The Hermit Kingdom’s Forgotten Threat: Evaluating UNSCR 1540’s Effectiveness in Controlling North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program

Mitigating the proliferation of biological weapons remains uniquely challenging, even 48 years after the ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Suspected development of advanced biological weapons by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), despite its status as a party to both the BWC and other nonproliferation agreements, has emphasized the need for international efforts to keep biological weapons out of the hands of rogue nations and terrorist networks. Among the numerous weaponized cultures believed to be in development by the North Korean military are anthrax, botulism, cholera, plague and smallpox. With a steady decrease in resources and attention devoted to preparedness for biological attacks or outbreaks since 2001, the United States and its allies remain vulnerable to biological weapons in development by North Korea. An ongoing example of this danger is demonstrated by the international community’s struggle to respond to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. With United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540’s expiration in 2021, this paper aims to assess its effectiveness in preventing the proliferation of biological weapons by analyzing the legal requirements UNSCR 1540 imposes on UN member nations. Using North Korea’s biological weapons program as a case study, this paper will evaluate the successes and failures of UNSCR 1540’s legal mechanisms in controlling biological weapons development in North Korea in its penultimate year of validity. This paper will also examine the overlapping roles served by the World Health Organization (WHO), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and UNSCR 1540, and how their administrative frameworks identify and respond to natural disease outbreaks and biological attacks. Finally, this paper will recommend actions the United Nations Security Council may take to more effectively pursue its mission of nonproliferation.

9th Review Conference: Strengthening of Biological Weapons Convention

Pandemics have always appeared in numerous manifestations throughout the history. The devastating COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 but, the world is still in its clutches. Above two and half million lives have already been lost worldwide. The magnitude of Coronavirus has already produced the effects that fundamentally change the actions of the states on infectious diseases globally. It has also highlighted the power of disease that can be too fatal and widespread to bring life to an abrupt and total standstill. Further, this has exposed the serious weakness of the states in their national preparedness to respond to this global pandemic. It is timely and necessary to address this type of pandemics. The states have already been working hard to control and ease the potential effects of infectious diseases. As part of that work, it should be possible now that the 45 years old Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention stands on a new starting line. It is to be hoped that the international community will bring protracted discussions on the serious working of the Convention to a successful conclusion. This paper will help in identifying the possible options that the State Parties should discuss to strengthen the Convention, enhancement in its potency and implementation at the upcoming 9th Review Conference of BWTC, which is scheduled to be held in November 2021.

Exploring Science and Technology Review Mechanisms Under the Biological Weapons Convention

Since the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) opened for signature in 1972, biology and other converging disciplines have advanced considerably. These changes could have profound implications for a science-based disarmament agreement like the BWC. To address changes in biology and biotechnology, BWC States Parties have established processes to review developments in science and technology (S&T), including annual expert meetings on this topic. However, shortcomings are evident in the current approaches and many BWC States Parties have expressed support for a more systematic review of science and technology under the Convention. This study seeks to inform discussions on establishing a dedicated and systematic S&T review process under the BWC through an examination of existing S&T review-type mechanisms employed in different regimes beyond the BWC, a survey of States Parties views on a possible review mechanism and a study of past and present discourse on this issue in the BWC. Based on the analysis conducted, this study also presents options for BWC States Parties to consider ahead of the Ninth BWC Review Conference.

Enforced Transparency: A Solution to Autonomous Weapons as Potentially Uncontrollable Weapons Similar to Bioweapons

This chapter argues that in many respects the regulation of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) presents a similar challenge to arms control as biological weapons do and that many lessons learned from the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) could be applied to the control of AWS. AWS that utilize “deep learning” are potentially unpredictable and uncontrollable weapons. International regulation efforts for AWS should focus on the development of safety and design standards for artificial intelligence (AI), should put in place confidence-building measures for enhancing transparency and trust in AI R&D and related applications, and should aim for a ban of offensive AWS. Enforced international transparency in the development of AI could make AI better and safer, including in a military context, which would improve strategic stability.

Coronavirus Is A Biological Warfare Weapon

Dr. Francis Boyle, who drafted the Biological Weapons Act has given a detailed statement admitting that the 2019 Wuhan Coronavirus is an offensive Biological Warfare Weapon and that the World Health Organization (WHO) already knows about it. Francis Boyle is a professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law. He drafted the U.S. domestic implementing legislation for the Biological Weapons Convention, known as the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, that was approved unanimously by both Houses of the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President George H.W. Bush.

Trends in Global Disarmament Treaties

Since the adoption of the UN Charter, states have concluded numerous international disarmament treaties. What are their core features, and are there any trends in their design? This article discusses the five global disarmament treaties, namely the 1971 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It first considers how a broad set of prohibitions of activities with respect to specific weapons has evolved over time. Then, it analyses the treaties’ implementation and compliance support mechanisms as well as their procedural aspects regarding entry into force and withdrawal. This article finds that a pattern has developed over the last two decades to outlaw all and any use of weapons by disarmament treaty, without first instituting a prohibition on their use under international humanitarian law (IHL). It also finds that reporting obligations, meetings of States Parties and treaty-related institutions are generally created, either directly by treaty or by subsequent state party decisions. Finally, there is a tendency to make the treaty’s entry into force easier, and the withdrawal more difficult. It is argued that these trends arise from states’ attempt to establish more easily disarmament treaties, design more robust disarmament treaties and more effectively protect civilians. The article concludes by reflecting whether these trends form the basis of a new branch of international law—international disarmament law—and discusses them in the context of emerging weapons and technologies.