HARD DETERMINISM

2010 ◽  
pp. 106-123
Keyword(s):  
Hard Determinism

The Limited Compatibilism of Epiphenomenalism with Responsibility

2020 ◽  
pp. 413-434
Author(s):  
Michael S. Moore
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
General Control ◽  
Past Event ◽  
The Past ◽  
Hard Determinism ◽  
The Future

The second response to the epiphenomenal challenge is to deny that epiphenomenalism has any implications that are skeptical of responsibility. Such a compatibilist response is seemingly ruled out by adopting the classical compatibilist response to the challenge of hard determinism. Whether this is in fact so is explored in this chapter, the thesis being that in a certain range of cases we are responsible for effects that we do not cause so long as those effects are on one horn of an epiphenomenal fork the existence of which we know and the other horn of which we can control. Because such responsibility across the horns of an epiphenomenal fork can involve control of the past, and because a general control of the past to the extent that we can control the future is implausible, some care is taken to limit the scope of what in the past we can control by our present decisions. These limits are cast in terms of there being a strong necessitation of a past event by a present decision which necessitation is known to the actor as he acts to make it have been the case that such past event occurred.

Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics

2008 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-144
Author(s):  
Ben Vilhauer
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Hard Determinism

Betting Against Hard Determinism

Res Publica ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Göran Duus-Otterström
Keyword(s):  
Hard Determinism

Free Will and Mental Quausation

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
SARA BERNSTEIN ◽  
JESSICA WILSON
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
General Problem ◽  
Mental Causation ◽  
Nonreductive Physicalism ◽  
Hard Determinism ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Common Strategy ◽  
Mental Events

ABSTRACT:The questions of how to understand free will and mental causation are clearly connected, for events of seemingly free choosing are mental events that appear to be efficacious vis-à-vis other events. Nonetheless, the free will and mental causation debates have proceeded largely independently of each other. Here we aim to make progress in determining the mutual bearing of these debates. We first argue that the problems of free will and of mental causation can be seen as special cases of a more general problem of mental ‘quausation’, concerning whether and how mental events of a given type can be efficacious qua the types they are—qualitative, intentional, freely deliberative—given reasons to think such events are causally irrelevant. We go on to identify parallels between hard determinism and eliminativist physicalism and between soft determinism and nonreductive physicalism, and we use these parallels to identify a new argument against hard determinism and to reveal and motivate a common strategy underlying apparently diverse soft determinist accounts.

Kenny on hard determinism

1974 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 202-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.C. Bradley
Keyword(s):  
Hard Determinism

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

2005 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
The Past ◽  
Hard Determinism ◽  
Determinism And Indeterminism ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will provides a guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of free will—perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The articles combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. The book is divided into eight parts: Part I (Theology and Fatalism), Part II (Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism), Part III (The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism). Part IV (Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility), Part V (Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style), Part VI (Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will), Part VII (Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and Others), and Part VIII (Neuroscience and Free Will). Taken as a whole, the book provides a roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic.

Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saul Smilansky
Keyword(s):  
Hard Determinism

scholarly journals The ethics of hard determinism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Hard Determinism

The ethics of hard determinism are described.

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