The A-edition First Paralogism

This chapter opens with an account of the A-edition first Paralogism. After refining the account of Transcendental Illusion given in Chapter 1, it proceeds to examine Julian Wuerth’s rival interpretation of the first Paralogism and, in connection with that interpretation, Kant’s notion of the ‘substantiale’. The chapter discusses a problem with Kant’s characterization of a paralogism in terms of ‘transcendental’ and ‘empirical’ uses of a category. Finally, it considers the three ways in which a paralogism can be diagnosed, namely, either as an invalid argument with known premises or as a valid argument with at least one unknown premise (a ‘paralogism’ now only by courtesy) or, finally, as a valid argument with known premises which is ‘false with respect to form’ because its proponent commits the fallacy of overestimating the significance of what has been proved. This last, it argues, is the diagnosis Kant offers of the A-edition first paralogism.

Closing Reflections

In this concluding chapter the main lessons of the book are reviewed, and some further problems for Kant raised. The chapter reflects once again on Kant’s confession that he had found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith, offering a deeper explanation of this claim than was given in the introduction. It then considers the consequences of his having regarded Transcendental Realism as not just false, but rather logically impossible. It asks whether such a view can be reconciled—given Kant’s views on contradiction—with the supposed contentfulness of transcendental illusion or with Transcendental Idealism itself. It raises a problem for Kant’s account of metaphysical error as arising from transcendental illusion. Finally, it evaluates Kant’s claim to have offered an exhaustive critique of speculative metaphysics, arguing that this is unfortunately not the case.

The B-Edition First Paralogism

This chapter analyses the second-edition first paralogism. It argues that Kant offers a plausible account of how a philosopher in the grip of transcendental illusion might be led to commit a fallacy of equivocation of the kind Kant discerns in the first paralogism (when its premises are taken to be true), namely, a sophisma figurae dictionis. (The paralogism Kant states is actually an abridged polysyllogism.) The chapter explains how Kant can, by the lights of his own epistemology, regard the premises of the argument as true. The chapter criticizes an interpretation of the Paralogism offered by Michelle Grier and responds to a textual worry raised by Patricia Kitcher. It defends the author’s interpretation against the recent criticisms of Julian Wuerth and Béatrice Longuenesse. Finally, the chapter explains the ways in which the author’s account diverges from that of the (to his mind) close-to-correct interpretation of Karl Ameriks.

Transcendental Illusion

This chapter examines the nature of logical, empirical, and transcendental illusion. It goes into depth on the following topics: Kant’s account of the sources of transcendental illusion, his illustrative example of the construction of polysyllogisms and the lessons he draws from this example, his two accounts of how transcendental illusion leads to dogmatism and error, and his argument for the universality of transcendental illusion. The author partly agrees with, and partly takes issue with, Michelle Grier’s justly influential account of Kant’s views on transcendental illusion and metaphysical error. What is correct in this account is its insistence on maintaining a sharp distinction between transcendental illusion and dogmatic metaphysical error; what is mistaken is its account of the fallacy that constitutes the first paralogism.

The Fourth Paralogism

This chapter examines Kant’s diagnosis of the fourth paralogism. This paralogism argues for the differential certainty of our knowledge of external objects, on the one hand, and our knowledge of our own existence, on the other. The chapter argues that the paralogism does not wear its equivocal middle term, ‘existence outside us’, on its sleeve. An effort is made to reformulate the paralogism so that this phrase can be seen to be the true locus of the equivocation. The chapter then goes on to discuss a range of related issues, including: anti-materialism, monism, Kant’s rejection of external-world scepticism, and the role played by transcendental illusion in encouraging the paralogism. The chapter closes with some reflections on architectonic and method as these topics relate to the Paralogisms.

The First Paralogism

This chapter addresses a range of questions relating to the Paralogisms in general and the first Paralogism in particular. In particular it is asked: What is Kant’s notion of a paralogism? and How is transcendental illusion supposed to operate in the first paralogism? The answer to the first of these questions is surprising. Kant understands a paralogism as an argument that has true premises but is ‘false with respect to form’. But, crucially, he understands falsity with respect to form more expansively than as formal invalidity: arguments that are ‘false with respect to form’ include certain informal fallacies, including the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi—a fallacy of overestimation of the strength of one’s proven conclusion. This explains how it could be that the A-edition first paralogism is ‘false with respect to form’ (as a paralogism must, by definition, be) even though it is not in fact an invalid argument.

The Phenomenon of Vagueness

The theory outlined in Chapter 2 is applied to three problems: the sorites puzzle; the Luminosity of mental states; and personal identity in the face of fission. We attempt to solve the sorites puzzle by distinguishing the principle of Tolerance from the Cut-Off principle and we argue that the plausibility of the sorites argument arises from a sort of transcendental illusion. We attempt to defend the Luminosity of the mental by showing that it is compatible with the Margin for Error principle, once that principle is properly formulated. Finally, we deal with the case of fission by taking the original person to be weakly identical, i.e. not distinct, from his offspring. This then enables us to reconnect the notions of survival and what matters to the identity of a person over time. None of these solutions would be possible without the adoption of our distinctive logic of vagueness.

The Possibility Proof is Not What Remains from Kant's Beweisgrund

The so-called ‘possibility proof’ in Kant's pre-Critical Beweisgrund has been widely discussed in the literature, and it is a common view that he never really abandoned it. As I shall argue, this reading is mistaken. I aim to show that the natural illusion in the Critique of Pure Reason, which is usually taken to be the possibility proof turned into a transcendental illusion, has both a different conclusion and a different argument than the possibility proof. Rather, what remains from Beweisgrund is what I will call the ‘proof a posteriori’, which the Critique turns into a transcendental illusion that is of regulative use for reason.