From Modal to Post-Modal Metaphysics

Author(s):  
Nathan Wildman
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 198-220
Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser

This chapter is devoted to explaining the nature and use of metaphysical necessity in Newton’s “General Scholium.” In particular, it focuses on Newton’s metaphysical commitments about (i) the nature of modality; (ii) the nature of formal causation; and (iii) God’s existence. In order to explain these, the chapter draws on Clarke and Clarke’s subsequent correspondence with Joseph Butler. In order to clarify some philosophical distinctions, I treat Toland’s Spinozism, in particular, as the target of some of Newton’s arguments. Along the way, I’ll provide suggestive evidence that Newton was in a decent position to distinguish the thought of Descartes from Spinozism


2000 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Woosuk Park ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Knappik

AbstractI propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of theScience of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts of facts about finite reality can be given.


Mind ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 120 (477) ◽  
pp. 53-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Hawthorne ◽  
G. Uzquiano
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Kerry McKenzie

Chakravartty (2007) and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.


Author(s):  
Woosuk Park

The problem I tackle in this article is: Do we have in Scotus a modal logic or a counterpart theory? We need to take a rather roundabout path to handle this problem. This is because, whether it be in Lewis's original formulation or in others' applications, the crucial concept of 'counterpart' has never been clearly explicated. In section two, I shall therefore examine the recent controversy concerning Leibniz's views on modalities which centers around the counterpart relation. By fully exploiting the lessons learned from such an examination, I shall then launch a trilemma against a Leibnizian in section three. Section four shall make the claim that unlike Leibniz's case, Scotus's position is not endangered by the trilemma. One important premise will be adopted from my thesis presented elsewhere regarding the different between Scotus's haecceitas and Leibniz's individual essence. Another will be secured from a brief report on Scotus's views on similarity, which might be utterly original to modern eyes jaundiced by contemporary set theories.


Author(s):  
Ylwa Sjölin Wirling

Abstract The idea that justified modal belief can be accounted for in terms of empirically justified, non-modal belief is enjoying increasing popularity in the epistemology of modality. One alleged reason to prefer modal empiricism over more traditional, rationalist modal epistemologies is that empiricism avoids the problem with the integration challenge that arise for rationalism, assuming that we want to be realists about modal metaphysics. In this paper, I argue that given two very reasonable constraints on what it means to meet the integration challenge for modality, empiricism is currently at best on a par with, but potentially worse off than, rationalist alternatives, with respect to the integration challenge.


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