On the Way to Integrate Increasing Shares of Variable Renewables in China: Experience from Flexibility Modification and Deep Peak Regulation Ancillary Service Market Based on MILP-UC Programming

China has declared ambitious carbon emission reduction targets and will integrate increasing shares of variable renewables for the next decades. The implementation for flexibility modification of thermal power units and deep peak regulation ancillary service market alleviates the contradiction between rapid capacity growth and limited system flexibility. This paper establishes three flexibility modification schemes and two price rules for simulation and proposes an analysis framework for unit commitment problem based on mixed-integer linear programming to evaluate the policy mix effects. Results confirm the promoting effects of flexibility modification on integrating variable renewables and illustrate diverse scheme selections under different renewables curtailment. Particularly, there is no need for selecting expensive schemes which contain more modified units and more developed flexibility, unless the curtailment decrement is compulsorily stipulated or worth for added modification cost. Similarly, results also prove the revenue loss compensation effect of deep peak regulation ancillary service market and illustrate diverse price rule selections under different curtailment intervals. Price rule with more subdivided load intervals and bigger price differences among them is more effective, especially under the higher requirement for curtailment rate. Therefore, the government should further enlarge flexibility modification via but not limited to more targeted compensation price, while generators should further consider a demand-based investment.

Appraising the Scope and Application of the Market-Price Rule in Upheld Contracts

The use of the market price for determining liability in contract lacks dedicated attention in South African law. Even far scanter is the holistic literature on the use of the market-price rule in contracts that are not terminated on breach of contract. Although, there has been suggestions that the market-price rule can be used to determine damages in upheld contracts, this was never technically demonstrated. Thus, the argument that the market-price rule can be used in contracts that are not terminated remains moot. This article presents various methods that illustrate how the market-price rule should apply in upheld contracts. The article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the market-price rule to determine its efficacy in contracts that are not terminated, with the focus on the determination of the degree of liability. Regarding the determination of liability, the article to some extent discusses contracts with latent defects and those with items of questionable quality. Various methods and techniques are discussed to enlighten about how the market price can affect the determination of liability in upheld contracts, and to illustrate that this principle is suitable for determining damages in contracts that are not terminated.

Good Deal Bounds

In this chapter we study an incomplete market, but we do not look for a unique martingale measure. Instead we try to find “reasonable” bounds on arbitrage free prices. The terms “reasonable” is formalized in terms of a price rule with bounded Sharpe ratio–so-called good deal bounds. We study a factor model and show that the good deal bounds can be obtained by solving a control problem where the likelihood process acts as a state variable, and the Girsanov kernel is the control variable. The theory is then applied to concrete examples.

Using Breach Experiments to Explore Price Setting in Everyday Economic Locations

This paper draws inspiration from the breach experiments of Garfinkel as a basis for exploring the naturally occurring order of price setting in locations without an institutionalised single price rule. We organised two experiments (at a flea market in Copenhagen and boot sale in Oxford) to study price setting. The findings suggest that members of price setting interactions accountably, demonstrably and reflexively accomplish a regularly repeated order to price setting through constitutive expectancies and the congruence of relevances that are made available within interactions. In conclusion we suggest that our experiments proved to have analytic utility in bringing gently structured comparisons to the fore. The experiments provided us with the opportunity to engage with the basis for price setting in different everyday economic locations and we felt that this was the opening to a mode of research that has future potential.

Net Neutrality Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?

The economics literature on Net Neutrality (NN) has been largely critical of NN regulation on the basis of theoretical findings that NN violations can be both welfare improving and welfare deteriorating, depending on the circumstances of the case in question. Thus, an ex post competition policy approach would be preferable to a strict ex ante prohibition of NN violations. In contrast, the current paper argues that NN regulation is largely ineffective, in particular, when it comes to the prohibition of fast lanes and other quality of service (QoS) differentiations, and to a lesser extent, when it comes to the zero price rule. NN regulation is only effective in preventing the blocking of specific content and in preventing the favoring of ISP owned content and in preventing some price discriminations. These are also areas where NN regulations are more likely to be welfare-enhancing. Where they are ineffective, NN regulations are likely to create inefficiencies through the cost and allocative inefficiencies caused by NN bypass. The paper ends with a call for theoretical and empirical economic analyses of NN circumvention techniques.

Innovative Contracting for Pharmaceuticals and Medicaid's Best-Price Rule

In recent years, drug manufacturers and private payers have expressed interest in novel pricing models that more closely link a drug's price to its value. Indication-based pricing, outcome-based pricing, drug licenses, and drug mortgages have all been discussed as alternatives to paying strictly for volume. Manufacturers and payers have complained, however, that Medicaid's “best-price rule” inhibits their ability to enter into these new pricing arrangements. This article examines the best-price rule and assesses to what extent, if any, it might frustrate the goal of paying for value. We conclude that the best-price rule is not as serious a problem as it is sometimes made out to be but that it is also not simply a convenient excuse for refusing to try something new. The law here is complex, and moving to a pay-for-value model for drugs will require close coordination among manufacturers, payers, and regulators.