Relationship between Inherent Cooking Rate and Warner-Bratzler Shear Force of Pork Chops Cooked to Two Degrees of Doneness

The objective was to test inherent cooking rate differences on tenderness values of boneless pork chops when exogenous factors known to influence cooking rate were controlled. Temperature and elapsed time were monitored during cooking for all chops. Cooking rate was calculated as the change in °C per minute of cooking time. Warner-Bratzler shear force (WBSF) was measured on chops cooked to either 63 °C or 71 °C. Slopes of regression lines and coefficients of determination between cooking rate and tenderness values for both degrees of doneness (DoD) were calculated. Shear force values decreased as cooking rate increased regardless of DoD (p ≤ 0.05), however changes in tenderness due to increased cooking rate were limited (β1 = −0.201 for 63 °C; β1 = −0.217 for 71 °C). Cooking rate only explained 3.2% and 5.4% of variability in WBSF of chops cooked to 63 °C and 71 °C, respectively. Cooking loss explained the most variability in WBSF regardless of DoD (partial R2 = 0.09–0.12). When all factors were considered, a stepwise regression model explained 20% of WBSF variability of chops cooked to 63 °C and was moderately predictive of WBSF (model R2 = 0.34) for chops cooked to 71 °C. Overall, cooking rate had minimal effect on pork chop tenderness.

Vertical Mergers and Input Foreclosure Lessons from the AT&T/Time Warner Case

This article offers a practical guide to analyzing vertical mergers using the general approach to input foreclosure and raising rivals’ costs that is described in the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines that were issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The step-by-step analysis described here draws lessons from how that theory of harm played out in the lone vertical merger case that has been litigated by the antitrust agencies in recent decades: the 2018 challenge by the Department of Justice to the merger between AT&T and Time Warner. I testified in court as the DOJ’s economic expert in that case. I explain here how to quantify the increase in rivals’ costs and the elimination of double marginalization that are caused by a vertical merger and how to evaluate their net effect on downstream customers. I also explain how this economic analysis fits into the three-step burden-shifting approach that the courts apply to mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Based on my experience in the AT&T/Time Warner case, I identify a number of shortcomings of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines.

Vocal Virtuosity, Value Creation, and the Transformation of Contemporary Gospel Music

This chapter argues that virtuosic gospel vocal performance constitutes a medium of spiritual value creation that produces communal power and facilitates what can be described as a trade of musicality—of commercial exchange centered around sacred music. Dorinda Clark Cole is a renowned gospel vocalist. In this chapter, Clark Cole’s concert at the Samsung Experience showroom in the Time Warner Center at the Columbus Circle area of New York City provides a productive site from which to examine the commercialization of gospel music because it involves exchange relations between a musical community and a corporate sponsor. A closer focus on the relationship between gospel music and capitalism in this context challenges a dichotomized notion of how gospel music circulates in varied sacred and secular arenas that seemingly represent incommensurate, even contrasting, systems of value. Through a musical analysis and an exploration of corporate interests in the concert, value creation through musical performance in a commercial setting is shown to forge social relations and produce power that sustains the regenerative nature of gospel music.

Vertikale Integration im Mediensektor und Fusionskontrolle

The antitrust assessment of vertical media mergers between content providers and distributeurs has until now unjustifiably led a shadowy existence in Germany. Yet there is a considerable practical relevance in view of the success of OVDs such as Netflix and causally related controversial vertical mergers such as AT&T/Time Warner. Hence, this dissertation sharpens the view for the numerous interesting problem areas. With an interdisciplinary and comparative law approach, the causes of vertical media mergers in the face of OVD disruption as well as the economic foundations are first examined. Building on the economic findings and taking into account the important aspects sector regulation, the lex lata and the current antitrust practice in the US, the EU and Germany are then discussed and evaluated.

Um outro quinhão de imagens: Audiovisual on-line e Multi-Channel Networks

Este artigo investiga uma experiência específica para a criação de conteúdo voltado ao streaming, em sua busca por construir outras dimensões para a imagem on-line. A análise recai sobre os multi-channel networks (MCNs), produtores de conteúdo nativo que, diferenciando-se em relação ao broadcast convencional e à televisão segmentada, contam com o envolvimento tanto de conglomerados globais de comunicação, como a Disney e a Time Warner, quanto de operações de tecnologias de informação, com destaque para o Google. Construídos segundo esta associação diversa, alimentam plataformas como o YouTube, mas não apenas. Os MCNs ordenam uma lógica para a imagem que, como outras tentativas de definir a televisão do séc. XXI, inserem-se num diagrama de controle pautado pela lógica do protocolo, com conteúdo diversificado trafegando livremente por espaços variados.

Vertical Mergers, The Coase Theorem, And The Burden of Proof

The challenge by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner, and a prior challenge by DOJ and Federal Communications Commission to Comcast’s acquisition of NBC-Universal, has increased attention on vertical mergers. The standard approach identifies a tactic that the merged firm would employ that is both profitable and harms consumers. This approach misses the target; a profitable but anticompetitive tactic may be necessary but is not sufficient. The “Coase theorem” implies that courts and enforcement agencies should instead focus on why vertical integration is necessary to achieve an outcome that would be profitable to the merging firms. The focus on the tactic rather than why ownership matters presumes that vertical merger is necessary, without supporting theory or evidence. The same proposition should hold for horizontal mergers, but the required strength of evidence is greater for vertical mergers because mergers between complement providers are first-order beneficial and the conduct facilitated by horizontal mergers but not vertical mergers is typically illegal.

INDECISÕES E PROCRASTINAÇÕES: A FUSÃO AT&T-TIME WARNER E A REGULAÇÃO NO BRASIL

Centrado numa perspectiva arqueológica e atento à forma adotada pelas mídias para a constituição do streaming, o texto analisa o julgamento sobre a compra da Time Warner pela AT&T no Brasil, cujo resultado permitirá a criação de novas plataformas de difusão para a imagem, mediante a associação entre uma estrutura para tráfego de informação e o conteúdo de um criador global. Ainda indefinido, o processo se estende desde 2017, em meio a deliberações legais divergentes, que, contraditoriamente, põem em questão a própria norma que avalia o caso. No Brasil, seus termos se tornam parte do que é discutido, expondo uma relação repetida com as normas. Tal dúvida envolve intervenções que buscam produzir dos reguladores uma interpretação das leis segundo as expectativas de quem é julgado, numa decisão com força para inviabilizar um evento capaz de renovar a difusão do audiovisual.