Electoral Accountability, Party Loyalty, and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Senate

2013 ◽  
pp. 23-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamie L. Carson
1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 955-976 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith T. Poole ◽  
Howard Rosenthal ◽  
Kenneth Koford

Two related issues have developed in the scale analysis of voting in the U. S. Congress. One is methodological; it concerns the appropriate dimensionalizing model. The other is more substantive, entailing interpretation of the extent to which voting dimensions carry an ideological component. Kenneth Koford contributed to consideration of these issues in his research note, “Dimensions in Congressional Voting,” in the September 1989 issue of this Review. In this controversy, his claims are challenged vigorously by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. In turn, Koford defends his argument that “much roll call voting in Congress does not fit a single dimension.”


2004 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
LESLIE A. SCHWINDT-BAYER ◽  
RENATO CORBETTA

2000 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian J. Gaines ◽  
Brian R. Sala

This note extends Melissa P. Collie's “Universalism and the Parties in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1921–80,” American Journal of Political Science 32, 4 (November 1988): 865–883. Detecting a strongly negative correlation between the time series of universalism and partisanship in roll call votes for the 67th through 96th U.S. Houses, Collie concluded that consensus and partisanship are alternative, rival means of organizing legislative activity. If robust, this finding ought not to be time- or chamber-specific: it should be in evidence over the whole (partisan) histories of both House and Senate, session by session. Moreover, the inverse relationship should persist under alternative operationalizations of both partisanship and universalism. Using several measures of partisanship and universalism, mostly based on roll call votes tabulated for sessions of Congress, we reassess this relationship for the 43rd through 105th Congresses. Collie's core finding persists for both chambers over the longer time span provided that one uses her measures. But results are weaker when sessions of Congress rather than Congresses are used as units of observation, and alternative operationalizations of partisanship and universalism do not strongly replicate the original finding.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-85
Author(s):  
Philip D. Waggoner

Legislators are elected to be the voice of their constituents in government. Implicit in this electoral connection is the responsiveness of legislators to the preferences of constituents. Many past approaches only examine successful legislative behavior blessed by the majority party, not all legislative behavior, thereby limiting inference generalizability. I seek to overcome this limitation by considering bill sponsorship as an outlet in which all members are free to engage. Testing expectations on bill sponsorship in the 109th and 110th Congresses, I find that legislators are responsive, though only on “safely-owned” issues. I compare these findings to roll call voting on the same issues in the same Congresses and find a different pattern, suggesting legislators leverage bill sponsorship differently than roll call voting as they signal legislative priorities.


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