Revisiting the Theory-Constitutive Metaphor

In his seminal article “Metaphor and Theory Change: What is `Metaphor ́ a metaphor for?” (1993, [1979]), Richard Boyd describes a certain class of metaphors within science, namely, the theory-constitutive metaphors (henceforth the TCMs); this class of metaphors, Boyd explains, plays an important role in the formulation and development of theories because they express explanatory claims which, at least for the time being, cannot be conceived in any other known (literal) way. Hence, TCMs become a part of scientific thought and the development of concepts. TCMs can fix reference to casual relations in the physical world, even though they have an open-endedness (vagueness and are not fully explicated); the TCMs, therefore, have a programmatic character or they invite further research. In the following we try to add more characteristics to the TCMs from a Peircean perspective, namely, that the TCMs depend on abduction – this 1) makes them both creative and explanatory, 2) relates them to guessing and anchors them in instinct, whereby 3) their plausibility concerns an affinity between mind and nature.

Gender equity approach to policing in Kenya: Lessons, challenges and prospects

Despite ample evidence of women's value, ensuring gender equity–equality is a major challenge for police departments worldwide. Using survey data gathered from a sample of 455 male and female police officers in the Kenya Police Service, this study examines the non-western plights of women in policing and describes a theory change to formulate gender-equity strategies for improved recruitment and retention of women in police service. Findings indicate that women officers can undertake most tasks better than or to the same degree as men, except for a small proportion of line duties, mirroring the literature on women in policing internationally. However, family commitments, an emphasis on physical strength for promotion, performance based on male standards, and male supervisors’ attitudes present severe challenges for women in the police service, reflecting the organizational climate and prevailing cultural norms. Implications for theory, policy and research are discussed.

An Epistemological Study of Theory Change

Belief Revision is a well-established field of research that deals with how agents rationally change their minds in the face of new information. The milestone of Belief Revision is a general and versatile formal framework introduced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, known as the AGM paradigm, which has been, to this date, the dominant model within the field. A main shortcoming of the AGM paradigm, as originally proposed, is its lack of any guidelines for relevant change. To remedy this weakness, Parikh proposed a relevance-sensitive axiom, which applies on splittable theories; i.e., theories that can be divided into syntax-disjoint compartments. The aim of this article is to provide an epistemological interpretation of the dynamics (revision) of splittable theories, from the perspective of Kuhn's inuential work on the evolution of scientific knowledge, through the consideration of principal belief-change scenarios. The whole study establishes a conceptual bridge between rational belief revision and traditional philosophy of science, which sheds light on the application of formal epistemological tools on the dynamics of knowledge.

A New Image for Science

Thomas Kuhn subverted the image of science that had become entrenched by the mid-twentieth century, that science was a body of knowledge produced by logical reasoning about objective facts. Kuhn argued that a new approach to the history of science revealed that the process of discovery was integral to the practice of science and that nonlogical factors played a role in theory acceptance and theory change. Insofar as they entered into the reasoning leading to the formulation of a theory, facts were not objective but interpreted consistent with contingent assumptions on which the theory rested. Kuhn himself believed that scientific knowledge was about reality. His theory of how scientific knowledge was produced, however, strongly supported the view that scientific theories were contingent interpretations of experience.

Selective Scientific Realism and Truth-Transfer in Theories of Molecular Structure

This chapter examines theoretical advances in understanding molecular structures at the turn of the 20th century which resulted from the Blomstrand-Jørgensen/Werner debate about the structure of cobalt complexes. Both models made predictions testable through precipitation experiments, which eventually led to Werner’s model replacing the Blomstrand-Jørgensen model of cobalt complexes. We argue that this example of theory change fits within a selective scientific realist framework: namely, the factors which gave rise to the predictive success of the failed model survived in the theory that replaced it. We further argue that the lessons from this historical case can illuminate how two contemporary objections to realism—P. Kyle Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and Timothy D. Lyons’ pessimistic modus tollens argument—fall short as arguments against realism.

Realist Representations of Particles

While much debate about scientific realism concerns the issue of whether it is compatible with theory change over time, and certain forms of selective realism have been suggested with this in mind, this chapter considers a closely related challenge for realism: that of articulating how a theory should be interpreted at any given time. In a crucial respect the challenges posed by diachronic and synchronic interpretation are the same; in both cases, realists face an apparent dilemma. The thinner their interpretations, the easier realism is to defend, but at the cost of more substantial commitment. The more substantial their interpretations, the more difficult they are to defend. The chapter looks at this worry in the context of the Standard Model of particle physics. Examining some selective realist attempts at interpretation, it argues that realism is, in fact, compatible with different commitments on the spectrum of thinner to more substantial, thus mitigating the dilemma.

Of Chimeras, Harmony, and Kintsugi: Towards a Historicist Epistemology of Paleontological Reconstruction, Theory-Change, and Exploring Heuristics

I analyze the epistemic strategies used by paleontologists between the early 19th and early 20th centuries to reconstruct features of ancient organisms from fossilized bodies and footprints by presenting two heuristics: (1) a “claim of harmony” which posits the harmonious interaction of natural objects in order for complex systems to be simplified and (2) the “kintsugi heuristic” which is used inter-theoretically to explore new claims of harmony. I apply these to three successive historical cases: Georges Cuvier’s laws of correlation, the panpsychist paleontology of Edward Drinker Cope, and the single-character approach of Henry Fairfield Osborn.

Sobre el respeto a la evidencia empírica. McIntyre en La actitud científica.

No hace mucho tiempo, la demarcación, el cambio teórico o la racionalidad científica coloreaban la paleta de la filosofía de la ciencia. Hoy estos problemas son vistos como asuntos clásicos de la disciplina. En La actitud científica, Lee McIntyre renueva el escaparate filosófico recuperando el problema de la demarcación, defendiendo que lo distintivo de la ciencia es “que se preocupa por la evidencia y está dispuesta a modificar sus teorías en función de la evidencia”. Se presentan a continuación una síntesis de la obra y cinco objeciones. Not long ago, demarcation, theory change and scientific rationality used to clutter up debates on the philosophy of science. These issues are now seen as the classical subjects of the discipline. In The Scientific Attitude, Lee McIntyre revamps the philosophical showcase by taking over the demarcation problem by asserting that “what is distinctive about science is that it cares about evidence and is willing to change its theories on the basis of evidence”. I hereby synthetize his proposal and offer five objections.