Grounded conceptual knowledge: Emergence from sensorimotor interactions

2015 ◽  
pp. 120-136
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Sensorimotor Interactions ◽  
Knowledge Emergence

Spontaneous focusing on quantitative relations as a predictor of the development of rational number conceptual knowledge.

2016 ◽  
Vol 108 (6) ◽  
pp. 857-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake McMullen ◽  
Minna M. Hannula-Sormunen ◽  
Eero Laakkonen ◽  
Erno Lehtinen
Keyword(s):  
Rational Number ◽  
Conceptual Knowledge

His Lordship's -ship and the King of Golfdom. Against a purely functional analysis of suffixhood

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Baeskow
Keyword(s):  
Functional Analysis ◽  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Semantic Information ◽  
Word Formation ◽  
Distributed Morphology ◽  
Word Class ◽  
Formation Processes ◽  
Functional Elements ◽  
Grammatical Morphemes ◽  
Independent Model

For many decades there has been a consensus among linguists of various schools that derivational suffixes function not only to determine the word-class of the complex expressions they form, but also convey semantic information. The aspect of suffix-inherent meaning is ignored by representatives of a relatively new theoretical direction – Neo-Construction Grammar – who consider derivational suffixes to be either purely functional elements of the grammar or meaningless phonological realizations of abstract grammatical morphemes. The latter view is maintained by adherents of Distributed Morphology, who at the same time emphasize the importance of conceptual knowledge for derivational processes without attempting to define this aspect. The purpose of this study is first of all to provide support for the long-standing assumption that suffixes are inherently meaningful. The focus of interest is on the suffixes -ship, -dom and -hood. Data from Old English and Modern English (including neologisms) will show that these suffixes have developed rich arrays of meaning which cannot be structurally derived. Moreover, since conceptual knowledge is indeed an important factor for word-formation processes, a concrete, theory-independent model for the representation of the synchronically observable meaning components associated with -ship, -dom and -hood will be proposed.

Lexikálny Význam V Recepcii

2018 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 302-315
Author(s):  
Juraj Dolník
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Lexical Meaning ◽  
Pragmatic Analysis ◽  
Way Of Thinking

Abstract Asking first about how the lexical meaning manifests itself as we experience it in a communicative event, the author explores the background of the ways in which we are able to perceive the meaning of words in texts. One useful way of thinking about how recipients react to the words in utterances is in terms of behavioural and actional lexical meaning. The first refers to the understanding of meaning, the second corresponds to interpretations of words when the recipient does not succeed in the process of natural understanding of words. These terms lead to questions about the rationality of language. One aspect of this rationality is the function of the intentional­emergent mechanism that adjusts the interplay of automatic and deliberate use of language. This mechanism has its roots in the fundamental human nature: we are behavioural­actional beings. Pragmatic analysis sheds light on how hearers understand and interpret what they hear with regard to their conceptual knowledge associated with words.

Knowledge, Conceptual Knowledge, and the Iconic Route to Grasping an Idea

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Rowett
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Types Of Knowledge ◽  
The Difference

This chapter sketches the reasons for taking Plato’s term episteme and related ‘knowledge’ terms to refer to an irreducible kind of knowledge that is not standardly included in lists of key types of knowledge, and for identifying corresponding irreducible senses of ‘being’ and ‘truth’. Second, it reviews existing ways of understanding Plato, exploring the difference between developmental and unitarian readings, and situating this work among them. Third, it considers the reasons why one might include a search for a definition as part of a philosophical enquiry, and examines when, if ever, such a search could be helpful, and why a successful definition might not be Plato’s main goal or a goal at all. Fourth, it examines the relation between knowledge and propositional utterances expressing knowledge. Finally, it sketches the plan for the rest of the book.

Conclusions and Further Tasks

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Rowett
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Type Iii

The chapter starts by telling a narrative to explain how and why the author came to reject the mistaken assumptions with which the research began, and how these initial assumptions had assumed false dichotomies familiar from existing work in the field. The chapter thereby explains why the results presented in Chapters 1–12 might seem unexpected. It draws together the chief philosophical lessons of those chapters, highlighting the fact that Plato is right about (i) how conceptual knowledge differs from both propositional knowledge and recognition of tokens, (ii) the different sense of ‘being’ involved in knowing ‘what it is’, about a type, (iii) the value of images and icons in the philosophical method, and (iv) the irrelevance of Socratic definitions and other bogus criteria for knowledge. Finally, it sketches some possible ways in which a further volume might apply the results to other dialogues.

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