Distributing Benefits and Burdens: Assessing Performance of the US Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System

Author(s):  
Jeremy L. Hall
2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (05) ◽  
pp. 1069-1092 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER LINDELÖF

This paper identifies differences in institutional contexts (legislation) between Sweden and the UK and their effects on technology transfer policies. It then proceeds to examine how such activities are organized by universities. Empirical evidence from surveys conducted with technology transfer managers at eight Swedish universities and eleven UK universities gathered in Sweden and the UK during 2004 is analyzed. It is argued that the historical developments of these systems depend on different institutional contexts, which influence the modes of organization. The UK technology transfer system is based on similar legislation to that of the US, with IPRs being granted to the universities. The Swedish system, however, grants IPRs to the individual researchers, though with some new features — such as science parks and incubators — suggesting a change towards greater agent (university) involvement in encouraging technology transfer. This change indicates a breakthrough for the "entrepreneurial university" in Sweden.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Gerrit J. Gonschorek ◽  
Günther G. Schulze ◽  

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.


2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis M. Hsu ◽  
Judy Hayman ◽  
Judith Koch ◽  
Debbie Mandell

Summary: In the United States' normative population for the WAIS-R, differences (Ds) between persons' verbal and performance IQs (VIQs and PIQs) tend to increase with an increase in full scale IQs (FSIQs). This suggests that norm-referenced interpretations of Ds should take FSIQs into account. Two new graphs are presented to facilitate this type of interpretation. One of these graphs estimates the mean of absolute values of D (called typical D) at each FSIQ level of the US normative population. The other graph estimates the absolute value of D that is exceeded only 5% of the time (called abnormal D) at each FSIQ level of this population. A graph for the identification of conventional “statistically significant Ds” (also called “reliable Ds”) is also presented. A reliable D is defined in the context of classical true score theory as an absolute D that is unlikely (p < .05) to be exceeded by a person whose true VIQ and PIQ are equal. As conventionally defined reliable Ds do not depend on the FSIQ. The graphs of typical and abnormal Ds are based on quadratic models of the relation of sizes of Ds to FSIQs. These models are generalizations of models described in Hsu (1996) . The new graphical method of identifying Abnormal Ds is compared to the conventional Payne-Jones method of identifying these Ds. Implications of the three juxtaposed graphs for the interpretation of VIQ-PIQ differences are discussed.


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