A Kantian Critique of Sellars’ Transcendental Realism

This chapter outlines a strong version of ‘realism’ against what Meillassoux labels ‘correlationism’. It suggests, however, that the critiques made by certain realists of the Kantian noumenal can be answered. It begins by defending Kantian ‘empirical realism’ against the critiques of some realists. Then it moves on to claim that Kant’s arguments for transcendental idealism are stronger than those for Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. The chapter suggests, more controversially, that if one takes seriously Kant’s notion of ‘spontaneous causation’, it is possible to offer a Kantian defence of the ‘grounding’ of the phenomenal in the noumenal. Finally, it argues that Kant offers a stronger form of realism than is generally supposed by his critics.

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Beyond empiricism and transcendental idealism: Transcendental realism and the critique of classical modernism (1973–1975)

The Formation of Critical Realism ◽

10.4324/9780203878088-8 ◽

2010 ◽

pp. 61-83

Keyword(s):

Transcendental Idealism ◽

Transcendental Realism

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Closing Reflections

The Fiery Test of Critique ◽

10.1093/oso/9780199656042.003.0019 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 453-462

Author(s):

Ian Proops

Keyword(s):

Transcendental Idealism ◽

Transcendental Illusion ◽

Transcendental Realism

In this concluding chapter the main lessons of the book are reviewed, and some further problems for Kant raised. The chapter reflects once again on Kant’s confession that he had found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith, offering a deeper explanation of this claim than was given in the introduction. It then considers the consequences of his having regarded Transcendental Realism as not just false, but rather logically impossible. It asks whether such a view can be reconciled—given Kant’s views on contradiction—with the supposed contentfulness of transcendental illusion or with Transcendental Idealism itself. It raises a problem for Kant’s account of metaphysical error as arising from transcendental illusion. Finally, it evaluates Kant’s claim to have offered an exhaustive critique of speculative metaphysics, arguing that this is unfortunately not the case.

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Realism and Materialism

Being and Motion ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190908904.003.0005 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 42-50

Author(s):

Thomas Nail

Keyword(s):

Object Oriented ◽

Transcendental Idealism ◽

New Materialism ◽

The Real ◽

Transcendental Realism ◽

Object Oriented Ontology

This chapter lays out a methodology of transcendental realism and new materialism based on motion. Transcendental realism is the study of the real minimal ontological conditions for the actual emergence of the historical present. The purpose of this method is to give a description of what previous being must at least be like given that it appears as it does today: in motion. The chapter offers critiques of constructivism, empiricism, metaphysics, and transcendental idealism. It also offers a critique of vitalist new materialism, negative materialism, object-oriented ontology, formalism, and all ahistorical methods of thinking about matter and materialism. It concludes with a theory of “process materialism.”

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