Salary caps

Author(s):  
Hayden Coombs ◽  
Braden Bagley
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Dennis Coates ◽  
Bernd Frick
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Zimbalist
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Helmut M Dietl ◽  
Markus Lang ◽  
Alexander Rathke

Abstract This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and studies the welfare effect of salary caps. It shows that salary caps will increase competitive balance and decrease overall salary payments within the league. The resulting effect on social welfare is counter-intuitive and depends on the preference of fans for aggregate talent and for competitive balance. A salary cap that binds only for large-market clubs will increase social welfare if fans prefer aggregate talent despite the fact that the salary cap will result in lower aggregate talent. If fans prefer competitive balance, on the other hand, any binding salary cap will reduce social welfare.


Author(s):  
Anthony C. Krautmann ◽  
John L. Solow
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-258
Author(s):  
Stanley Veliotis

This paper derives equivalent gross salary for Major League Baseball free agents weighing offers from teams based in states with different income tax rates. After discussing tax law applicable to professional sports teams’ players, including “jock taxes” and the interrelationship of state and federal taxes, this paper builds several models to determine equivalent salary. A base-case derivation, oversimplified by ignoring nonsalary income and Medicare tax, demonstrates that salary adjustment from a more tax expensive state’s team requires solely a state (but not federal) tax gross-up. Subsequent derivations, introducing nonsalary income and Medicare tax, demonstrate full Medicare but small federal tax gross-ups are also required. This paper applies the model to equalize salary offers from two teams in different states in a highly stylized example approximating the 2010 free agency of pitcher Cliff Lee. Aspects of the models may also be used to inform other sports’ players of their after-tax income if salary caps limit the ability to receive adequately grossed-up salaries.


2021 ◽  
pp. 152700252110595
Author(s):  
Marco Runkel

Competitive balance regulation is more widespread in North American than in Europan sports leagues. The present paper addresses the question whether this observation can be explained with the help of differences in the degree of player mobility. Using an extended version of the workhorse contest model of sports leagues, the paper shows that the answer depends on the kind of competitive balance regulation. While player mobility may help to explain the difference with respect to salary regulation (e.g., salary caps), the choice of revenue sharing schemes turns out to be independent of player mobility.


Author(s):  
David George Surdam

This chapter examines the origins of the BAA, which was fraught with disappointment and difficulties. The nascent BAA sought the two advantages of territorial rights and the reserve clause that other professional team sports league owners possessed, but the league faced competition from an incumbent league—the National Basketball League (NBL). The two basketball leagues contested just one or two cities and were largely able to avoid a ruinous bidding war for players, including graduating college talent. This low level of strife was unique to professional basketball and may have contributed to the eventual success of those teams that survived. The BAA owners also made crucial decisions regarding revenue sharing, team salary caps, and differentiating their product from the college game.


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