“The Twofold Affection”: The Background to John Chrysostom’s Use of Φύσις and Χάρις

John Chrysostom’s pairing of φύσις and χάρις, which tends to be read exclusively in light of the Pelagian controversies, reflects the influence of distinct models in early Christianity for conceptualizing the interaction between created nature(s) and the divine creator. The first, informed especially by Pauline categories, understands “nature” (φύσις; natura) to refer to an inborn relationship that stands in contrast to the adopted sonship qualified by “grace” (χάρις; gratia). The second, evident especially in Philo and Alexandrian theologians, takes nature as an individual essence, to which grace is superadded as a property. In the final portion of the essay I show evidence that Chrysostom tends to prioritize the property model over the filial model of nature and grace.

MICHAEL BERKELEY (b. 1948)Three Songs to Children (2002)

This chapter looks at British composer Michael Berkeley’s Three Songs to Children (2002). This early piece, recently revised, is ideal for a young artist’s recital. Unpretentious and straightforward in its demands, it has a haunting charm and freshness. In addition to higher voices, a light mezzo could sing it comfortably, since there are no extremes of tessitura. The individual essence of three great but fundamentally different poets is mirrored in the contrasting treatment of the settings. The first—‘A Cradle Song’ (W. B. Yeats)—is a tender, rocking lullaby; the central, longest song—‘Sonnet to a Child’ (Wilfred Owen)—digs deeper, capturing the vibrant imagery and poignant reflections in more rhetorical style; and the third—‘A Child Asleep’ (Walter de la Mare)—is bound together by a continuous running accompaniment. The composer favours a tonal idiom, sometimes modal, and shows a predilection for sudden key shifts. Cues and doublings in the accompaniment are generally helpful. The lithe vocal lines move easily over a wide range and phrasing is well thought out, but there are a few unexpected quirks in syllabic groupings, including changes of accent and syncopation, which give added life to the rhythms.

CORE OF THE ESSENCE AND CORE OF THE PERSON: JEAN HERING AND A HIDDEN SOURCE OF EDITH STEIN’S EARLY ONTOLOGY

The present paper makes the case for considering Jean Hering the source from which Edith Stein first borrowed the concept of “core,” notably, “core of the person.” In particular, we maintain that the background of Stein’s decision is represented by the original version of Hering’s famous booklet Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee, namely, the Appendix (Fragmente zur Vorbereitung einer künftigen Lehre vom Apriori) to his still unpublished dissertation on Lotze. Nevertheless, whereas Hering introduces the concept of “core” to merely discriminate between different types of essences within the framework of a general attempt at determining the structure of individual essences, Stein takes it to characterize always and exclusively the structure of the person, notably, its mode of being, thereby paving the way for her future personalistic ontology. The paper will be divided into three parts. In § 2 evidence will be produced to support the thesis that Stein had direct knowledge of Hering’s dissertation. § 3 will analyze Hering’s notions of essence and “core of the essence” (in both versions of the text and in relation to the example of the “essence” of Caesar). Finally, § 4 will tackle the “core” in Stein’s early works, in particular in the book on empathy, and in comparison with Hering’s understanding of it. The paper intends to pursue a double goal: it aims at emphasizing the novelty of Stein’s conception of the essence, notably, core of the (individual) essence while at the same time reconstructing the wider framework to which it belongs.

Essence and Existence

The essentialist theory faces two problems concerning contingent beings. First, it apparently leads to the conclusion, unpalatable to believers in contingently existing individuals, that Aristotle is a necessary being. Second, if, as is reasonable to suppose, some natures exist contingently, then they will, it seems, be unable to ground necessities. In this chapter, it is attempted to explain how these problems are best solved. The heart of the first problem concerns how essence interacts with existence. In short: statements of essence—including statements of individual essence—are not existence-entailing with respect to the entities whose essences they purport to state. The key to solving the second problem is a distinction between a proposition being true in and true of a possible situation. The essences of actually yet contingently existing entities ground necessary truths, and in particular, the truth of propositions about those entities of, but not in, all possible situations.

TO THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING THE NATURE OF CORPOREALITY INTELLIGENCE OF PERSONALITY

The article is aimed to reveal the theoretical review of corporeality intelligence of the individual essence problem. Different philosophical and psychological scientific views of corporeality’s role in human life are analyzed. The specificity of considering the «body image» and «physical self» personality in classical and contemporary scientific research is defined. The role of corporeality in the functioning of the individual in the modern conditions of the technogenic society is determined. The theoretical understanding of the essence of corporeality intelligence and its phenomenology in human behavior is described.Corporeality intelligence is described as an important component in self- consciousness and as a factor that determine the achievement of satisfaction in life and activity, personality’s self-realization success. Corporeality intelligence is defined a set of knowledge about the body and its nature, body skills and abilities of a person.

There is no haecceitic Euthyphro problem

Jason Bowers and Meg Wallace (‘The Haecceitic Euthyphro Problem’, Analysis, 2018) have recently argued that those who hold that every individual instantiates a ‘haecceity’ (or ‘individual essence’) are caught up in a Euthyphro-style dilemma when confronted with familiar cases of fission and fusion. Key to Bowers and Wallace’s dilemma are certain assumptions about the nature of metaphysical explanation and the explanatory commitments of belief in haecceities. However, I argue that the dilemma only arises due to a failure to distinguish between providing a metaphysical explanation of why a fact holds vs. a metaphysical explanation of what it is for a fact to hold. In the process, I also shed light on the explanatory commitments of belief in haecceities.

Explanation and Individual Essence

In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz Principle (PII) and its converse for the qualitative view can be avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity- conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT or, alternatively, the neo-Aristotelian position of taking essences as natures in the Aristotelian sense, can help to evade these main charges against the qualitative view. The functional parallels with the alternative haecceitistic view of individuation and individual essence will also be considered.