An Incentive Mechanism Using Game Theory for Wireless Mesh Networks

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have attracted much attention in recent years. The main problems in WMNs are the unfairness in bandwidth sharing and potential selfish behavior. In this paper, an incentive-based pricing model is designed which follows the concepts of mechanism design in game theory to encourage nodes to relay packets for other nodes and therefore achieve fairness. In the pricing model, we consider the packet transmitting amounts, idle conditions and the special need of border nodes in the margin area. The incentive is the main feature of the model. We also discuss the model using mathematical analysis from various perspectives. The analysis shows that this model is highly effective in eliminating unfairness in the multi-hop transmission topology. This is achieved by allowing border mesh routers to receive a fair profit. This flexible pricing model is capable of encouraging packet forwarding. With the issue of unfairness resolved, WMNs can be expected to have a broader range of applications.