Party autonomy: promoting legal certainty and predictability in international commercial contracts through choice of law (the applicable rules of law)

In ’n regstelsel waar partye by internasionale kontrakte die outonomie gelaat word om die reg van toepassing op hulle kontrak te kies, word algemeen verwag dat die reg wat hulle kies die reg van ’n staat is. Die keuse van enige soort buitestaatlike reg as die reg van toepassing op kommersiële kontrakte word gewoonlik nie deur die howe toegelaat nie. Indien ’n bepaalde internasionale kontrak ’n arbitrasieklousule bevat, verskil die posisie. Daar is presedente wat toon dat arbitrasie-tribunale bereid is om regskeuses in internasionale kontrakte te handhaaf en toe te pas, ongeag die aard van die gekose reg, hetsy dit staatlik, of buitestaatlik is. Die vraag wat in hierdie verband ontstaan, is waarom howe arbitrasietoekennings sonder voorbehoud afdwing, selfs wanneer ’n nie-staatlike reg deur die tribunaal toegepas is om tot die beslissing te kom wat nou afgedwing moet word, maar terselfdertyd die toepassing van dieselfde buitestaatlike reg verwerp in sake wat direk voor hulle kom. In hierdie artikel argumenteer die outeur dat howe die keuse deur die partye van buitestaatlike reg behoort te aanvaar op grond van die beginsel van partyoutonomie. Die outonomiebeginsel speel ’n rol in alle kommersiële kontrakte. In die internasionale kontraktereg word partyoutonomie vandag beskou as die belangrikste verbindingsfaktor vir die vasstelling van die reg. Die erkenning van die keuse van buitestaatlike reg bied aan partye die geleentheid om toepaslike regsreëls te kies vir die hantering van spesifieke juridiese uitdagings wat verband hou met hul kontrak. Partye sal baat by die gevolglike regsekerheid en voorspelbaarheid wat die reg betref wat van toepassing is op die kontrak. Dit sal sodoende help om lang en duur geskille te voorkom wat bloot handel oor welke reg van toepassing sou wees. Die outeur bespreek welke kategorieë van buitestaatlike reg gekies behoort te kan word om internasionale kontrakte te beheers.

Wybór prawa dla umowy o pracę. Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej z dnia 15 lipca 2021 r. w sprawach połączonych DG, EH c/a SC Gruber Logistics SRL (C-152/20) oraz Sindicatul Lucrătorilor din Transporturi, TD c/a SC Samidani Trans

This paper comments on a recent ruling concerning the choice of law to the individual employment contract according to the Rome I Regulation. In the judgement in the joined cases C–152/20 and C–218/20 (DG, EH v. SC Gruber Logistics SRL and Sindicatul Lucrătorilor din Transporturi, TD v. SC Samidani Trans SRL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provided the interpretation of Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation on two issues. At first, the EU Court was asked about the freedom of choice of law applicable to the individual employment contract if (a) national law required the inclusion of a clause into that contract under which the contractual provisions are supplemented by national law and (b) the contractual clause concerning that choice was drafted by the employer. The second issue was connected with the concept of the employee’s protection, under which the choice of law may not have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him (her) by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement, under the law that would have been applicable to the contract in the absence of choice. Regarding the first question, the CJEU admitted that the parties to an individual employment contract dispose of freedom to choose the law applicable to that contract, even if the contractual provisions are supplemented by national labour law under a (relevant) national provision, if “the national provision in question does not require the parties to choose national law as the law applicable to that contract”. Secondly, the Court found that the parties to an individual employment contract were “to be regarded as being, in principle, free to choose the law applicable to that contract, even if the contractual clause concerning that choice is drafted by the employer”. Therefore, the CJEU confirmed the application of the rules concerning the choice of law resulting from Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation to the individual employment contracts. Referring to the second issue of the commented ruling, the CJEU confirmed that Article 8 (1) of the Rome I Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, where the parties have chosen the law governing the individual employment contract, the application of the law that would apply to the contract in the absence of choice must be excluded, with the exception of “provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement”, if those provisions offer the employee concerned greater protection than those of the law chosen by the parties. The EU Court underlined that rules on the minimum wage could be treated as “provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement” and the law that, in the absence of choice, would be applicable should decide about it. Unfortunately, it is necessary to follow the commented judgment’s justification to correctly understand the concept of an employee’s protection applied in Article 8 (1) of the Rome I Regulation. The thesis of the ruling in this regard seems to be too laconic, and it can be misinterpreted.

THE LAW APPLICABLE TO DIVORCE ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ROMANIAN CIVIL CODE

The article aims to study the provisions concerning the law applicable to divorce according to art. 2597 and art 2600 of the Romanian Civil Code (2011e, 2011f). The article aims to answer the following questions: 1. What is the law applicable to divorce by choice of law agreement? 2. What is the law applicable to divorce in the absence of a choice of law agreement? 3. What does recognition of divorce by unilateral termination entail? 4. What is the scope of divorce law?

Human Rights Litigation against Multinational Companies in Germany

Miriam Saag-Maaβ‎ reviews the potential for human rights and environmental cases against multinationals in Germany. Outlining the rules on jurisdiction as per EU and national law. The chapter discusses the application of the Rome II Regulation to choice of law and the potential relevance of overriding mandatory provisions of German law and the possibility of claims for impairment or interference with property including the injunctive relief to prevent flooding caused by greenhouse emissions in Lliaya v. RWE. It also outlines the elements for liability for corporate human rights abuse under section 823(I) BGB and for the omission to comply with safety duties, in particular the potential for claims against a parent or buying company for breach of a safety duty by subsidiaries and suppliers. It considers key issues arising in Jabbir v. KiK, including the application of the Pakistani law and outlines key barriers to justice relating to discovery, collective actions, recovery of legal costs and funding.

AT LAST A SOUTH AFRICAN PROPER LAW OF DELICT Burchell v Anglin 2010 3 SA 48 (ECG)

The laws of defamation all over the world share a common denominator – the balancing of two basic human rights: the right to freedom of expression and the right to reputation. In spite of this common objective, the laws pertaining to defamation often differ substantially from country to country and courts are often reluctant to apply legal rules or recognize judgments of foreign courts in this regard. Until recently the question as to which law to apply in cases involving delict was neglected in most legal systems. Although this position has changed in many countries as a result of technological development as well as modern communication systems, South African choice of law in delict remained almost non-existent. In spite of the prevalence of the lex fori as connecting factor under the influence of Von Savigny in the past, and until recently in England, it is today generally accepted that the lex loci delicti should, at least as a point of departure, be used as the connecting factor in delict. As Forsyth points out, the application of the lex loci delicti is in accord with the locus regit actum principle as well as the vested rights theory. The application of the lex loci delicti is not without problems however. One problem is that the place where the delict was committed is not always clear. The elements constituting the delict may have their origin in different jurisdictions. A product manufactured in one country, may cause damage in another. Is the lex loci delicti the place where the conduct (manufacturing) took place or the place where the damage was caused? Moreover, harm may be caused in different countries where the defective products are available. Another example is defamation. A defamatory statementpublished in one country may cause damage in another jurisdiction. The problem becomes even more prevalent where a defamatory statement is uploaded on the Internet. A statement uploaded on a server in one country can be and generally is accessible in a multiplicity of countries. To complicate matters further, the statement may cause pecuniary damage in one or more countries and personality infringement in another. Moreover, because the requirements for defamation are closely linked to public policy and a country’s attitude towards the protection of freedom of expression, the statement may be regarded as defamatory in one country but not in another. A second problem is that the lex loci delicti may be perfectly clear, but may be almost irrelevant. The typical example is illustrated in the American case of Babcock v Jackson (191 NE 2d 279 (1963)), where a car, registered and insured in New York with driver and passengers resident in New York, left the road in Ontario during an over-the-border drive with resultant injury to one of the passengers. In this scenario the place where the delict occurred is clearly Ontario but this single fact is less significant than all the other factors that have connection with the delict and the parties, namely New York. The lex loci delicti rule fails to assign an appropriate system in this type of case. That is the reason why the New York court in Babcock applied New York law. In South Africa very little case law exists regarding the choice of law in delict and, until now, regarding choice-of-law in defamation. The few casesthat were reported did not deal with the matter satisfactorily. The matter is therefore still very much res nova and open to our courts to break new ground. This is exactly why the judgment of Crouse AJ in Burchell v Anglin (2010 3 SA 48 (ECG)) can be regarded asa ground-breaking decision.

A NEW SOLUTION CONCERNING CHOICE-OF-LAW FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF DEBTS

This article explores a solution to the choice-of-law issues concerning both voluntary and involuntary assignments arising in a domestic forum. The focus is on English private international law rules relating to cross-border assignments. A distinction is made between primary and extended parties as the foundation for choice-of-law analysis. Drawing on insights from the distinction of the use value and exchange value of debts found in economics, this article proposes a new analytical framework for choice-of-law based on a modified choice-of-law theory of interest-analysis.

Kewenangan Mengadili atas Penerapan Choice Of Law Pada Asuransi Pengangkutan Laut

Transportation is currently developing very rapidly in the aspect of life, there are many transportations that provide cheaper prices than other transportation. To avoid the risks in sea transportation using sea freight insurance, but sea freight insurance still uses English law and its provisions. So that in the sea transportation insurance agreement the choice of law applies. The study examines the position of the choice of law in the settlement of maritime transportation disputes and explains the procedure for resolving disputes over the choice of law on the authority to adjudicate sea transportation. This study uses a normative research method with a statutory approach because there is still a conflict of norms, sourced from primary and secondary data. In the Civil Code Articles 1320 and 1338 it has been determined that the conditions for the validity of an agreement and agreements made legally will become law for those who make them. So apart from that, the choice of law in the jurisdiction to adjudicate is also contained in international civil law, thus in the settlement of maritime transportation insurance disputes that still use English law, it can be resolved by looking at the facts contained in the sea freight insurance agreement with the applicable laws. apply.

Optionality

This Chapter focuses on a distinctive characteristic of an important portion of contemporary rules of contract law that sets them apart not only from public law but also from other branches of private law (e.g. property and family law), i.e. that these rules can be set aside freely by the contracting parties. Contrary to national civil codes, however, positive EU contract law does not include many instances of non-mandatory rules. This raises the question of what exactly justifies the existence of such optional rules: should public institutions be providing elaborate sets of contract law rules if private parties can set them aside as they please, and, if so, what kind of considerations should determine the content of such rules? Similar questions can be asked with respect to other instances of optional contract law, such as choice of law in cross-border contracts.

The Conflict of Laws and Unjust Enrichment

This essay revisits the relationship between the conflict of laws and the law of unjust enrichment (or, more widely, the law of restitution) in light of shifts in the legal landscape over the past forty years. It considers the rules of jurisdiction and of choice of law applied by the English courts, accounting for the effects of the UK’s departure from the European Union.