How government withdrawal affects corporate social performance?

This study aims to investigate whether government withdrawal affect corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance, and how CEO’s political connection moderates its relationship. We use sample data from Chinese listed firms over the 2010 to 2015 period to test our hypotheses. We find that decrease in state ownership through government withdrawal tends to negatively affect firms’ CSR performance, but the CEO’s political connection weakens its negative relationship and increases the firm’s likelihood towards CSR activities. Our findings imply that firm’s social engagement mainly result from high governmental involvement, and usually from political connections, because such firms are subject to close scrutiny by stakeholders and thus are more likely to improve social performance. Moreover, this research provides important implications to policy makers regarding the social outcomes of government withdrawal and the usefulness of firms’ political connection in developing economies like China. Este estudio tiene como objetivo investigar si la retirada del gobierno afecta al rendimiento de la responsabilidad social corporativa (RSC), y cómo la conexión política del CEO modera su relación. Utilizamos los datos de una muestra de empresas chinas que cotizan en bolsa durante el período 2010-2015 para comprobar nuestras hipótesis. Encontramos que la disminución de la propiedad estatal a través de la retirada del gobierno tiende a afectar negativamente a los resultados de RSC de las empresas, pero la conexión política del CEO debilita su relación negativa y aumenta la probabilidad de la empresa hacia las actividades de RSC. Nuestras conclusiones implican que el compromiso social de las empresas se debe principalmente a la alta participación gubernamental, y normalmente a las conexiones políticas, porque estas empresas están sometidas a un estrecho escrutinio por parte de las partes interesadas y, por lo tanto, es más probable que mejoren sus resultados sociales. Además, esta investigación ofrece importantes implicaciones para los responsables políticos en relación con los resultados sociales de la retirada del gobierno y la utilidad de la conexión política de las empresas en economías en desarrollo como China.

Political connections, political uncertainty and audit fees: evidence from Pakistan

Purpose This paper aims to examine the association between political connections, political uncertainty and audit fees. The authors use various measures of political connections and uncertainty: political connections (civil and military), political events (elections) and a general measure of political stability (i.e. a world bank index). Design/methodology/approach The authors measure the association between political connections, political uncertainty and audit fees. Audit fees reflect auditors’ perceptions of risk. The authors examine auditors’ business risk, clients’ audit and business risk after controlling for the variables used in prior audit fee research. Findings Results indicate that civil-connected firms pay significantly higher audit fees than non-connected firms owing to the instability of civil-political connections. Military-connected firms pay significantly lower audit fees than non-connected firms owing to the stable form of government. Furthermore, considering high leverage as a measure of clients’ high audit risk and high return-on-assets (ROA) as a measure of clients’ lower business risk, the authors interact leverage and ROA with civil and military connections. The results reveal that these risks moderate the relationship between political connection and audit fees. Election risk is independent of risk associated with political connections. General political stability reinforces the theme that a stable government results in lower risks. Originality/value The authors combine cross-sectional measures of political uncertainty (civil or military connections) with time-dependent measures (general measures of political instability and elections).

Politically Connected Firms and Their Stock Return Volatility during High-Visibility Events: Evidence from Malaysia

This study investigates the relationship between political connection and firm stock volatility. We examine whether stock return volatility of politically connected firms differ from non-connected firms during four events. These four events are general election, change of leadership, announcement of government budget, and announcement of policies by the government. This paper uses a volatility event study technique to calculate the abnormal stock return volatility during the four events. We use the data of public-listed firms in Malaysia from 2002 to 2013. The result shows that political connection is associated with higher stock volatility in certain events. They appear to be the most volatile in the event of general election and least volatile during budget announcement. Besides budget announcement, the other three events showed a stronger volatility as they are considered as more of a surprise announcement rather than scheduled announcement. The paper adds to a limited body of literature investigating the relationship between political connection and market behavior in Malaysia and hopes to show that political connection can impact the stock return volatility of firms during high-visibility events in Malaysia.

Hybrid ownership structures and cross-border acquisition completion of emerging market firms: An institutional and signalling theory perspective

<p><b>Over the last decade, cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) have emerged as one of the most significant engines through which emerging market firms (EMFs) carry out foreign investments. Yet, emerging market acquirers (EMAs) terminate a significant percentage of initiated CBAs before completion. Compared to the 18 percent termination rate of CBAs involving acquirers from developed economies (DEs), CBAs by EMAs have a 33 percent termination rate. Scholars attribute the higher CBA termination by EMAs to the dual hurdle of 'liability of origin' and 'liability of foreignness' arising from direct government involvement and institutional voids in emerging economies. Although extant research provides in-depth insights into why EMAs have higher CBA termination rates than developed economies acquirers, they fall short in exploring how EMAs can navigate these challenges. Hence, in this study, I aim to investigate ownership based solutions to the institutional challenges affecting the CBA completion of EMAs.</b></p> <p>A striking phenomenon in the foreign investment of EMFs is that a firm's ownership matters. Pioneering ownership-based studies reveal that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-owned enterprises (POEs) experience distinct interactions with home and host countries leading to diverse foreign investment challenges and strategies. Government regulatory discretion combined with capital market imperfection in emerging markets means that SOEs are privileged in accessing government support. In contrast, POEs lack direct government support and seek to establish and leverage political ties to survive. This need for sustained firm government relationships and the gradual pro-market reforms in many emerging economies catalyse hybrid ownership structures among EMFs where state and private owners coexist in one organization. However, this emergence of hybrid ownership structures and their implications for EMFs' foreign investment activities are under-investigated in the international business domain.</p> <p>Building on the new institutional theory and the signalling theory, I argue that hybrid ownership structures can act as signals through which external stakeholders evaluate and confer legitimacy on EMAs during the CBA process. My conceptualization emphasizes the mixture of unique resources brought into hybrid organizations by both SOEs and POEs. Accordingly, I assert that as hybrid organizations incorporate elements prescribed by both SOEs and POEs, they are likely to project at least partial appropriateness to a broader set of institutional referents. As a result, hybrid ownership structures confer legitimacy-enhancing benefits, resource-enhancing benefits, and operational autonomy benefits that position EMAs to simultaneously navigate the home and host institutional challenges in CBAs ultimately increasing the completion likelihood. In addition to proposing a direct effect of hybrid ownership on CBA completion, I develop novel varieties of hybrid ownership structures that categorize variations in the internal configurations of hybrid organizations as typology, degree, and nature of hybridization. I carry out further investigation on how the hybrid ownership effect might vary with these varieties of hybrid ownership structures. Subsequently, I identify top executives' political connection, target industry political sensitivity, and host country regulatory quality as contingences to the effect of hybrid ownership on CBA completion of EMAs.</p> <p>Analysing a dataset of 838 CBAs by Chinese firms between the years 2008 to 2017, the results from this study demonstrate that acquirers with hybrid ownership structures are more likely to complete CBAs than nonhybrid acquirers. Moreover, while the hybridization effect varied with the degree of hybridization, the results did not provide conclusive evidence for the nature of hybridization. The result also reveals that top executives' political connection and the host country regulatory quality present differing interactions with the hybrid ownership effect relative to the hybrid organization's typology. With these findings, I contribute to the literature on EMFs' CBA completion by demonstrating that hybrid ownership structures benefit from their different owners' resources to overcome challenges in CBAs. I also contribute to the conceptualization and implication of hybrid ownership for EMFs strategic outcomes. I find that the benefits of hybrid ownership differed with the controlling shareholder's identity and the degree of hybridization in a hybrid organization. Furthermore, by examining the boundary conditions of top executives' political connection, target industry political sensitivity, and host regulatory quality, I provide insights into how intra-organizational attributes and external factors shape the significance of ownershipstructures in EMFs foreign investment.</p>

Hybrid ownership structures and cross-border acquisition completion of emerging market firms: An institutional and signalling theory perspective

<p><b>Over the last decade, cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) have emerged as one of the most significant engines through which emerging market firms (EMFs) carry out foreign investments. Yet, emerging market acquirers (EMAs) terminate a significant percentage of initiated CBAs before completion. Compared to the 18 percent termination rate of CBAs involving acquirers from developed economies (DEs), CBAs by EMAs have a 33 percent termination rate. Scholars attribute the higher CBA termination by EMAs to the dual hurdle of 'liability of origin' and 'liability of foreignness' arising from direct government involvement and institutional voids in emerging economies. Although extant research provides in-depth insights into why EMAs have higher CBA termination rates than developed economies acquirers, they fall short in exploring how EMAs can navigate these challenges. Hence, in this study, I aim to investigate ownership based solutions to the institutional challenges affecting the CBA completion of EMAs.</b></p> <p>A striking phenomenon in the foreign investment of EMFs is that a firm's ownership matters. Pioneering ownership-based studies reveal that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-owned enterprises (POEs) experience distinct interactions with home and host countries leading to diverse foreign investment challenges and strategies. Government regulatory discretion combined with capital market imperfection in emerging markets means that SOEs are privileged in accessing government support. In contrast, POEs lack direct government support and seek to establish and leverage political ties to survive. This need for sustained firm government relationships and the gradual pro-market reforms in many emerging economies catalyse hybrid ownership structures among EMFs where state and private owners coexist in one organization. However, this emergence of hybrid ownership structures and their implications for EMFs' foreign investment activities are under-investigated in the international business domain.</p> <p>Building on the new institutional theory and the signalling theory, I argue that hybrid ownership structures can act as signals through which external stakeholders evaluate and confer legitimacy on EMAs during the CBA process. My conceptualization emphasizes the mixture of unique resources brought into hybrid organizations by both SOEs and POEs. Accordingly, I assert that as hybrid organizations incorporate elements prescribed by both SOEs and POEs, they are likely to project at least partial appropriateness to a broader set of institutional referents. As a result, hybrid ownership structures confer legitimacy-enhancing benefits, resource-enhancing benefits, and operational autonomy benefits that position EMAs to simultaneously navigate the home and host institutional challenges in CBAs ultimately increasing the completion likelihood. In addition to proposing a direct effect of hybrid ownership on CBA completion, I develop novel varieties of hybrid ownership structures that categorize variations in the internal configurations of hybrid organizations as typology, degree, and nature of hybridization. I carry out further investigation on how the hybrid ownership effect might vary with these varieties of hybrid ownership structures. Subsequently, I identify top executives' political connection, target industry political sensitivity, and host country regulatory quality as contingences to the effect of hybrid ownership on CBA completion of EMAs.</p> <p>Analysing a dataset of 838 CBAs by Chinese firms between the years 2008 to 2017, the results from this study demonstrate that acquirers with hybrid ownership structures are more likely to complete CBAs than nonhybrid acquirers. Moreover, while the hybridization effect varied with the degree of hybridization, the results did not provide conclusive evidence for the nature of hybridization. The result also reveals that top executives' political connection and the host country regulatory quality present differing interactions with the hybrid ownership effect relative to the hybrid organization's typology. With these findings, I contribute to the literature on EMFs' CBA completion by demonstrating that hybrid ownership structures benefit from their different owners' resources to overcome challenges in CBAs. I also contribute to the conceptualization and implication of hybrid ownership for EMFs strategic outcomes. I find that the benefits of hybrid ownership differed with the controlling shareholder's identity and the degree of hybridization in a hybrid organization. Furthermore, by examining the boundary conditions of top executives' political connection, target industry political sensitivity, and host regulatory quality, I provide insights into how intra-organizational attributes and external factors shape the significance of ownershipstructures in EMFs foreign investment.</p>

A Research on the Crisis Spillover Effect of Food Safety Incidents on Competitive Firms: The Influence of Political Connections and Charitable Donations

Taking the perspective of corporate social responsibility and institutional theory, this research establishes an innovative relationship between variables such as charitable donation, political connection and crisis spillover effect of firms through quantitative analysis using the event study method, regression analysis and the Heckman two-stage model. Taking 8 food safety incidents from 2011 to 2016 as research samples, this paper studies the impact of food safety incidents on the market value of both firms under crisis and their competitive firms, as well as the influence of political connection and charitable donation. Based on the current situation that the product crisis or reputation crisis of a firm will, inevitably, affect the market performance and value of its competitive firms in the same industry, this paper attempts to answer questions such as “what kind of firms are capable of minimizing this negative influence?” “will the political connection of competitive firms exert a positive or negative impact?” and “can actions taken before the crisis, such as charitable donation of competitive firms, help these firms in reducing the harm?” The conclusions are as follows: first, the occurrence of food safety incidents not only has a negative impact on the market value of the crisis firm, but also has a negative spillover effect on the competitive firm; second, charitable donations made by the competitive firm before the crisis demonstrates a positive competitive effect on the competitive firm, and the intensity of such charitable donations is positively correlated with this positive competitive effect; third, the political connection of the competitive firm has no significant impact on the crisis spillover effect. These findings provide enlightenment for the operation and management of firms in the food industry.