A Game Theoretic Approach to Optimize Identity Exposure in Pervasive Computing Environments

Cyber Crime ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 375-394
Author(s):  
Feng W. Zhu ◽  
Sandra Carpenter ◽  
Wei Zhu ◽  
Matt Mutka

In pervasive computing environments, personal information is typically expressed in digital forms. Daily activities and personal preferences with regard to pervasive computing applications are easily associated with personal identities. Privacy protection is a serious challenge. The fundamental problem is the lack of a mechanism to help people expose appropriate amounts of their identity information when accessing pervasive computing applications. In this paper, the authors propose the Hierarchical Identity model, which enables the expression of one’s identity information ranging from precise detail to vague identity information. The authors model privacy exposure as an extensive game. By finding subgame perfect equilibria in the game, the approach achieves optimal exposure. It finds the most general identity information that a user should expose and which the service provider would accept. The authors’ experiments show that their models can reduce unnecessary identity exposure effectively.

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Feng W. Zhu ◽  
Sandra Carpenter ◽  
Wei Zhu ◽  
Matt Mutka

In pervasive computing environments, personal information is typically expressed in digital forms. Daily activities and personal preferences with regard to pervasive computing applications are easily associated with personal identities. Privacy protection is a serious challenge. The fundamental problem is the lack of a mechanism to help people expose appropriate amounts of their identity information when accessing pervasive computing applications. In this paper, the authors propose the Hierarchical Identity model, which enables the expression of one’s identity information ranging from precise detail to vague identity information. The authors model privacy exposure as an extensive game. By finding subgame perfect equilibria in the game, the approach achieves optimal exposure. It finds the most general identity information that a user should expose and which the service provider would accept. The authors’ experiments show that their models can reduce unnecessary identity exposure effectively.


Author(s):  
Simon Krogmann ◽  
Pascal Lenzner ◽  
Louise Molitor ◽  
Alexander Skopalik

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that simply select the closest opened facility. In our model, every facility location has a set of attracted clients and each client has a set of shopping locations and a weight that corresponds to its spending capacity. Facility agents selfishly select a location for opening their facility to maximize the attracted total spending capacity, whereas clients strategically decide how to distribute their spending capacity among the opened facilities in their shopping range. We focus on a natural client behavior similar to classical load balancing: our selfish clients aim for a distribution that minimizes their maximum waiting time for getting serviced, where a facility’s waiting time corresponds to its total attracted client weight. We show that subgame perfect equilibria exist and we give almost tight constant bounds on the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability, which even hold for a broader class of games with arbitrary client behavior. Since facilities and clients influence each other, it is crucial for the facilities to anticipate the selfish clients’ behavior when selecting their location. For this, we provide an efficient algorithm that also implies an efficient check for equilibrium. Finally, we show that computing a socially optimal facility placement is NP-hard and that this result holds for all feasible client weight distributions.


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