Could Robots Feel Pain?

Author(s):  
Bruce MacLennan

This chapter considers the question of whether a robot could feel pain or experience other emotions and proposes empirical methods for answering this question. After a review of the biological functions of emotion and pain, the author argues that autonomous robots have similar functions that need to be fulfilled, which require systems analogous to emotion and pain. Protophenomenal analysis, which involves parallel reductions in the phenomenological and neurological domains, is explained and applied to the “hard problem” of robot emotion and pain. The author outlines empirical approaches to answering the fundamental questions on which depends the possibility of robot consciousness in general. The author then explains the importance of sensors distributed throughout a robot's body for the emergence of coherent emotional phenomena in its awareness. Overall, the chapter elucidates the issue of robot pain and emotion and outlines an approach to resolving it empirically.

2016 ◽  
pp. 1324-1332
Author(s):  
Bruce J. MacLennan

Emotions are important cognitive faculties that enable animals to behave intelligently in real time. The author argues that many important current and future applications of autonomous robots will require them to have a rich emotional repertoire, but this raises the question of whether it is possible for robots to experience their emotions consciously, as people do. Under what conditions would phenomenal experience of emotions be possible for robots? This is, in effect, the “hard problem” of robot emotions. This paper outlines a scientific approach to the question grounded in experimental neurophenomenology.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce J. MacLennan

Emotions are important cognitive faculties that enable animals to behave intelligently in real time. The author argues that many important current and future applications of autonomous robots will require them to have a rich emotional repertoire, but this raises the question of whether it is possible for robots to experience their emotions consciously, as people do. Under what conditions would phenomenal experience of emotions be possible for robots? This is, in effect, the “hard problem” of robot emotions. This paper outlines a scientific approach to the question grounded in experimental neurophenomenology.


Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (14) ◽  
pp. R685-R688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaut Brunet ◽  
Detlev Arendt

Author(s):  
Daniel D. Hutto ◽  
Erik Myin

E-approaches to cognition—enactive, embodied, ecological—conceive of minds as fundamentally relational and interactive. They are often heralded as offering a new paradigm for thinking about the mental. Yet only the most radical versions of E-approaches—those that seek not to complement but to replace traditional cognitivist accounts of mind—have any prospect of ushering in a truly revolutionary rethink of the nature of cognition. This chapter considers whether such a conceptual revolution might really be in the cards. It identities the major options proposed by E-theorists, rating each in terms of degree of radicality. It reminds readers of the hard problem of content and reviews the range of options for handling it. It argues that “going radical” is one of the most attractive ways of dealing with the hard problem of content and that it is worth exploring the positive research program that going radical opens up.


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