze medalists who lost more easily. Effect sizes ranged from d = 0.27 to 1.01. These results provide theoretical support to basic emotion theory and confirm the anecdotal observations that Paralympic competition generates wide-ranging and diverse emotions.


Author(s):  
Alan J. Fridlund

This chapter documents the twin origins of the behavioral ecology view (BECV) of human facial expressions, in (1) the empirical weakness and internal contradictions of the accounts proposed by basic emotion theory (BET) and particularly the neurocultural theory of Paul Ekman et al., and (2) newer understandings about the evolution of animal signaling and communication. BET conceives of our facial expressions as quasi-reflexes which are triggered by universal, modular emotion programs but require management in each culture lest they emerge unthrottled. Unlike BET, BECV regards our facial expressions as contingent signals of intent toward interactants within specific contexts of interaction, even when we are alone and our interactants are ourselves, objects, or implicit others. BECV’s functionalist, externalist view does not deny “emotion,” however it is defined, but does not require it to explain human facial displays.


2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 363-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Russell ◽  
Erika L. Rosenberg ◽  
Marc D. Lewis

Author(s):  
Dacher Keltner ◽  
Daniel T. Cordaro

In this chapter we review recent advances in basic emotion theory, which holds that humans have evolved a limited set of emotional expressions that serve important communicative functions within social interactions. Our review highlights recent evidence showing that a much wider array of emotions than previously thought—up to 15—have distinct displays that are recognized across different cultures. The new science of expression reveals that new modalities—tactile communication and vocalization—likewise signal a variety of emotions. Our review also brings into focus how emotions may be signaled in specific modalities, and likely sources of cultural accents in emotional expression.


2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dacher Keltner ◽  
Disa Sauter ◽  
Jessica Tracy ◽  
Alan Cowen

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dacher Keltner ◽  
Jessica L. Tracy ◽  
Disa Sauter ◽  
Alan Cowen

Author(s):  
Kristján Kristjánsson

Aristotelian virtue ethics has gained momentum within latter-day moral theorizing. Many people are drawn towards virtue ethics because of the central place it gives to emotions in the good life; after all, Aristotle says that emotions can have an intermediate and best condition proper to virtue. Yet nowhere does Aristotle provide a definitive list of virtuous emotions. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle does analyse a number of emotions. However, many emotions that one would have expected to see there fail to get a mention, and others are written off rather hastily as morally defective. Whereas most of what goes by the name of ‘Aristotelian’ virtue ethics nowadays is heavily reconstructed and updated Aristotelianism, such exercises in retrieval have not been systematically attempted with respect to his emotion theory. The aim of this book is to offer a revised ‘Aristotelian’ analysis and moral justification of a number of emotions that Aristotle either did not mention (such as awe, grief, and jealousy), relegated, at best, to the level of the semi-virtuous (such as shame), made disparaging remarks about (such as gratitude) or rejected explicitly (such as pity, understood as pain at another person’s deserved bad fortune). It is argued that there are good ‘Aristotelian’ reasons for understanding those emotions either as virtuous or as indirectly conducive to virtue. The book begins with an overview of Aristotle’s ideas on the nature of emotions and of emotional value, and it ends with an account of Aristotelian emotion education.


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