Comitology and Delegation System in the European Union

The article addresses the system of comitology and delegation in the European Union. It explores such issues like evolution of comitology, contemporary procedures of the control over the European Commission in the process of elaboration of implementing and delegated acts, preferences of legislators regarding control procedures, factors determining the final choice among these procedures. The article shows that the system is based on the “police patrol” model.Should we consider the comitology / delegation procedures as a mechanism of control or discussion (deliberation)? This question is of the greatest theoretical interest. The purpose of this article is to show based on the existing empirical studies, the actual preferences of EU institutions when choosing the procedures of comitology/delegation and the factors influencing the final decision. The article demonstrates that both prior to and after the Lisbon Treaty, the preferences of institutions in choosing procedures differ significantly and can be largely explained by the goal of maximizing their own influence. An empirical analysis of the results of the final choice of procedures demonstrates that the main factors that push toward stricter control procedures are institutional conflict and the complexity of the issue under discussion. These preferences and factors of the choice of procedures allow to conclude that the EU institutions consider the system of comitology and delegation primarily as a mechanism of control over the Commission in the logic of the principal-agent theory.

Reducing information asymmetry and building trust in projects using blockchain technology

The success of every construction project is highly dependent on effective communication and trust between key project participants. It is assumed that all participants in the project will work smoothly together to complete the project. Nevertheless, according to the principal-agent theory, there is information asymmetry between project participants because they also have their own self-interests. Information asymmetry is the situation in which one of the two parties is better informed than the other. Due to complexity of construction projects and the number of participants involved, implementation of blockchain technology would reduce information asymmetry. This paper provides a framework for implementation of blockchain technology in construction projects so as to reduce information asymmetry and enhance trust between project participants. Blockchain technology ensures that all project participants have access to all the information exchanged between them over the duration of the project, and thus helps in developing a more trustful relationship between them.

Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR: A Critical Analysis of Principal–Agent Theory

This paper explores the question of what drives proxy alignment in war and argues that current proxy war scholarship needs further thinking to go beyond focusing on the principal–agent theory and individual actors’ motivation analysis. Rather, there is a need to look at the generative mechanisms of proxy alignment as a process that constitutes patterns of friend–enemy relations. The paper argues securitization patterns from domestic to regional and international levels drive actors to re-evaluate their positions and define their enemies and friends. This is a process of securitization alignment and confluence, which serves as a generative mechanism for proxy alignment in a conflict. Securitization alignment is based on a convergence of securitizations by different actors that create a friend–enemy dynamic and convergence of security interests between actors. The confluence of securitizations from the domestic level to regional and beyond also connects actors across different levels to be in alignment and impact the conflict.

The effects of performance evaluation on punishment in organisations

This article expands understanding of the relationship between punishment and performance in organisations. We analyse Korean data on performance and punishment as follows. While prior literature has focused on the effect of punishment on performance, this article examines the effect of performance gaps on punishment. Based on behavioural theory, strategic reference point theory and principal–agent theory, it sheds light on the negative relationship between performance gaps (cause) and punishment (effect). The article demonstrates that low performers are more often punished and high performers less so (i.e. a negativity bias). Our results also show that organisations prioritise light punishment over heavy punishment when disciplining employees in response to performance. Points for practitioners Low-performing organisations are more often punished and high-performing organisations less often so. The degree to which negative performance increases punishment is greater than that to which positive performance decreases punishment. Organisations prioritise light punishment over heavy punishment when disciplining employees in response to performance.

Promoting Information-Resource Sharing within the Enterprise: A Perspective of Blockchain Consensus Perception

The prevalence of information technology (IT) and information systems (IS) provides opportunities for enterprises to sustain open innovation. However, information silos that appeared with IS use have made IS inconvenient and thus impeded enterprises’ open innovation. The present study, therefore, aims to resolve this issue by helping understand how to encourage information-resource sharing within the enterprise. We first proposed a new concept—consensus perception—based on the blockchain characteristics and advantages derived from prior studies, and then developed a conceptual model based on the consensus perception and principal–agent theory. Second, we used this conceptual model to investigate whether blockchain technology (BT) can be used to promote information-resource sharing. The results showed that information security concern, perceived rewards, and openness have direct influences on information-resource sharing intention and that trust has indirect effects. The findings provide useful theoretical and practical contributions to sustain enterprises’ open innovation by adopting BT to solve the information-resource sharing issues.

A vállalkozások közzétételi gyakorlatának elméleti megközelítése = Theoretical Aspects of Accounting Disclosure

A vállalkozások közzétételi gyakorlata folyamatosan változott az elmúlt évtizedekben a változó jogi, gazdasági és társadalmi környezet hatására. Egyre több kutatás foglalkozik a közzétételi motivációs tényezőkkel, valamint a vállalati információk közlésével foglalkozó elméletekkel (érdekhordozói elmélet, megbízó-ügynök elmélet, jelzéselmélet, legitimitás elmélet). Tanulmányunkban kísérletet teszünk ezen ösztönző tényezők csoportosítására, valamint bemutatjuk a fenti elméleteket. = Business disclosure practices have changed progressively in recent decades as a result of the changing legal, economic and social environment. More and more research is dealing with the motivational factors of disclosure as well as theories dealing with the disclosure of corporate information (stakeholder theory, principal-agent theory, signaling theory, legitimacy theory). In our study, we attempt to group these motivating factors and present the above theories.

CIO reporting structure and firm strategic orientation – a content analysis approach

Purpose Grounded in the principal-agent theory, this study aims to develop and test hypotheses too, investigate how the firm’s strategic orientations, namely, innovation, growth, differentiation and cost leadership impact the chief information officer (CIO) reporting relationship and structure. Design/methodology/approach The study uses content analysis to analyze a data set of press releases collected from the LexisNexis Academic wire index. The press releases were issued by firms when they hired CIOs between 2003 and 2007, yielding 128 firms, which had specific information about the CIO reporting relationship and structure. Findings The results reveal that firms seeking an innovation, growth or differentiation strategy have their CIOs reporting to the chief executive officer. Research limitations/implications The current study is motivated by the desire to replicate and extend the works of previous researchers who have assessed various CIO issues. Replication takes several forms such as the use of similar or different data sets, different research environments or reinvestigating research concepts through a different theoretical lens. This study makes use of a multi-firm data set spanning five years and the principal-agent theory as the theoretical framework to explore the CIO reporting relationship and structure. Although this study focuses on the hiring trends and the strategic orientations of the firms, future studies should explore other characteristics associated with the CIOs that might have an impact on the reporting relationship such as the years of experience, age, educational background of CIOs and information technology budgets. Practical implications The existing literature has not settled the debate as to whom the CIO should be reporting to and understanding the reporting relationships is important because, in many firms, the organizational structures and the reporting relationships are indicative of the power dynamics and how the organizational resources are controlled and shared. Originality/value Replication studies are important because they confirm, reinforce, extend and provide reliability to the paradigms and knowledge in the discipline, as well as offer reliability of the results upon which scientific progress is based.

Civil–Military Relations and Human Rights

Do civil–military relations influence human rights practices? Building on principal–agent theory, we argue that civilian–military relations, instead of having an effect on mean levels of repression, will be associated with the dispersion in human rights practices. States where there is less control of the military or more conflict between civilian and military leadership will see a wider range of human rights practices. We test our hypotheses quantitatively on a global sample of countries, using updated data on civil–military relations and find evidence that civil–military conflict and lack of control increase the variance in human right practices.