We The Court : The European Court of Justice and The European Economic Constitution

Author(s):  
Giacomo Rugge

This article provides an analysis of the recent European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) judgment in Council v. K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others. After the Cypriot financial and banking crisis of 2012-13, the case raised the issue as to whether the Euro Group could be considered as an ‘institution’ for the purposes of non-contractual liability under Art. 340 para. 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Court replied in the negative, offering a set of arguments on the nature and role of the Euro Group within the European economic constitution and on the legal protection of individuals vis-à-vis austerity measures. The article summarises and criticises those arguments, showing how this judgment of the Court has made the Euro Group essentially immune against judicial proceedings, despite its pivotal role in the management of European economic and monetary issues.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-242
Author(s):  
Anders Nørgaard Laursen

Abstract This paper reports on an investigation of a recent decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in case C-48/13, Nordea Bank Denmark, concerning the Danish rules for reincorporation of losses from permanent establishments situated in European Union/ European Economic Area (EU/EEA) member states other than Denmark. The article includes comments on various EU tax law aspects of the case - namely the restriction test applied by the ECJ, the justifications brought forward by the intervening governments and the question of proportionality - and examines the consequences of the Danish tax law going forward.


1982 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-47
Author(s):  
Ghiţa Ionescu

No one, friend or foe, of the European Community could deny that its emergence, growth and consolidation in a very brief time as a ready-made administration, with all the powerful institutions it comprises, has been one of the most impressive achievements of modern political imagination and organizational skill. In Brussels, in Luxembourg, in Strasbourg, institutions appeared almost overnight created by the Treaty of Rome, the names of which inspire such contrary feelings in Europe and in the world at large: the European Court of Justice, the European Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee; and last but not least, the European Commission, the most controversial of all these institutions, the most hated or the most admired, precisely because people believe and know that the Commission is the motor of this extraordinary development in European political history.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


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