CTBT IMS - International Cooperation at its finest

Author(s):  
Nurcan Meral OZel ◽  
David Jepsen

<p>The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is one of the most ambitious global projects ever undertaken by more than 183 states. It’s establishment exemplifies international cooperation through the huge undertaking, coordination and massive investment by all Member States. The IMS monitors the whole earth, atmosphere and undersea for any potential nuclear test but this extraordinary network can also detect and record traces of natural and anthrogenic disasters that are ever present.</p><p>The IMS network sets a precedent for reliability, quality and requirements on a global scale. The network is comprised of 4 technologies (seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide) that monitor the earth’s environments to an incredibly low level and hence is an invaluable resource for monitoring and understanding natural hazards.To date, for example, the CTBTO has signed 14 agreements with tsunami warning organizations for the usage of CTBT data to assist with the timeliness and accuracy of tsunami warnings.</p><p>The effectiveness of plans to deal with natural disasters depends on a country’s level of resources and readiness. Member States can rely and call upon the CTBTO and the IMS network to assist them at a time of crisis. The IMS is truly a global network that has no borders.</p>

1999 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 989-1003 ◽  
Author(s):  
István Bondár ◽  
Robert G. North ◽  
Gregory Beall

Abstract The prototype International Data Center (PIDC) in Arlington, Virginia, has been developing and testing software and procedures for use in the verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After three years of operation with a global network of array and three-component stations, it has been possible to characterize various systematic biases of those stations that are designated in the Treaty as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS). These biases include deviations of azimuth and slowness measurements from predicted values, caused largely by lateral heterogeneity. For events recorded by few stations, azimuth and slowness are used in addition to arrival-time data for location by the PIDC. Corrections to teleseismic azimuth and slowness observations have been empirically determined for most IMS stations providing data to the PIDC. Application of these corrections is shown to improve signal association and event location. At some stations an overall systematic bias can be ascribed to local crustal structure or to unreported instrumental problems. The corrections have been applied in routine operation of the PIDC since February 1998.


1969 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 49-52
Author(s):  
Tine B. Larsen ◽  
Peter H. Voss ◽  
Trine Dahl-Jensen ◽  
Søren Gregersen

Any major shaking of the Earth can be recorded on a seismograph regardless of the nature of the source. Earthquakes and large explosions generate waves with similar frequency content. This fact has been used for decades to construct systems to monitor detonations of underground nuclear explosions. The quality of the monitoring system has increased significantly in recent years, and we demonstrate here that the data are useful in Danish earthquake research.


2018 ◽  
Vol 213 (3) ◽  
pp. 1785-1791 ◽  
Author(s):  
L G Evers ◽  
J D Assink ◽  
P SM Smets

SummarySupersonic rockets generate low-frequency acoustic waves, that is, infrasound, during the launch and re-entry. Infrasound is routinely observed at infrasound arrays from the International Monitoring System, in place for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Association and source identification are key elements of the verification system. The moving nature of a rocket is a defining criterion in order to distinguish it from an isolated explosion. Here, it is shown how infrasound recordings can be associated, which leads to identification of the rocket. Propagation modelling is included to further constrain the source identification. Four rocket launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2009 and 2017 are analysed in which multiple arrays detected the infrasound. Source identification in this region is important for verification purposes. It is concluded that with a passive monitoring technique such as infrasound, characteristics can be remotely obtained on sources of interest, that is, infrasonic intelligence, over 4500+ km.


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