Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine whether corporate insiders extract information from activity of outsiders, specifically the short sellers.
Design/methodology/approach
Using portfolio approach and Fama-MacBeth regressions, this study examines the relation between short interest and subsequent insider trading activities.
Findings
The following results are reported. First, there is a strong inverse relation between short selling and subsequent insider trading, which is partially due to common private information and same target firm characteristics. Second, insiders extract information from shorts. This information extraction effect is more pronounced for firms whose insiders have stronger incentives to extract shorts information (insider purchases, higher short sale constraints, and better information environments). Third, during the September 2008 shorting ban, the information extraction affect disappeared among the large banned firms, whose shorting activities were distorted.
Research limitations/implications
The findings contradict the of-cited accusations corporate executives hold against short sellers. Instead, corporate insiders appear to trade in the same direction as suggested by shorting activities.
Practical implications
Among the vocal critics of short sellers are corporate insiders, who allege that short sellers beat down their stock prices. Many corporations even engage in stock repurchases to show confidence that the stock will perform well going forward despite the short sellers’ actions. This paper’s analysis on their personal portfolios suggests the other way around.
Originality/value
By focusing on how corporate insider trading is related to shorts information, this paper sheds new light on whether corporate decisions convey the true information the corporate insiders possess.
