scholarly journals The Similarity and Difference of Factors that Determine the Intensity of Debarking by Sika Deer:

2021 ◽  
Vol 103 (5) ◽  
pp. 344-350
Author(s):  
Hayato Iijima ◽  
Tetsuya Maruyama ◽  
Hiroyuki Sakaniwa ◽  
Atsushi Morita ◽  
Kazushi Arai ◽  
...  
1998 ◽  
Vol 244 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Long ◽  
N.P. Moore ◽  
T. J. Hayden

2003 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mayumi Sakuragi ◽  
Hiromasa Igota ◽  
Hiroyuki Uno ◽  
Koichi Kaji ◽  
Masami Kaneko ◽  
...  

Mammal Study ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 261
Author(s):  
Asuka Yamashiro ◽  
Yoshinori Kaneshiro ◽  
Yoichi Kawaguchi ◽  
Tadashi Yamashiro

Mammal Study ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 155
Author(s):  
Tomoko Naganuma ◽  
Shinsuke Koike ◽  
Rumiko Nakashita ◽  
Chinatsu Kozakai ◽  
Koji Yamazaki ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 1163-1192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ranjani Krishnan ◽  
Joan L. Luft ◽  
Michael D. Shields

Performance-measure weights for incentive compensation are often determined subjectively. Determining these weights is a cognitively difficult task, and archival research shows that observed performance-measure weights are only partially consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Ittner et al. (2003) have concluded that psychology theory can help to explain such inconsistencies. In an experimental setting based on Feltham and Xie (1994), we use psychology theories of reasoning to predict distinctive patterns of similarity and difference between optimal and actual subjective performance-measure weights. The following predictions are supported. First, in contrast to a number of prior studies, most individuals' decisions are significantly influenced by the performance measures' error variance (precision) and error covariance. Second, directional errors in the use of these measurement attributes are relatively frequent, resulting in a mean underreaction to an accounting change that alters performance measurement error. Third, individuals seem insufficiently aware that a change in the accounting for one measure has spillover effects on the optimal weighting of the other measure in a two-measure incentive system. In consequence, they make performance-measure weighting decisions that are likely to result in misallocations of agent effort.


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