If You Try, You’ll Get By: Chinese Private Firms' ’Efficiency Gains from Overcoming Financial Constraints

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 1343-1373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Greene

I examine acquisitions of private firms by public acquirers to better understand the effects of financial constraints on the division of economic gains in takeovers. Empirical tests exploit interstate bank branching deregulation, which relaxes financial constraints on private firms and can strengthen their bargaining position in an acquisition. Using a proxy for the degree to which targets depend on acquirers for financing, I find that private targets depend less on acquirers as a result of interstate bank branching deregulation. Relaxing financial constraints on private targets leads to an increase in target valuation multiples and a decrease in acquirer wealth gains.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-204
Author(s):  
Aviner Augusto Silva Manoel ◽  
Marcelo Botelho da Costa Moraes ◽  
David Ferreira Lopes Santos ◽  
Marcos Fava Neves

2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (9) ◽  
pp. 3472-3485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Behr ◽  
Lars Norden ◽  
Felix Noth

2018 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-442
Author(s):  
Zuzana Brinčíková ◽  
Marek Kálovec ◽  
Colin W. Lawson ◽  
Eva Muchová

Abstract Fourteen Slovak state-owned enterprises were studied, using published data and structured interviews with management. A novel methodology is used to assess SOE autonomy, effectiveness, accountability and governance. Variations in operating conditions reflect different government objectives and different ownership models. Mixed state-private firms performed more like competitive firms than did wholly state-owned SOEs. This information was fed into an assessment of Slovak SOEs’ compliance with the 2015 OECD Guidelines on SOE Corporate Governance. There are many differences between Slovak practice and the Guidelines. This may reflect a choice to favour government interests, rather than the OECD’s inclusion of a wider group of stakeholders. One cost is foregone efficiency gains. Another is the perception that the present highly opaque governance system hides corruption.


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