Model Counting with Boolean Algebra and Extension Rule

2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (7) ◽  
pp. 49-56
Author(s):  
Youjun Xu ◽  
Dantong Ouyang ◽  
Yuxin Ye
2010 ◽  
Vol 108-111 ◽  
pp. 268-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Ping Zhou ◽  
Chun Guang Zhou ◽  
Ming Hao Yin ◽  
Hui Yang

Extension rule is a new method for computing the number of models for a given propositional formula. In some sense, it is actually an inverse propositonal resolution. In order to improve counting performance, we introduce some reasoning rules into extension rule based model counting and present a new algorithm RCER which combines the extension rule and the reasoning rule together. The experiment results show that the algorithm not only occupies less space but also increases the efficiency for solving model counting.


IEEE Access ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 41042-41049
Author(s):  
Naiyu Tian ◽  
Dantong Ouyang ◽  
Fengyu Jia ◽  
Meng Liu ◽  
Liming Zhang

2005 ◽  
Vol 64 (9) ◽  
pp. 699-712
Author(s):  
Victor Filippovich Kravchenko ◽  
Miklhail Alekseevich Basarab
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1521-1527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying LI ◽  
Ji-Gui SUN ◽  
Xia WU ◽  
Xing-Jun ZHU
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Andrew Bacon

This chapter presents a series questions in the philosophy of vagueness that will constitute the primary subjects of this book. The stance this book takes on these questions is outlined, and some preliminary ramifications are explored. These include the idea that (i) propositional vagueness is more fundamental than linguistic vagueness; (ii) propositions are not themselves sentence-like; they are coarse grained, and form a complete atomic Boolean algebra; (iii) vague propositions are, moreover, not simply linguistic constructions either such as sets of world-precisification pairs; and (iv) propositional vagueness is to be understood by its role in thought. Specific theses relating to the last idea include the thesis that one’s total evidence can be vague, and that there are vague propositions occupying every evidential role, that disagreements about the vague ultimately boil down to disagreements in the precise, and that one should not care intrinsically about vague matters.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Matias López ◽  
Juan Pablo Luna

ABSTRACT By replying to Kurt Weyland’s (2020) comparative study of populism, we revisit optimistic perspectives on the health of American democracy in light of existing evidence. Relying on a set-theoretical approach, Weyland concludes that populists succeed in subverting democracy only when institutional weakness and conjunctural misfortune are observed jointly in a polity, thereby conferring on the United States immunity to democratic reversal. We challenge this conclusion on two grounds. First, we argue that the focus on institutional dynamics neglects the impact of the structural conditions in which institutions are embedded, such as inequality, racial cleavages, and changing political attitudes among the public. Second, we claim that endogeneity, coding errors, and the (mis)use of Boolean algebra raise questions about the accuracy of the analysis and its conclusions. Although we are skeptical of crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis as an adequate modeling choice, we replicate the original analysis and find that the paths toward democratic backsliding and continuity are both potentially compatible with the United States.


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