Closing Reflections

2021 ◽  
pp. 453-462
Author(s):  
Ian Proops
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Transcendental Illusion ◽  
Transcendental Realism

In this concluding chapter the main lessons of the book are reviewed, and some further problems for Kant raised. The chapter reflects once again on Kant’s confession that he had found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith, offering a deeper explanation of this claim than was given in the introduction. It then considers the consequences of his having regarded Transcendental Realism as not just false, but rather logically impossible. It asks whether such a view can be reconciled—given Kant’s views on contradiction—with the supposed contentfulness of transcendental illusion or with Transcendental Idealism itself. It raises a problem for Kant’s account of metaphysical error as arising from transcendental illusion. Finally, it evaluates Kant’s claim to have offered an exhaustive critique of speculative metaphysics, arguing that this is unfortunately not the case.

Kantian Realisms: The Noumenal, Causation and Grounding

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Assiter
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Transcendental Realism ◽  
Empirical Realism

This chapter outlines a strong version of ‘realism’ against what Meillassoux labels ‘correlationism’. It suggests, however, that the critiques made by certain realists of the Kantian noumenal can be answered. It begins by defending Kantian ‘empirical realism’ against the critiques of some realists. Then it moves on to claim that Kant’s arguments for transcendental idealism are stronger than those for Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. The chapter suggests, more controversially, that if one takes seriously Kant’s notion of ‘spontaneous causation’, it is possible to offer a Kantian defence of the ‘grounding’ of the phenomenal in the noumenal. Finally, it argues that Kant offers a stronger form of realism than is generally supposed by his critics.

Realism and Materialism

2018 ◽  
pp. 42-50
Author(s):  
Thomas Nail
Keyword(s):  
Object Oriented ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
New Materialism ◽  
The Real ◽  
Transcendental Realism ◽  
Object Oriented Ontology

This chapter lays out a methodology of transcendental realism and new materialism based on motion. Transcendental realism is the study of the real minimal ontological conditions for the actual emergence of the historical present. The purpose of this method is to give a description of what previous being must at least be like given that it appears as it does today: in motion. The chapter offers critiques of constructivism, empiricism, metaphysics, and transcendental idealism. It also offers a critique of vitalist new materialism, negative materialism, object-oriented ontology, formalism, and all ahistorical methods of thinking about matter and materialism. It concludes with a theory of “process materialism.”

Transcendental Realism, Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry E. Allison
Keyword(s):  
World View ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Fundamental Question ◽  
Property Dualism ◽  
Philosophical Reflection ◽  
Transcendental Realism ◽  
Two Sides ◽  
Empirical Realism

The debate regarding the interpretation of Kant's idealism is usually seen as turning on the best way to understand his transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves: that it marks either a contrast between two types of thing (the ‘two-object’ or ‘two-world’ view) or one between two sides or aspects of ordinary empirical objects (the ‘two-aspect’ view). But, even though I have long been associated with the latter camp, I have also thought for many years that this is not the most helpful way to frame the issue. The problem lies in an ambiguity inherent in the two-aspect view. It can be understood either metaphysically, as a thesis about the kinds of properties attributable to empirical objects, that is, as a form of property dualism in which these objects are assigned both phenomenal and noumenal properties, or methodologically, as a contrast between two ways in which such objects can be considered in a philosophical reflection on the conditions of their cognition. Accordingly, I take the fundamental question to be whether transcendental idealism is to be understood in the latter way or as a form of metaphysical dualism (whether as a thing or a property dualism being a matter of relative indifference). And I have further thought that the best way of addressing that question is through a consideration of the view which Kant opposes to transcendental idealism, namely, transcendental realism. If this realism is identified with a particular metaphysical doctrine then transcendental idealism must be as well; but if, as I maintain, transcendental realism cannot be so understood, then neither can Kant's idealism.

scholarly journals Meillassoux, Correlationism, and the Ontological Difference

PhaenEx ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
G. Anthony Bruno
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Existential Analysis ◽  
Ontological Difference ◽  
Mutual Dependence ◽  
Transcendental Realism

Meillassoux defines “correlationism” as the view that we can only access the mutual dependence of thought and being—specifically, subjectivity and objectivity—which he attributes to Heidegger. This attribution is inapt. It is only by accessing being—via existential analysis—that we can properly distinguish beings like subjects and objects. I propose that Meillassoux’s misattribution ignores the ontological difference that drives Heidegger’s project. First, I demonstrate the inadequacy of Meillassoux’s account of correlationism as a criticism of Heidegger and dispense with an objection. Second, I argue that Meillassoux’s neglect of the ontological difference stems from a question-begging appeal to transcendental realism, which is at odds with Heidegger’s twin claims for a variety of transcendental idealism in Being and Time. Third, I offer a reflection on three general marks of transcendental idealism.

scholarly journals Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 110-178
Author(s):  
Anja Jauernig
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Core ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Transcendental Realism ◽  
Empirical Realism ◽  
Transcendental Idealist

The core claims of transcendental idealism are examined, according to which empirical objects and empirical selves are appearances and not things in themselves, and pure space and time are nothing but forms of sensibility. Kant is shown to be a relationalist about empirical space and time in holding that empirical space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of empirical objects. Furthermore, it is explicated how Kant can be both a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist about empirical objects, empirical selves, and empirical space and time, and how his idealism differs from transcendental realism, as well as from ordinary idealism such as Berkeley’s.

The Many Faces of Transcendental Realism: Willaschek on Kant’s Dialectic

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-293
Author(s):  
Andrew Chignell
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Realism ◽  
Dramatic Narrative ◽  
The Many ◽  
Dialectical Principle

AbstractAfter providing a brief overview of Marcus Willaschek's Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics, I critically reconstruct his account of ‘transcendental realism’ and the role that it plays in the dramatic narrative of the Critique of Pure Reason. I then lay out in detail how Willaschek generates and evaluates various versions of transcendental realism and raise some concerns about each. Next, I look at precisely how Willaschek's Kant thinks we can avoid applying the ‘supreme’ dialectical principle (for every conditioned there is a totality of conditions which is unconditioned) to the domain of appearances. Finally, I call into question Willaschek's efforts to appropriate the lessons of the Transcendental Dialectic without following Kant into transcendental idealism.

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