The Good Samaritan or Non-Directed Donor

From the outset of kidney transplantation, some living donors were “Good Samaritan” donors—that is, individuals who donated a kidney without a specific recipient in mind. However, non-genetically related donors fell out of favor quickly because the results were no better than deceased donor grafts. As immunosuppression improved and graft outcomes from non-biologically related donors improved, attitudes changed (with greater and earlier support from the public than from transplant professionals and with greater support for spouses then friends then acquaintances, and then strangers). This chapter examines ethical controversies raised by Good Samaritan donors using a living donor ethics framework. It examines the moral justification for permitting living donation by strangers, the ethics of the donor and recipient selection and allocation processes, and whether Good Samaritan donors should be encouraged to catalyze a domino multi-donor-recipient pair chain rather than donate to a single candidate on the waitlist.

“If not Mine, She Won't Belong to Another”: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in a Femicide Perpetrator from Brazil

Case files can show how aggressors use different explanations to reduce the seriousness of their crime. We aimed to identify and categorize a 2016 Brazilian case file from a perpetrator of femicide, based on moral disengagement theory. Content analysis yielded 47 verbalized excerpts, with 70 disengagement occurrences. The most frequently used mechanisms throughout the aggressor's speeches consisted of moral justification and blaming the victim herself. Results indicated that he reduced the seriousness of the femicide and sought reduction of the consequences. We discuss how speeches in criminal cases can serve as a secondary source for producing data on violence.

Post-Modern Cosmopolitanism & Discourse Ethics

<p>This paper sets out an approach – post-modern cosmopolitanism – that seeks to allow moral conversation and moral justification between groups and individuals who do not share any substantive values. It does this without denying the plurality of value systems (universalism) and without allowing groups to retreat behind inviolable walls of ethical self-containment (relativism). The approach relies on many aspects of Jurgen Habermas’s discourse ethics, but it takes discourse ethics in a new direction, leading to a unique approach. I start the paper by showing the problems with the current dominant alternatives – universalism and relativism – both in terms of their lack of internal consistency and in terms of their inability to mitigate and resolve conflict in practice. I then introduce some of the important concepts that form the basis of the post-modern cosmopolitan approach: discourse ethics, communicative reason, the principles of discourse, and the idea of fundamental goals. Following this I discuss the nature of ‘reasons,’ in order to make sense of the claim of discourse ethics that we should engage with each other via an ‘exchange of reasons,’ and also to outline some of the key distinctions necessary for understanding the praxis of post-modern cosmopolitanism, the ‘cosmopolitan conversation’. Finally I examine some of the deficiencies in Habermas’s discourse ethics, and show how post-modern cosmopolitanism can overcome them. I conclude by outlining the nature of the ‘cosmopolitan conversation,’ and gesture at how we might begin to apply post-modern cosmopolitanism in real-world situations.</p>

Post-Modern Cosmopolitanism & Discourse Ethics

<p>This paper sets out an approach – post-modern cosmopolitanism – that seeks to allow moral conversation and moral justification between groups and individuals who do not share any substantive values. It does this without denying the plurality of value systems (universalism) and without allowing groups to retreat behind inviolable walls of ethical self-containment (relativism). The approach relies on many aspects of Jurgen Habermas’s discourse ethics, but it takes discourse ethics in a new direction, leading to a unique approach. I start the paper by showing the problems with the current dominant alternatives – universalism and relativism – both in terms of their lack of internal consistency and in terms of their inability to mitigate and resolve conflict in practice. I then introduce some of the important concepts that form the basis of the post-modern cosmopolitan approach: discourse ethics, communicative reason, the principles of discourse, and the idea of fundamental goals. Following this I discuss the nature of ‘reasons,’ in order to make sense of the claim of discourse ethics that we should engage with each other via an ‘exchange of reasons,’ and also to outline some of the key distinctions necessary for understanding the praxis of post-modern cosmopolitanism, the ‘cosmopolitan conversation’. Finally I examine some of the deficiencies in Habermas’s discourse ethics, and show how post-modern cosmopolitanism can overcome them. I conclude by outlining the nature of the ‘cosmopolitan conversation,’ and gesture at how we might begin to apply post-modern cosmopolitanism in real-world situations.</p>

The Open Society and Its Complexities

Two decades ago it was widely assumed that liberal democracy and the Open Society had won their century-long struggle against authoritarianism. Although subsequent events have shocked many, F. A. Hayek would not have been surprised that people are in many ways disoriented by the society they have created. For him, the Open Society was a precarious achievement, in many ways at odds with the deepest moral sentiments. He argued that the Open Society runs against humans’ evolved attraction to “tribalism”; that the Open Society is too complex for moral justification; and that its self-organized complexity defies attempts at democratic governance. In this wide-ranging work, Gerald Gaus re-examines Hayek’s analyses. Drawing on work in social and moral science, Gaus argues that Hayek’s program was prescient and sophisticated, always identifying real and pressing problems, though he underestimated the resources of human morality and the Open Society to cope with the challenges he perceived. Gaus marshals formal models and empirical evidence to show that the Open Society is grounded on the moral foundations of human cooperation originating in the distant evolutionary past, but has built upon them a complex and diverse society that requires rethinking both the nature of moral justification and the meaning of democratic self-governance. In these fearful, angry, and inward-looking times, when political philosophy has itself become a hostile exchange between ideological camps, The Open Society and Its Complexities shows how moral and ideological diversity, far from being the enemy of a free and open society, can be its foundation.

Diversity and Self-Organized Complexity

Part II of the volume takes up Hayek’s second unsettling thesis: that the Open Society is too complex for the practice of moral justification. To begin to analyze this unsettling thesis, it first considers the nature of the Open Society, and why it is characterized by extreme diversity and complexity. Thus the first section of this essay seeks to distinguish Millian and other liberalisms from the far more deeply diverse Open Society. It then argues that the Open Society is characterized by a process of autocatalytic diversity, which leads to ever-increasing complexity. This second essay concludes with an account of how the constitutive moral rules of the Open Society can be justified. It endorses Hayek’s criticism of social contract theory, proposing in its stead a self-organization model of moral justification.

The Complexities of Self-Governance

The first two Parts of this work have responded to two of Hayek’s unsettling claims concerning morality: that, given our moral evolution, we may be unfit for the Open Society; and that the Open Society is so complex as to befuddle attempts at moral justification. Each of these turned out to indeed be pressing problems, yet in both cases the resources of humans in a complex society are richer than Hayek thought. Part III turns to Hayek’s last unsettling thesis, and that which has been the focus of greatest criticism: that our complex Open Society is in many ways beyond human control and governance. This Part considers the dimensions of self-governance (control, setting the institutional framework, and solving strategic dilemmas), and considers the challenges posed by social complexity at the macro, meso, and micro levels.

Moral Justifications for Negative Screen Tourist Behaviour

<p><b>Screen tourism has become increasingly more popular over the last two decades, and while it has positive benefits for stakeholders and destinations, screen tourists engaging in negative tourist behaviour has become a problem at popular screen tourism destinations. However, little is known about how screen tourists justify engaging in this negative behaviour. Bandura’s Moral Disengagement theory has been used in various non-tourism and tourism contexts to examine and explain how individuals justify negative behaviours. This thesis applies Moral Disengagement theory to negative tourist behaviour in a screen tourism context, aiming to examine screen tourists’ use of moral disengagement mechanisms to justify negative on-site tourist behaviour. It further draws on previous research and literature on fandom and level of leisure involvement to provide a better understanding of how these factors might influence screen tourists’ moral justification of negative behaviour. Data was collected using a self-administered online survey, distributed to individuals who self-identified as members of either the Breaking Bad or Game of Thrones fandoms, and received 243 eligible responses. The survey measured level of fandom involvement, participants’ use of moral disengagement mechanisms in three hypothetical scenarios presenting negative screen tourism related behaviours, and responses to Bandura’s Moral Disengagement scale. </b></p> <p>Findings from this research suggest that some screen tourists morally justify engaging in negative behaviour in some contexts. This aligns with findings from previous research on moral disengagement and tourism. Furthermore, this research finds that mechanisms that are centred on disregarding/distorting the perceived harm on the victim were most frequently used. Lastly, groups were found to differ in their use of moral justification mechanisms, indicating that fandom identification, the moral alignment of the fandom object, and level of involvement influence individuals’ use of moral justification. It is also argued that (screen) tourism and fandom communities both have characteristics that facilitate moral disengagement. This knowledge can support screen tourism stakeholders in screen tourism development, and in mitigation of negative behaviours.</p>