Antimonopoly Compliance in the Energy Sector

The purpose of the article is to identify and clarify the main features of the functioning and implementation of the antimonopoly compliance system at electric power enterprises. The main idea of the article is to use various methods (analysis, induction, etc.) to conduct a study of changes in domestic legislation that relate to the legislative consolidation of the antimonopoly compliance system. Based on statistical data and data from scientific sources, we can identify the main areas of activity of energy companies, where violations of antitrust legislation are most common, which will be identified and prevented by the antitrust compliance system. The scientific novelty of this article is confirmed by the almost absent publications of other authors, which study the effectiveness of the antimonopoly compliance system in the field of electric power industry. The author comes to the conclusion that the antitrust compliance system is an effective mechanism that allows identifying antitrust risks both inside the company and outside it. An increase in the number of companies that have antitrust compliance services will reduce the number of illegal violations by unscrupulous market participants, while these circumstances affect not only the electric power industry, but also other areas of the Russian economy. According to the author, the implementation of antitrust compliance will help to: l) reduce the number of offences committed by companies; 2) to prevent the actions of employees, which may in its work, to violate the antitrust laws; 3) to reduce the number of anti-competitive actions. Availability of antitrust compliance within the company promotes as corporate ethics, and the adoption by the staff of the values of the organization.

Digital Protectionism: Myth or Reality?

Many governments continue or even return to protectionism, with a special influence on digital protectionism that has emerged in the era of digital development. Compared to the traditional protectionism the digital one usually differs due to the expansive growth of digital companies and the enormous amounts of data they gather. The authors focus on the two main elements of digital protectionism – a regulatory regime that creates barriers to cross-border data transfer and benefits in antitrust legislation in respect of internal companies. The purpose of the article is to identify the risks of applying special regulation of personal data protection and using antitrust policy to regulate digital companies functioning as means of protectionism. The analysis includes two stages: comparing of personal data protection and digital protectionism aims, assessing the protectionism motives within the framework of antitrust regulation. Based on the results of the study the authors come to the conclusion that industrial and antitrust regulators should take into account the risks of implementing digital protectionism to the competition.

FTC pick adds force to Biden's antitrust agenda

Significance Khan's unexpected appointment came five days after the House of Representatives introduced antitrust legislation that could break apart Amazon's control of its e-commerce marketplace, prevent Facebook and Google from buying smaller rivals, and make Apple change how it runs its app store. Impacts Biden does not favour breaking up tech platforms, despite such calls from some Progressive Democrats. Investigation -- or the threat of it -- could have a chilling effect on companies, including M&A activity. New US antitrust legislation affecting big tech would likely influence similar legislation in other countries.

Duopoly Competition with Network Effects in Discrete Choice Models

It has been realized for a long time that network effects play an important role in how market participants compete with each other. Arguably, companies like Facebook and Google are able to gain immense market power by leveraging the network effects of their consumers, despite potential competitors. This paper investigates how the dynamics play out in duopoly competition. We find that when the network effects per unit of consumption are weak, the competitors can co-exist and gain even market shares. As network effects become stronger, it is unstable, and even impossible, for the firms to coexist, and one firm emerges victorious, taking the majority of the market. The study provides a theoretical analysis for commonly observed market phenomena. It may also have implications for antitrust legislation: Special policies need to be created to maintain a competitive market structure for products and services with strong network effects.

The influence of digital platforms and algorithms on legal regulation of competition

The antitrust regulation faces challenges in the context of digitalization and algorithmization; several of them are analyzed in the article. The authors explore the influence of digital platforms and pricing algorithms on competitive environment, the practice of their application in view of monopolizing the market and the possibilities to resist such practice from the point of view of the antitrust legislation. They examine the approaches to regulating digital instruments of pricing in order to ensure fair competition. One of the approaches is based on the fact that there is no need to develop specific regulatory instruments due to the lack of information on the consequences of algorithmic pricing applied to competition. Another one implies checking every new pricing algorithm in order to establish its influence on competitive environment and allowing or prohibiting it based on that. The third approach suggests further control using new legal standards that differ from the current ones. Banning algorithmic pricing is viewed as unreasonable as the pricing itself becomes more economically effective. The question of responsibility is raised for the cases when cartels are formed as a result of the activity of computer software. It is concluded that the owners of the software must be held accountable for any actions of the algorithm, as no program can act of its free will, they are controlled by the creator or the right holder.

Competition Law of Ukraine

The research “Competition Law of Ukraine” by Oleksiy O. Kot is dedicated to give general overview of competition and antitrust regulation in legislation of Ukraine. After a brief description of the history of antitrust legislation development the main attention in this research paid to regulation of: protection from abuse of the monopoly; cartels (concerted actions); concentrations (M&A transactions); unfair competition; misleading information. Liability for antitrust legislation breach as well as problems of the actual court practice are also analysed in this research. Laws of Ukraine “On Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine” and “On Protection of Economic Competition” (unofficial translation of their current versions with latest amendments on December 2020) are included as annexes to this publication.

Law and economics vs. formal legal approach in criminal prosecution of the cartel

Criminal prosecution of monopolistic activities in the form of market cartelization is the most sensitive instrument for individuals and can both have a serious deterrent effect and restrict behavior that is beneficial to the public welfare. The paper considers theoretical and economic aspects of choosing an antitrust enforcement regime in view of the projected changes in the discussion and application of the norms of article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, taking into account possible differences between organizing a cartel, entering into a cartel agreement and participating in a cartel. It is obvious that there are various options for correlating the concept of concluding an agreement and participating in it, including anti-competitive. However, it requires realistic assumptions about human behavior. Based on the principle of methodological individualism and the concept of bounded rationality used in economic sciences, the authors demonstrate restrictions on projecting the ratio of agreement conclusion/participation of legal entities (economic entities) on actions of individuals. Practical issues of designing criminal punishment for cartels are considered taking into account various legal concepts, including the form and types of guilt, as well as on the basis of comparison with other articles of the Criminal Code providing punishment for collective unlawful acts. In connection with the reproduction of the tradition of hostility in antitrust legislation, the Russian antimonopoly legislation has identified the risks of objective imputation (risks of type I errors) and insufficient punishment of the cartel organizer (risks of type II errors) in case of underestimation of the weight of economic concepts based on the principle of methodological individualism and the assumption of bounded rationality of individuals.

Features of agricultural producers economic behavior in Ukraine

The economic behavior of business structures in agriculture directly depends on the organization of their cooperation in the economic activity process. The aim of the article is to study the features of modern economic behavior of agricultural producers in Ukraine. To do this, the author identified the distribution factors of organizational and legal forms of agricultural production by economic behavior type, as well as organizational and legal features of individual models of economic behavior of agricultural production in Ukraine. Materials of thematic scientific publications, as well as empirical methods (observation and comparison) and theoretical methods (analysis and synthesis, modeling) were used to highlight the features of the object of study. The influence of the oligarchic model of the national economy of Ukraine on the structural transformation of agricultural production entities in the form of subordination of the interests of the state to the interests of individual social groups and the low effectiveness of antitrust legislation is investigated. The author found that in Ukraine the dual structure of agricultural entities was formed, in which two models of their economic behavior were simultaneously developing. The corporate model is represented by large commodity production of agricultural products based on utilization of the resource potential of the reorganized collective agricultural enterprises. Individual small-scale model is presented in agricultural production using the resource potential of private households and farms. The author found out that the organizational and legal forms of agricultural business entities will be determined by their participation in the contract system, the feasibility of cooperation or their integration. Prospects for further research in this area are a comparative analysis of the role of behavioral economy in the economic growth of organizational forms of agricultural producers in Ukraine, as well as assessing the impact of innovative technologies on the evolution of management approaches in the agricultural sector.

Tax Incentives for Participants of Regional Investment Projects as Preferences

Under the general rule, tex incentives are provided in order to stimulate certain sectors of the economy or activities, contribute to the achievement of social and political objectives before the State. Contemporary tax laws of any country provide many tax incentives, and Russian tax laws are no exception. Meanwhile, tax incentives are in full discretion of the State and are granted at all levels of public power, with the regions having fairly broad powers in this matter. In this regard, without disputing the importance of tax incentivization, it is impossible to fail to notice that the provision of tax incentives may be unequal for the competitors operating on the same commodity market, and some of them, for some reason or other, are not subject to obtaining tax preferences. Moreover, although the tax incentives are provided by the State, the rules for granting them are not related to the procedure intended to grant state preferences under antitrust legislation. The incentives granted at the regional level that may lead to an imbalance in economic entities’ operation in various territories of the Russian Federation are of primery concern. On the example of tax incentives provided for participants of regional investment projects, the paper elucidates the issue of the balance between tax incentives under the Tax Code of the Russian Federation and preferences under antitrust laws. Comparing the essential features of the legal institutions under consideration, the author comes to the conclusion that regional tax incentives should be considered as a type of preferences, although antitrust regulation does not permit proper monitoring of the procedure of granting such preferences.