What Is Death?

2021 ◽  
pp. 223-234
Author(s):  
Mackenzie Graham

This chapter discusses how the line between life and death has been blurred by advances in science and technology. For much of human history, determining death was a straightforward process. When illness or injury caused the irreversible loss of heart, lung, or brain function, their mutual interdependence meant that the other vital functions would inevitably cease within a matter of minutes. A physician could declare a patient dead simply by showing the absence of a heartbeat, breathing, or reaction of the eye to light. The introduction of new medical procedures in the 1950s, including mechanical ventilation and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), meant that a person whose heart had stopped beating, or lungs had stopped breathing, could be kept alive. These patients presented a problem for the traditional understanding of death because they had irreversibly lost some vital functions, but not others. To understand the nature of human death, one must begin by defining the concept: what is it for any living thing to die? Having answered this metaphysical question, one can move to an epistemological one: what is the appropriate standard for judging that something has met the definition of death? Finally, one requires criteria and tests to affirm that the epistemological standard has been met: when can we confidently say that someone is dead?

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-393
Author(s):  
Elinor Gardner

Questions of life and death are primarily philosophical questions, as philosopher Robert Spaemann argues. Spaemann argues that “brain death” is philosophically unsatisfactory as a definition of death, and as the exclusive criterion for determining death, for two main reasons: first, because it attempts to annul the basic perceptions of the ordinary person in regard to death. Second, because the cause of life and unity in a living being cannot be reduced to the brain. This essay is an explication of Spaemann’s contribution to the “brain death” question, which consists in illuminating the philosophical issues at stake. Summary: This article presents Robert Spaemann’s philosophical case that “brain death” suffices neither as a definition of death nor as the sole criterion of death.


Author(s):  
John Harris

Problems concerning life and death are among the most dramatic and intractable in philosophy and they feature in all fundamental areas of philosophical inquiry, especially ethics. Most basic is the problem of what account to give of the value of life itself. This problem has had two main dimensions. One has been the controversy over what precise account to give of death; this has revolved around the issue of whether death is, as it is commonly perceived, an evil, and premature death a tragedy. The other has been the equally puzzling question of how to explain the positive value of life, and to resolve the problem that the more rich we make our account of the value of life, the more the value of life, and hence the nature of the wrong done by killing someone, seems to vary with the quality of the life of the person concerned. A second set of problems concerns the definition of death and appropriate criteria for death. Death, as the most extreme consequence of violence, also leads one into psychological discussions of aggression and into issues of political violence, terrorism, war and capital punishment in political philosophy. Third, there has been concern with a number of practical moral issues, including abortion and euthanasia. Finally, issues have arisen concerning the relation of the value of the life of persons to other sorts of lives, those of animals, for example, or the life and survival of the ecosystem itself. This discussion will concentrate on the central themes of the value of life and the harm and wrong represented by death.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (12) ◽  
pp. 868-871 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Symons ◽  
Reginald Mary Chua

Several bioethicists have recently discussed the complexity of defining human death, and considered in particular how our definition of death affects our understanding of the ethics of vital organ procurement. In this brief paper, we challenge the mainstream medical definition of human death—namely, that death is equivalent to total brain failure—and argue with Nair-Collins and Miller that integrated biological functions can continue even after total brain failure has occurred. We discuss the implications of Nair-Collins and Miller’s argument and suggest that it may be necessary to look for alternative biological markers that reliably indicate the death of a human being. We reject the suggestion that we should abandon the dead-donor criteria for organ donation. Rather than weaken the ethical standards for vital organ procurement, it may be necessary to make them more demanding. The aim of this paper is not to justify the dead donor rule. Rather, we aim to explore the perspective of those who agree with critiques of the whole brain and cardiopulmonary definitions of death but yet disagree with the proposal that we should abandon the dead-donor rule. We will consider what those who want to retain the dead-donor rule must argue in light of Nair-Collins and Miller’s critique.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 372-383
Author(s):  
David K C Cooper

The development of heart surgery is briefly reviewed, and the impact it has made on our concepts of life and death are considered. For centuries, death was defined by the cessation of heart beat. In the early days of heart surgery in the 1940s and 1950s, the heart sometimes temporarily stopped beating, but could be resuscitated, and some concluded that the patient had been ‘dead’ for a period of time. Subsequently, when the patient’s brain and other vital organs were protected either by the induction of a state of total body hypothermia or by the support of a heart-lung machine, the heart was purposely stopped from beating for periods of a few minutes to even several hours, but the patient remained alive. When heart transplantation was introduced in 1967, for a period of time the patient not only had no heartbeat, but had no heart, yet was not dead. When total artificial hearts were introduced, the patient permanently had no heart, but remained alive. In the near future, it is likely that the native heart will be permanently replaced by a genetically-engineered pig heart. Organ transplantation, particularly of the heart, contributed further to our changing concepts of life and death. In 1963, surgeons began to remove organs from donors whose brain had been irreversibly damaged, and had been diagnosed as being ‘brain-dead’, but in whom the heart was still beating. By 1968, the beating heart was routinely removed from brain-dead donors and transplanted into recipients, but this was no longer considered to be illegal as brain death had become the definitive definition of death, not lack of a heart beat or even lack of a heart.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana M Palmar-Santos ◽  
Azucena Pedraz-Marcos ◽  
Juan Zarco-Colón ◽  
Milagros Ramasco-Gutiérrez ◽  
Eva García-Perea ◽  
...  

Background: The technological advances of medicine, and specifically the techniques of organ transplants, have allowed crossing the border of life and death. This is especially relevant in the case of heart transplant, since its symbolism requires a redefinition not only of these traditional concepts, but also of the body or of one’s own identity. Aims: To explore the experiences of patients after receiving a heart from a donor. Methods: A phenomenological qualitative approach, through Merleau Ponty and Levinas perspectives, was conducted to capture the subjective experiences of heart transplant patients. We conducted 22 in-depth interviews: 12 with heart transplant patients from two hospitals in Madrid (Spain), and 10 with relatives who lived with them. Results: The line between life and death is erased for heart transplant patients. Three main themes arose from the analysis: towards death, the frontier between life and death, and towards life. The need to redefine the concepts of life and death is structured around issues such as the thought of facing one’s own death and the concept of gift and resurrection. Conclusion: Organ transplant techniques open the door to a new definition of death, of the identity of the body and its parts and the limits of life. Considering the cultural, legal, psychological, social and symbolic elements involved in the heart transplant process, a qualitative approach provides new avenues of understanding the clinical process from the patients’ perspective.


1976 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Klug ◽  
Marvin Boss

Dickstein's (1972) 30-item Death Concern Scale was developed as a measure of the extent to which an individual consciously contemplates death and evaluates it negatively. Scoring procedures provide a single score as a measure of death concern. Dickstein's definition of death concern and an examination of the items support the authors' contention that two aspects of death concern are being measured. Factor analyses of the item scores of 671 college students indicated the presence of two distinct factors in the Death Concern Scale. One factor represented Dickstein's “conscious contemplation of death” component, the other the “negative evaluation” component. The results of the factor analyses corroborated the subjective judgments of 5 independent judges and the authors of this article. It is suggested that the usefulness of this instrument may be enhanced by the utilization of separate scores for each of these two factors.


2021 ◽  
Vol V (4) ◽  
pp. 157-174
Author(s):  
Svetlana Neretina

The article considers the phenomenon, on the one hand, of a mirror, in which any thing, subject, person, first of all, is fixed in a reflection that makes it possible to observe oneself for the sake of self — understanding, on the other hand, the boundaries, mainly the boundaries between life and death, which can be crossed for the same purpose with the help of certain mental and physiological processes that affect the psycho — emotional state (in this case, sleep). Both phenomena, which seem similar, are in fact different: in one case, the emphasis is placed on contemplation, in the other — on speculation and hearing, tuned to the voice of another world. It is not by chance that Dostoevsky chose the place of the event: the cemetery as the border between life and death and the cemetery monument as a symbol of memory, where the hero “thought accordingly”. Since the hero of the story is in an inadequate state after the funeral, the theme of menippea, a seriously funny genre, appears as if by itself, especially since M. M. Bakhtin considered the story “Bobok” “one of the greatest menippe in world literature.” The author of the article considers Bakhtin's approach to the story from the standpoint of menippea justified, because he defines this genre not from the point of view of the effect it produces on the reader, but from the standpoint of the philosophy of action, which Bakhtin considered to be the true definition of this genre. The author draws attention to the “logic of turning”, or tropologic, on the basis of which the story is built with its oxymorons, comparisons, and irony. The story, according to the author, is characterized not by ambivalence, but by the convergence of beginnings and ends. The philosophical thought of one of the characters in the story correlates the thoughts of the living and the dead, i.e. those who are in different space-time realities, so that they seem to be embedded in each other. This similarity, which does not deprive the story of carnivalization, which always deals with duality, is internally focused on the idea of like-mindedness having one source, anticipating the question that has not yet been born about the way of modifying being in possibility into being in reality.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikaela Sifuentes

The search for a universal definition of death is a relatively new objective in human history, framed by complex biological, technological, and socio-political factors. While it is widely understood that “life” and “death” describe inverse states of being, what separates these two states has been vigorously debated by scientists, ethicists, and theologians. Far from merely an academic distinction, the definition of death has implications that extend to end-of-life healthcare, organ transplantation, and inheritance law. This review explores the historical and current definitions of death in the United States, the role of technological advances, and the resultant social and legal applications.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
James L. Bernat

The definition of death is one of the oldest and most enduring problems in biophilosophy and bioethics. Serious controversies over formally defining death began with the invention of the positive-pressure mechanical ventilator in the 1950s. For the first time, physicians could maintain ventilation and, hence, circulation on patients who had sustained what had been previously lethal brain damage. Prior to the development of mechanical ventilators, brain injuries severe enough to induce apnea quickly progressed to cardiac arrest from hypoxemia. Before the 1950s, the loss of spontaneous breathing and heartbeat (“vital functions”) were perfect predictors of death because the functioning of the brain and of all other organs ceased rapidly and nearly simultaneously thereafter, producing a unitary death phenomenon. In the pretechnological era, physicians and philosophers did not have to consider whether a human being who had lost certain “vital functions” but had retained others was alive, because such cases were technically impossible.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikaela Sifuentes

The search for a universal definition of death is a relatively new objective in human history, framed by complex biological, technological, and socio-political factors. While it is widely understood that “life” and “death” describe inverse states of being, what separates these two states has been vigorously debated by scientists, ethicists, and theologians. Far from merely an academic distinction, the definition of death has implications that extend to end-of-life healthcare, organ transplantation, and inheritance law. This review explores the historical and current definitions of death in the United States, the role of technological advances, and the resultant social and legal applications.


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