Exclusive Dealing and the Whiskey Trust, 1890–1895

1998 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 755-778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Troesken
Keyword(s):  
Low Cost ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Competitive Effects ◽  
Market Dominance ◽  
Predatory Strategy ◽  
History Of

This article uses the history of the Whiskey Trust to explore the competitive effects of vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing. The Whiskey Trust distilled alcoholic spirits and bribed distributors not to carry competing brands of spirits. For the Whiskey Trust, exclusive dealing was an ineffective predatory strategy. Despite the trust's market dominance and manifold predatory strategies, it failed to preempt entry. The trust failed, in part, because its rivals could vertically integrate at low cost. Competition disciplined the trust more effectively than did numerous antitrust suits.

Vertical Restrictions: Development of Theory, Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement

2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Hierarchical Organization ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
New Institutional Theory ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Antitrust Legislation ◽  
Market Organization

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.

The Nature of Vertical Restraints

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-197
Author(s):  
Robert L. Steiner
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Restraints

scholarly journals Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hal J. Singer ◽  
J. Gregory Sidak
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Dynamic Efficiency ◽  
Cable Operator ◽  
Market Dominance ◽  
Time Warner ◽  
Vertical Foreclosure

This paper argues that a cable operator with sufficient market power in the downstream multi-channel video programming distribution (MVPD) market can deny access to unaffiliated programmers, resulting in an upstream programming rival's exit or impaired dynamic efficiency. Further, market dominance by cable operators may harm consumers of video programming through higher prices and less choice in the downstream MVPD market. The reason is that as unaffiliated video programming becomes affiliated programming, the latter is then withheld from rival MVPDs. This analysis is then applied to the recent acquisition of Adelphia by Comcast and Time Warner.

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