R&D Competition, Cooperation, and Microeconomic Policies

Handbook of Research on Comparative Economic Development Perspectives on Europe and the MENA Region - Advances in Finance, Accounting, and Economics ◽

10.4018/978-1-4666-9548-1.ch010 ◽

2016 ◽

pp. 195-218

Author(s):

Rafael Moner-Colonques ◽

Jose J. Sempere-Monerris

Keyword(s):

Joint Ventures ◽

Competition Policy ◽

Research Networks ◽

External Effects ◽

Competitive Edge ◽

Ex Post ◽

Industry Performance ◽

Ex Ante ◽

Research Joint Ventures ◽

Good Nature

This chapter aims to contribute to the better understanding of R&D by scholars and practitioners. It includes a first section where the concept of innovation is defined and its public good nature and cumulative dimension are analysed. Next, the incentives that firms have to undertake R&D to attain a competitive edge upon rivals are considered. This entails the consideration of both ex ante and ex post incentives to undertake R&D. Since innovation is costly and derives important external effects, cooperation in R&D activities is prominent in several industries where firms enter into research joint ventures, or form research networks. The effect of cooperation is that, under some circumstances, the industry performance is better as compared to full competition. The final section addresses the complementarities and conflicts among the different microeconomic policies (trade, industrial and competition policy) faced by governments when considering the support of R&D activities.

Download Full-text

Understanding competition in digital markets: new perspectives on old practices

Competition Law Journal ◽

10.4337/clj.2021.03.04 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 20 (3) ◽

pp. 139-145

Author(s):

Andrew Mell ◽

Gareth Shier

Keyword(s):

Economic Theory ◽

Industrial Organization ◽

Competition Policy ◽

Business Practices ◽

Policy Tools ◽

Digital Ecosystems ◽

Online Platforms ◽

Ex Post ◽

The World ◽

Ex Ante

Around the world, competition agencies and academics alike have raised concerns that the existing suite of policy tools and economic theory fail to capture all of the harms that can arise in digital markets. At the same time, other academics and practitioners consider that competition policy and industrial organization is unable to account for many of the benefits that online platforms and digital ecosystems can bring. As a range of new interventions – ranging from strengthened ex-post enforcement tools to new ex-ante regulations – are being proposed, we ask which view is right? Are the business practices observed in digital markets and targeted by these reforms so obviously harmful that they are deserving of a return to form-based prohibitions in place of effects-based analysis? Or does this represent an unhelpful regression, based on a misunderstanding of how these new types of markets function?

Download Full-text

Net Neutrality Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?

Review of Network Economics ◽

10.1515/rne-2018-0051 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 17 (3) ◽

pp. 225-243 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Ingo Vogelsang

Keyword(s):

Competition Policy ◽

Net Neutrality ◽

Specific Content ◽

Much Ado About Nothing ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante ◽

Price Rule ◽

Economic Analyses ◽

The Cost

Abstract The economics literature on Net Neutrality (NN) has been largely critical of NN regulation on the basis of theoretical findings that NN violations can be both welfare improving and welfare deteriorating, depending on the circumstances of the case in question. Thus, an ex post competition policy approach would be preferable to a strict ex ante prohibition of NN violations. In contrast, the current paper argues that NN regulation is largely ineffective, in particular, when it comes to the prohibition of fast lanes and other quality of service (QoS) differentiations, and to a lesser extent, when it comes to the zero price rule. NN regulation is only effective in preventing the blocking of specific content and in preventing the favoring of ISP owned content and in preventing some price discriminations. These are also areas where NN regulations are more likely to be welfare-enhancing. Where they are ineffective, NN regulations are likely to create inefficiencies through the cost and allocative inefficiencies caused by NN bypass. The paper ends with a call for theoretical and empirical economic analyses of NN circumvention techniques.

Download Full-text