Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) and Financial Distressed Risk (FDR): Does Institutional Ownership Matter?

This study aims to investigate the effect of corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) on financial distressed risk (FDR) among firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). This paper also examines whether there is a negative linkage between institutional ownership as a corporate governance mechanism and corporate bankruptcy. The final research purpose is to analyze if there is a moderating effect of institutional owners on the relationship between CSRD and FDR too. The study sample consists of 200 firms listed on the TSE between 2013 and 2018, and the statistical model is logistic regression. When FDR is assessed under both Article 141 of Iran’s business law and the Altman Z-score model, our results on the main research hypotheses are quite similar. Considering the social and cultural conditions and economic situation of the Iranian market, the results show that firms with a high level of CSR disclosure are not able to make themselves more creditworthy and do not have better access to financing, resulting in more financial insolvency. Our findings confirm institutional shareholders play a vital role in facilitating a firm’s emergence from bankruptcy. The results also demonstrate financial distress risk is less seen among companies with more institutional owners that disclose more CSR information. In other words, since the goals related to CSR are long-term and Iranian institutional investors have a long-term horizon towards the company, the presence of more institutional owners within a firm push managers to provide additional voluntary CSR disclosure so firms can maintain the trust of their shareholders at the highest possible level and prevent financial distress. Our additional analysis indicates there is a positive association between financial leverage and firm failure, whereas the current ratio and ROA are negatively connected with corporate bankruptcy. Finally, when FDR is assessed on the Altman Z-score model, our evidence supports a negative relation between purchase and sale-related party transactions and bankruptcy risk, which is consistent with the efficient transaction hypothesis.

Does corporate governance compliance condition information asymmetries? Moderating role of voluntary disclosures

PurposeThis study examines the moderating effects of low and high levels of voluntary disclosures (VDs) between corporate governance and information asymmetry (IA).Design/methodology/approachThe study used PROCESS macro to construct bootstrap confidence intervals at the 95% level to estimate the model, and “simple slope analysis” to visualize the model.FindingsThe better corporate governance provides a monitoring mechanism that disseminates private information and reduces IA The effect of corporate governance on IA is contingent on the levels of VDs within a firm, and this relationship is strengthened when the level of VDs within a firm is high, and results remain consistent when levels of sub-indices are high. Additional analysis reveals that effective boards and audit committees reduce IA. Increased inside, an associated company, family and foreign ownership exacerbate IA, whereas institutional owners act as effective monitors to overcome informational disadvantages.Practical implicationsThe findings provide implications for policymakers to promote corporate governance and more relevant reporting practices as effective mechanisms for protecting shareholders' rights and attenuating IA in capital markets.Originality/valueThe study is valuable to understand the strength of the relationship between corporate governance and information asymmetries based on the moderating role of different VD levels.

The impact of institutional ownership on the value relevance of accounting information: evidence from Egypt

Purpose This paper aims to examine the value relevance (VR) of accounting information (AI) presented by Egyptian listed non-financial companies. Further, the study investigates the influence of institutional ownership on the value relevance of AI in a developing market, namely, the Egyptian market. Design/methodology/approach The study uses data from 2014 to 2017 with a total of 248 observations and analyses the data using regression analysis. Data are collected from the nonfinancial companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Findings The authors found that the AI reported by the Egyptian listed non-financial companies is value relevant. Regarding the influence of institutional ownership, it is found to significantly impact the VR of AI reported by the sample companies. This model investigated the effect of corporate size and financial leverage as controlling variables and found that they have an insignificant influence on the VR of AI. Originality/value The current study findings enrich the literature by enhancing the understanding regarding institutional owners’ impact on corporate value. Further, bringing evidence from an emerging market can have implications for accounting researchers interested in addressing other emerging markets with similar contextual and institutional environments.

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Tweets: Do Shareholders Care?

We study how messages on Twitter by large non-governmental organizations (NGOs), targeting companies from the S&P500, affect these companies’ stock prices. With a sample of 1,611 tweets between 2009 and 2017 by 18 large NGOs, we observe significant changes in the stock prices of the targeted firms. More specifically, NGO tweets stating a positive message about the environmental, social, or governance (ESG). Actions of the firm have a positive effect on stock prices, while negative tweets have a negative effect. Nevertheless, we find that the presence of institutional owners hampers this effect: firms with high institutional ownership value positive tweets more negatively, and negative tweets more positively. These results support the idea that shareholders react significantly to NGO tweets but they react differently depending on their time horizon: for shareholders who have a more short-term horizon, typically institutional owners, the reaction diverges societal expectations about how firms should contribute to society.

Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Performance in Emerging Economies Multinationals: Evidence from India

This study fills the gap in the literature by considering the heterogeneous impact of institutional ownership on various dimensions of corporate social performance (CSP). Using the behavioural risk agency perspective, we argue that the risk behaviour of various institutional owners is not the same towards the CSP. We have taken a balanced panel sample of 61 Indian multinational firms for the span of 2013–2018 to test the proposed hypotheses. Results show a negative association of pressure-sensitive institutional investors’ ownership with social and governance dimensions of CSP. Mutual funds ownership is positively associated with the social and governance dimensions of CSP. Foreign institutional investors ownership has no significant impact on CSP. We found that the environmental dimension of CSP is ignored by institutional owners. The moderating effect of firm internationalisation on the relationship between institutional ownership and CSP is also examined.

OWNERSHIP, COMPENSATION AND BOARD DIVERSITY AS INNOVATION DRIVERS: A COMPARISON OF U.S. AND CANADIAN FIRMS

Using a large sample of North American firms, from 1999 to 2016, we investigate the effect of corporate governance structures, specifically ownership, board characteristics, and executive compensation contracts on innovation intensity and output. We consider both R[Formula: see text]D expenditures and patents as innovation proxies and evaluate consequences of the economic downturns of 2000 and 2008. We find that R[Formula: see text]D investment increases with ownership by institutional blockholders and with the number of institutional owners, confirming the key role institutions play in innovation activities of firms. We observe higher R[Formula: see text]D levels for firms with more independent boards, more females board members and more outside directorships held by directors. We report that firms with CEO/chair of the board duality have lower R[Formula: see text]D intensity, as do firms with higher ownership by directors and with a higher mean board age. Innovation is negatively related to CEO salary levels, but positively related to the ratio of incentives to total compensation, confirming that incentives contribute to aligning shareholders and management interests, which leads to better long-term decisions. However, those incentives reduce the number of patents. We do not find any systematic changes in R[Formula: see text]D for the 2000 recession, however there is an increase for the 2008 financial crisis.

Family Versus Institutional Involvement in Restructuring: Evidence From the Communications Equipment Industry

The prospect of restructuring can be seen as a mixed gamble that creates tensions between family owners and institutional investors in publicly traded firms. Both sides diverge in their reference points as family owners will pursue noneconomic goals, while institutional owners will pursue economic goals. We develop and test arguments to predict how resistance from family owners and support from institutional owners affect a firm’s restructuring. Using panel data from 1990 to 2004, the findings support our predictions and show that family owners can achieve both economic and noneconomic goals post-restructuring.

Corporate Governance and Capital Structure: Evidence from Sustainable Institutional Ownership

Because corporate sustainability enhances corporate governance principles, firms are increasing their efforts to provide transparency and public disclosure. These efforts inform the public about the relationship between corporate governance and sustainability. Well-informed shareholders know about this relationship, which is becoming more apparent over time. In this study, we empirically examined the possible bilateral relationships between institutional ownership and a firm’s capital structure. Methodologically, we used an instrumental variable approach and the two-step generalized method of moments. The implications of this study are two-fold. First, we found that a firm’s debt level was low if its institutional ownership level was high. Institutional monitoring may substitute for external debt monitoring, leading firms to employ low leverage. Second, we found that the level of institutional ownership was high if a firm’s debt level was high. This association suggests that institutional investors prefer high-leveraged firms because institutional owners decrease their monitoring costs through debt monitoring. In the long run, sustainable institutional ownership materially impacts the capital structures of firms.

Active Investors, Passive Investors, and Common Ownership

Recent studies have extensively examined the hypothesis that a higher degree of common ownership relaxes competition. This approach has typically conducted comparative statics analysis based on exogenously given rates of common ownership. This study constructs a simple model in which common ownership emerges as an equilibrium outcome resulting from ownership acquisition. We characterize the equilibrium incentives of institutional owners to acquire common ownership of the firms operating in a duopolistic product market. Further, we explore the effects of common ownership on passive investors, consumer welfare, and total welfare.