The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989

2020 ◽  
pp. 145-147
Author(s):  
David McBride
Keyword(s):  
Biological Weapons

scholarly journals Biological weapons: the facts not the fiction

2001 ◽  
Vol 1 (6) ◽  
pp. 502-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Lamb
Keyword(s):  
Biological Weapons

Trends in Global Disarmament Treaties

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Casey-Maslen ◽  
Tobias Vestner
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
State Party ◽  
Chemical Weapons Convention ◽  
Support Mechanisms ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Core Features

Abstract Since the adoption of the UN Charter, states have concluded numerous international disarmament treaties. What are their core features, and are there any trends in their design? This article discusses the five global disarmament treaties, namely the 1971 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It first considers how a broad set of prohibitions of activities with respect to specific weapons has evolved over time. Then, it analyses the treaties’ implementation and compliance support mechanisms as well as their procedural aspects regarding entry into force and withdrawal. This article finds that a pattern has developed over the last two decades to outlaw all and any use of weapons by disarmament treaty, without first instituting a prohibition on their use under international humanitarian law (IHL). It also finds that reporting obligations, meetings of States Parties and treaty-related institutions are generally created, either directly by treaty or by subsequent state party decisions. Finally, there is a tendency to make the treaty’s entry into force easier, and the withdrawal more difficult. It is argued that these trends arise from states’ attempt to establish more easily disarmament treaties, design more robust disarmament treaties and more effectively protect civilians. The article concludes by reflecting whether these trends form the basis of a new branch of international law—international disarmament law—and discusses them in the context of emerging weapons and technologies.

New designs for biological weapons

1987 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Wright
Keyword(s):  
Biological Weapons

The potential for abuse of genetics in militarily significant biological weapons

2002 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Whitby ◽  
Piers Millett ◽  
Malcolm Dando
Keyword(s):  
Biological Weapons

Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons – History, Main Provisions, Significance and Reasons for Not Signing

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-21
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
The United States ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Pharmaceutical Companies ◽  
Special Role ◽  
International Agreement ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Weapons Control

Received 30 January 2021. Accepted for publication 20 March 2021 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) does not have a legally binding verification regime. An attempt by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, created by the UN Committee on Disarmament, to strengthen the BTWC by developing a legally binding document – the Protocol, was blocked by the United States in July 2001. The purpose of this work is to study the history, main provisions, significance and reasons for not signing the Protocol to the BTWC. The attention is paid to the events in biological weapons control, which have led a number of countries to the understanding of the necessity to develop the Protocol. The background of the US actions to block this document is the subject of special consideration. During the Second Review Conference on the Implementation of the Convention (8–25 September 1986, Geneva) the USSR, the German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic proposed to develop and adopt the Protocol as an addition to the BTWC. This document was supposed to establish general provisions, definitions of terms, lists of agents and toxins, lists of equipment that was present or used at production facilities, threshold quantities of biological agents designed to assess means and methods of protection. The proposed verification mechanism was based on three «pillars»: initial declarations with the basic information about the capabilities of each State Party; inspections to assess the reliability of the declarations; investigations to verify and confirm or not confirm the alleged non-compliance with the Convention. The verification regime was to be under the control of an international organization – the Organization for the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons. However, the US military and pharmaceutical companies opposed the idea of international inspections. The then US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Robert Bolton II, played a special role in blocking the Protocol. During the Fifth Review Conference in December 2001, he demanded the termination of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts mandate for negotiations under the pretext that any international agreement would constrain US actions. The current situation with biological weapons control should not be left to chance. Measures to strengthen the BTWC should be developed, taking into account the new fundamental changes in dual-use biotechnology. It should be borne in mind, that the Protocol, developed in the 1990s, is outdated nowadays.

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