State Legislative Process

This chapter explores the history and operation of state legislatures. The urban-rural divide characterizes stark political and social differences that fuel legislative behavior. The content of public policies across the United States is influenced by these divisions and contributes to either the support of or opposition to social change. State legislators are on the front lines of these geographic ideological divides. These variations by region contribute to the increase in single-party control and have generated pronounced policy differences.

Life in the Middle

For almost thirty years, political scientists have believed that the US Senate would be less affected by partisan polarization due to the existence of a handful of moderate senators who would act as power brokers between the two sides, yet year after year we see partisan gridlock. Life in the Middle argues that the belief in the powerful, pivotal moderate neglects their electoral circumstances and overestimates their legislative power. Indeed, not all senators are elected under equal circumstances where the modern centrist has to balance between two conflicting constituencies like Susan Collins in Maine, or represents a state where the opposition outnumbers their base like Joe Manchin in West Virginia. Using data compiled from the Congressional Record, the book examines the legislative behavior of moderates and finds that they seldom amend legislation to their preferences, rarely speak on the record, and often lose on final votes. Using unique interview data with nineteen legislative directors and six retired centrist senators, it also finds that the behind-the-scenes conversations mirror the on-stage behavior where centrists are not influential or viewed as pivotal by party leaders. Furthermore, moderates reported less satisfaction with legislative outcomes than their peers. Life in the Middle suggests that lawmaking needs to be re-evaluated as being much more variable and less reliant on the work of moderates and more on party leaders. Indeed, the mainstream concerns about polarization and its negative effects of increased gridlock and ideological legislation may be true.

Shifting party goals: Party electoral support and legislative behavior in the majority and the minority

While scholars agree that parties are interested in both pragmatic (electoral) and programmatic (policy) goals, they disagree about the relative importance of those goals. How parties weight these goals has implications for the effect of party involvement on legislative behavior. We argue that parties emphasize these goals differently based on whether they are in the majority or minority. We examine links between party support in primary elections for the US Congress and subsequent legislative behaviors, finding that candidates who received more party support during the primary election were more likely to engage in partisan efforts in the next Congress. Further, party support of incoming legislators is linked to increased partisan behavior through leapfrog representation. We find that these relationships are stronger for majority party candidates, suggesting that parties put a greater emphasis on winning majorities when in the minority but a greater emphasis on policy congruence when in the majority.

The US Congress and Rogue States

Foreign policy has become one of the most polarizing issues in American politics. This paper investigates the extent to which this division extends to arguably one of the most bipartisan foreign policy issues: policies toward rogue states. Our examination of congressional voting and sponsorship data related to rogue states since 1991 finds that, while there is a high degree of bipartisanship on the issue, there are nuanced but significant partisan differences. First, we find that Democrats are significantly more likely to support a rogue state bill dealing with human rights concerns, whereas Republicans are significantly less likely to support a conciliatory bill. We also find that members of Congress are less likely to propose and support a rogue state bill in the presence of a co-partisan president. We thus conclude that, despite the overall high degree of bipartisanship on rogue state issues, partisanship plays an important role in influencing legislative behavior.

The Structure of Political Choices: Distinguishing Between Constraint and Multidimensionality

In the literatures on public opinion and legislative behavior, there are debates over (1) how constrained preferences are and (2) whether they are captured by a single left–right spectrum or require multiple dimensions. But insufficient formalization has led scholars to equate a lack of constraint with multidimensional preferences. In this paper, we refine the concepts of constraint and dimensionality in a formal framework and describe how they translate into separate observable implications for political preferences. We use this discussion to motivate a cross-validation estimator that measures constraint and dimensionality in the context of canonical ideal point models. Using data from the public and politicians, we find that American political preferences are one-dimensional, but there is more constraint among politicians than among the mass public. Furthermore, we show that differences between politicians and the public are not explained by differences in agendas or the incentives faced by the actors.

A Sum of Its Parts: Party Fit and Party Change in the U.S. House

Previous research has noted the transformation of the American parties since the 1970s, as exhibited in their increased ideological polarization and transformation on social issues like civil rights, abortion, and the environment. We contribute to the literature on party change by theoretically stressing the decentralized and individualistic nature of American parties, while using a measure of party change that is based on legislative behavior beyond roll call voting. Our paper uses social network analysis to analyze the parties from the 93rd to 110th Congresses, utilizing bill cosponsorship to define connections between members. Our analysis illustrates how the core of the party, that is, who are most central in the cosponsorship network, has changed over time. We find evidence that party centrality influenced retirement decisions, thereby reinforcing and contributing to party change.