scholarly journals 9. A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal

1977 ◽  
pp. 103-124
Keyword(s):  
2003 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 229-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven D. Edwards ◽  
Kevin Forbes

2021 ◽  
pp. 223-234
Author(s):  
Mackenzie Graham

This chapter discusses how the line between life and death has been blurred by advances in science and technology. For much of human history, determining death was a straightforward process. When illness or injury caused the irreversible loss of heart, lung, or brain function, their mutual interdependence meant that the other vital functions would inevitably cease within a matter of minutes. A physician could declare a patient dead simply by showing the absence of a heartbeat, breathing, or reaction of the eye to light. The introduction of new medical procedures in the 1950s, including mechanical ventilation and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), meant that a person whose heart had stopped beating, or lungs had stopped breathing, could be kept alive. These patients presented a problem for the traditional understanding of death because they had irreversibly lost some vital functions, but not others. To understand the nature of human death, one must begin by defining the concept: what is it for any living thing to die? Having answered this metaphysical question, one can move to an epistemological one: what is the appropriate standard for judging that something has met the definition of death? Finally, one requires criteria and tests to affirm that the epistemological standard has been met: when can we confidently say that someone is dead?


1976 ◽  
pp. 489-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander M. Capron ◽  
Leon R. Kass
Keyword(s):  

1979 ◽  
pp. 555-588
Author(s):  
Alexander M. Capron ◽  
Leon R. Kass
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (12) ◽  
pp. 868-871 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Symons ◽  
Reginald Mary Chua

Several bioethicists have recently discussed the complexity of defining human death, and considered in particular how our definition of death affects our understanding of the ethics of vital organ procurement. In this brief paper, we challenge the mainstream medical definition of human death—namely, that death is equivalent to total brain failure—and argue with Nair-Collins and Miller that integrated biological functions can continue even after total brain failure has occurred. We discuss the implications of Nair-Collins and Miller’s argument and suggest that it may be necessary to look for alternative biological markers that reliably indicate the death of a human being. We reject the suggestion that we should abandon the dead-donor criteria for organ donation. Rather than weaken the ethical standards for vital organ procurement, it may be necessary to make them more demanding. The aim of this paper is not to justify the dead donor rule. Rather, we aim to explore the perspective of those who agree with critiques of the whole brain and cardiopulmonary definitions of death but yet disagree with the proposal that we should abandon the dead-donor rule. We will consider what those who want to retain the dead-donor rule must argue in light of Nair-Collins and Miller’s critique.


1972 ◽  
Vol 121 (1) ◽  
pp. 87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Morgan Capron ◽  
Leon R. Kass
Keyword(s):  

1966 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
W. W. Morgan

1. The definition of “normal” stars in spectral classification changes with time; at the time of the publication of theYerkes Spectral Atlasthe term “normal” was applied to stars whose spectra could be fitted smoothly into a two-dimensional array. Thus, at that time, weak-lined spectra (RR Lyrae and HD 140283) would have been considered peculiar. At the present time we would tend to classify such spectra as “normal”—in a more complicated classification scheme which would have a parameter varying with metallic-line intensity within a specific spectral subdivision.


1975 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 21-26

An ideal definition of a reference coordinate system should meet the following general requirements:1. It should be as conceptually simple as possible, so its philosophy is well understood by the users.2. It should imply as few physical assumptions as possible. Wherever they are necessary, such assumptions should be of a very general character and, in particular, they should not be dependent upon astronomical and geophysical detailed theories.3. It should suggest a materialization that is dynamically stable and is accessible to observations with the required accuracy.


1979 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
pp. 125-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Allen

No paper of this nature should begin without a definition of symbiotic stars. It was Paul Merrill who, borrowing on his botanical background, coined the termsymbioticto describe apparently single stellar systems which combine the TiO absorption of M giants (temperature regime ≲ 3500 K) with He II emission (temperature regime ≳ 100,000 K). He and Milton Humason had in 1932 first drawn attention to three such stars: AX Per, CI Cyg and RW Hya. At the conclusion of the Mount Wilson Ha emission survey nearly a dozen had been identified, and Z And had become their type star. The numbers slowly grew, as much because the definition widened to include lower-excitation specimens as because new examples of the original type were found. In 1970 Wackerling listed 30; this was the last compendium of symbiotic stars published.


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