Hegel’s modal argument against Spinozism. An interpretation of the chapter ‘Actuality’ in theScience of Logic

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Franz Knappik
Keyword(s):  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Modal Argument ◽  
Critical Engagement ◽  
Modal Metaphysics

AbstractI propose a new reading of Hegel’s discussion of modality in the ‘Actuality’ chapter of theScience of Logic. On this reading, the main purpose of the chapter is a critical engagement with Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. Hegel first reconstructs a rationalist line of thought — corresponding to the cosmological argument for the existence of God — that ultimately leads to Spinozist necessitarianism. He then presents a reductio argument against necessitarianism, contending that as a consequence of necessitarianism, no adequate explanatory accounts of facts about finite reality can be given.

A restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the cosmological argument

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Quantum Mechanical ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Restricted Version ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen ◽  
Mechanical Phenomena

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that, necessarily, every contingently true proposition has an explanation. The PSR is the most controversial premise in the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is likely that one reason why a number of philosophers reject the PSR is that they think there are conceptual counter-examples to it. For instance, they may think, with Peter van Inwagen, that the conjunction of all contingent propositions cannot have an explanation, or they may believe that quantum mechanical phenomena cannot be explained. It may, however, be that these philosophers would be open to accepting a restricted version of the PSR as long as it was not ad hoc. I present a natural restricted version of the PSR that avoids all conceptual counter-examples, and yet that is strong enough to ground a cosmological argument. The restricted PSR says that all explainable true propositions have explanations.

Arguments for the Existence of God

2014 ◽  
pp. 700-716
Author(s):  
Brandon C. Look
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Knowledge ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Eternal Truths ◽  
The Status

This chapter critically discusses Leibniz’s arguments for the existence of God. It explores Leibniz’s improvements on the traditional ontological arguments of Anselm and Descartes, as well as his version of the cosmological argument and his argument from eternal truths. It is suggested that, while Leibniz’s arguments are unlikely to move a hardened atheist, they do offer important insights about the status of the existence predicate, the nature of modality, and the nature of mathematical knowledge.

Oakes’ New Modal Argument for the Existence of God

1984 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-459
Author(s):  
Linda Zagzebski ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Existence Of God ◽  
Modal Argument

Hume and Proofs for the Existence of God

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Bell
Keyword(s):  
Causal Reasoning ◽  
Ontological Argument ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Design Argument ◽  
Theory Of Ideas ◽  
Empiricist Theory

This chapter is about Hume’s critiques of the cosmological, ontological, and design arguments for the existence of God, as proposed by Samuel Clarke and other Newtonian theologians. Clarke regarded the cosmological argument (in a form that incorporates the ontological argument) as essential to prove the uniqueness, eternity, infinity, and omnipresence of God and the design argument as essential to prove the wisdom and foresight of God. The criticisms Hume makes all depend on his empiricist theory of ideas and his revolutionary theories of causation and causal reasoning. Most of the chapter discusses these themes. The concluding section draws attention to recent research that shows two things. One is how central to Hume’s whole philosophical enterprise is his rejection of theological ideas and doctrines. The other is how this relates to his rejection of certain parts of Newtonian metaphysics.

scholarly journals Al-Ghazālī and Descartes on Defeating Skepticism

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 133-148
Author(s):  
Saja Parvizian ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Natural Light ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Divine Intervention ◽  
The Third ◽  
Meditations On First Philosophy ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Key Features

Commentators have noticed the striking similarities between the skep­tical arguments of al-Ghazālī’s Deliverance from Error and Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. However, commentators agree that their solutions to skepticism are radically different. Al-Ghazālī does not use rational proofs to defeat skepticism; rather, he relies on a supernatural light [nūr] sent by God to rescue him from skepticism. Descartes, on the other hand, relies on the natural light of reason [lumen naturale] to prove the existence of God, mind, and body. In this paper, I argue that Descartes’ solution is closer to al-Ghazālī’s than commentators have allowed. A close reading of the cosmological argument of the Third Meditation reveals that there is also a type of divine intervention em­ployed in the Meditations, which helps Descartes defeat skepticism. This reading may buttress the case made by some that al-Ghazālī influenced Descartes; but more importantly, it requires us to rethink key features of Descartes’ epistemology.

scholarly journals A Cosmo-Ontological Argument for the Existence of a First Cause - Perhaps God

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
Uwe Meixner
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Causal Argument ◽  
Modern Physics ◽  
First Cause

The paper presents a new version of the "Cosmological Argument" – considered to be an ontological argument, since it exclusively uses ontological concepts and principles. It employs famous results of modern physics, and distinguishes between event-causation and agent-causation. Due to these features, the argument manages to avoid the objection of infinite regress. It remains true, however, that the conclusion of the argument (just like the conclusion of Thomas Aquinas’s causal argument) is too unspecific to be unambiguously considered an argument for the existence of God.

Conceptual, Historical, and Cognitive Roots of Perfect Being Theism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yujin Nagasawa
Keyword(s):  
Precise Definition ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Design Argument ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter provides a precise definition of perfect being theism and compares it with alternatives such as atheism, polytheism, pantheism, and panentheism. The chapter then considers the historical and cognitive roots of perfect being theism. It argues, contrary to what is widely believed, that perfect being theism is not Anselm’s invention or an unnatural, scholarly artefact. The chapter then explains the philosophical merits of holding perfect being theism and considers the relationship between perfect being theism and prominent arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological argument and the design argument. It concludes with a discussion of three types of arguments against perfect being theism.

A response to Oppy, and to Davey and Clifton

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD M. GALE ◽  
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
True Proposition ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Entailment Relation ◽  
Strong Principle

Our paper ‘A new cosmological argument’ gave an argument for the existence of God making use of the weak Principle of Sufficient Reason (W-PSR) which states that for every proposition p, if p is true, then it is possible that there is an explanation for p. Recently, Graham Oppy, as well as Kevin Davey and Rob Clifton, have criticized the argument. We reply to these criticisms. The most interesting kind of criticism in both papers alleges that the W-PSR can be justifiably denied by the atheist, and constitutes no improvement on the strong Principle of Sufficient Reason (S-PSR) which claims that every true proposition in fact has an explanation. The criticism is predicated on the fact that it can be shown that the W-PSR entails the S-PSR. We argue that the W-PSR's plausibility remains despite the criticisms. From this it can be seen to follow that the entailment relation between the W-PSR and the S-PSR gives one reason to believe the S-PSR.

scholarly journals Locke, God, and Materialism

2021 ◽  
pp. 101-132
Author(s):  
Stewart Duncan
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Rene Descartes ◽  
Cosmological Argument ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
Important Argument ◽  
Ralph Cudworth

This chapter investigates Locke’s views about materialism, by looking at the discussion in Essay IV.x. There Locke—after giving a cosmological argument for the existence of God—argues that God could not be material, and that matter alone could never produce thought. In discussing the chapter, I pay particular attention to some comparisons between Locke’s position and those of two other seventeenth-century philosophers, René Descartes and Ralph Cudworth. Making use of those comparisons, I argue for two main claims. The first is that the important argument of Essay IV.x.10 is fundamentally an argument about the causation of perfections. Indeed, Locke gives multiple such arguments in the chapter. My second main claim is that my proposed reading of IV.x is not merely consistent with what Locke says elsewhere about superaddition, but also provides reasons to favor a particular understanding of what superaddition is.

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