Of Distributive Justice and Economic Efficiency: An Integrated Theory of the Common Law

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Webster

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 413-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELODIE BERTRAND

Abstract:‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (Coase, 1960) asserts a normative role for the common law judge, that of taking into account the economic consequences of his decisions in allocating property rights. This position is often accused of inconsistency: Coase sees the figure of the judge as willing and able to improve economic efficiency, but criticises the actors of public intervention, particularly regulators, for being fallible, vulnerable to political pressures, and lacking information. I shall show that Coase's giving this role to the judge stems precisely from his criticism of public intervention. This means that his figure of the judge escapes the tenets of the theoretical system that first rendered it necessary. Various reasons could explain this difference of treatment as between the judge and the other figures of public intervention in Coase's system, but Coase makes too strong an opposition between common law on one side and regulatory and statutory law on the other, and leaves unexplained the motivation of judges.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-169
Author(s):  
Florian Rödl

Abstract In the first part of his book, Peter Benson elaborates for the common law that fairness in exchange is not only a fundamental principle of contract law, but that it is, moreover, conceptually rooted in the idea of private autonomy. For the common law presumes that a party to a contract intends, in principle, to exchange performance at its value and on fair terms. The following comment shows that this presumption also animates German contract law, including the rules on the review of standard terms. In the second part, Benson develops the image of a harmonious complementarity of private law, which is characterised by transactional justice, and public law, which instantiates distributive justice. The following comment disputes the claimed harmony by demonstrating the fundamental asymmetry in the institutionalisation of both forms of justice in civil society.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 256-283
Author(s):  
Peter Benson

Abstract This reply addresses some of the basic questions and criticisms raised by commentators in their interesting pieces on Justice in Transactions. My aim in that book is to work out a public basis of justification for the common law of contract. Given the limits of space, the discussion here is unavoidably selective and incomplete. Within these parameters, however, the article presents, and hopefully clarifies, some of the book’s main arguments that are relevant to the comments, using the footnotes for more detailed responses to the particular points made. These points encompass both methodological and substantive issues. The former center around the nature of public justification and whether the proposed theory of contract law meets its requirements. The substantive issues addressed include the role of promises in contract law, the compatibility between contractual fairness and contractual freedom, and the relation between contract and distributive justice.


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