The Rome Convention 1980: Background and General Principles

2018 ◽  
pp. 251-278
Author(s):  
Abla Mayss ◽  
Alan Reed
Keyword(s):  
2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 513-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chukwuma Samuel Adesina Okoli ◽  
Gabriel Omoshemime Arishe

Author(s):  
Raymond Cox ◽  
Louise Merrett ◽  
Marcus Smith ◽  
Francis Jacobs ◽  
Malcolm A. Clarke

Author(s):  
Enonchong Nelson

This chapter offers a critical examination of the significant, but largely unexplored, question whether, and to what extent, a foreign order restraining the issuing bank from making payment under a letter of credit can afford the issuing bank a good defence to a claim in a court outside that bank’s home jurisdiction. At common law, in England as well as in other jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong, Singapore and the US, such orders have only limited effect in the forum. This chapter argues that the approach of the English courts to article 4 of the Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations meant that such orders could defeat a claim against the issuing bank in England only in very narrow circumstances. It goes on to examine the extent to which the changes introduced in article 4 of the Rome I Regulation of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations have altered the position under English law, so that stop payment orders made in the issuer’s home jurisdiction may now have a much wider reach in England. The chapter contends that notwithstanding the amendments to article 4, in the specific context of letters of credit, the approach of the English courts under the Rome I Regulation is likely to be broadly similar to that under the Rome Convention. The Rome I Regulation has not (even unintentionally) opened the door to stop payment orders made in the issuer’s home jurisdiction.


2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 1505-1524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Jaap Kuipers

The relationship between Community law and Private International Law (PIL) did not have an easy start. The original EEC Treaty merely made one reference to PIL. The notable exception was the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1968), an international convention concluded on the basis of art. 220 EEC (293 EC). The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) did not even have an explicit legal basis. After the adoption of the Rome Convention it remained relatively silent on the Community level. It did not help that due to the status of international convention the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was deprived of any power of interpretation. The problem was resolved in two separate protocols. The protocol on the Brussels Convention entered into force in 1975 and the protocol on the Rome Convention only entered into force in 2004. Whereas there has been a substantial amount of case-law on the Brussels Convention, the ECJ only delivered its first judgment on the Rome Convention in October 2009.


2020 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-90
Author(s):  
William Day

AbstractThere has always been considerable uncertainty about the nature and scope of the rule by which contractual performance is excused if illegal in the place of performance, even though performance would not be illegal by the contract's governing law. This article revisits the so-called “Ralli Bros rule” and looks at how the scope of the rule has been developed and its nature misunderstood. It argues that the rule is neither a choice of law rule nor part of the rules discharging a contract for frustration but is instead a public policy rule favouring judicial abstention for reasons of comity. This has implications for how the rule interacts with the choice of law rules for contracts under the Rome Convention and the Rome I Regulation.


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