scholarly journals Toward a Naturalistic Philosophy of Institutions

OEconomia ◽  
2016 ◽  
pp. 443-450
Author(s):  
Cyril Hédoin
2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Trigg ◽  

It is argued that the only response to the mereological objections of the ordinary language philosopher available to the scientistic philosopher of mind requires the adoption of the view that ordinary psychological talk is theoretical and falsified by the findings of brain science. The availability of this sort of response produces a kind of stalemate between these opposed views and viewpoints: the claim that attribution of psychological predicates to parts of organisms is nonsense is met with the claim that it is only nonsensical if our ordinary ways of talking are – naively – taken to be sacrosanct. The aim of the paper is to show that the ordinary language philosopher has a reply here that the scientistic philosopher is not in a position to ignore. Namely, that the only way to resist mereological objections is to adopt conceptions of personhood that are inimical to naturalistic accounts of mentality.


Synthese ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 196 (9) ◽  
pp. 3841-3867 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Polonioli

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-323
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Bedard

In a recent article, New Testament scholar Zeba Crook argues that in order for the study of Christian Origins to be taken seriously alongside other academic disciplines, a naturalistic philosophy must be adopted. Currently, there is a blend of openness, agnosticism and rejection among New Testament scholars with regard to miracles in the New Testament. This article responds to the concerns about an openness to the supernatural and offers a suggestion on how the study of religion can remain an academic discipline apart from theology and yet still be open to supernatural explanations.


Metaphysica ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Haug

AbstractHuw Price has argued that naturalistic philosophy inevitably leads to a deflationary approach to ontological questions. In this paper, I rebut these arguments. A more substantive, less language-focused approach to metaphysics remains open to naturalists. However, rebutting one of Price’s main arguments requires rejecting Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. So, even though Price’s argument is unsound, it reveals that naturalists cannot rest content with broadly Quinean, “mainstream metaphysics,” which, I suggest, naturalists also have independent reasons to reject.


2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
SHERRY E. LOVELESS ◽  
JAMES GIORDANO

Abstract:Neuroscience affords knowledge that can be leveraged in the ontological valuation of individuals, groups, and species. Sociocultural sentiments, norms, and mores may impede embracing such knowledge to revise moral attitudes, ethics, and policies. We argue that the practices of neuroethics will be valuable in that they ground ethico-legal discourse in (1) naturalistic philosophy; (2) the current epistemological capital of neuroscience; (3) the issues, problems, and solutions arising in and from neuroscientific research and its applications; and 4) the use of neurocentric criteria—such as painience—to define and resolve ethical decisions regarding attitudes toward and treatment of nonhuman animals.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-391
Author(s):  
Carin Robinson

This paper argues that naturalistic philosophy does not meet its own empiricist mandate. It argues from an empiricist perspective. Naturalists either claim that philosophy is like science in significant ways, or they claim that philosophy ought to be like science. This paper, being chiefly focused on the former claim, argues that naturalistic philosophy is nothing like science. Using Papineau’s markers for the similarities between naturalistic philosophy and science, I argue, counter Papineau, that the method employed in naturalistic philosophy is not a posteriori and its claims are certainly not synthetic in the same way as that of science. This methodological distinction between science and philosophy is one made by Carnap. To show how the methods are distinct I compare two papers; I compare the method employed by Andy Clark in his philosophical paper on the brain as a prediction error minimisation machine with that employed by Rees and Haynes in their neuroscientific paper on mental content.


Diogenes ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 15 (60) ◽  
pp. 103-129
Author(s):  
Marvin Farber

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