The Voter’s Conundrum

Author(s):  
Benjamin Hale

This chapter seeks to make sense of motivating and justificatory reasons as different sorts of answers to “why” questions. The chapter uses the related problems of overpopulation and the irrationality of voting to first, examine the tragedy of the commons; second, to explore a response to causal impotence objections; and third, to establish the right as the justified. It also distinguishes between justification as a status and justification as a process.

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Hardisty ◽  
Howard Kunreuther ◽  
David H. Krantz ◽  
Poonam Arora

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaime G. Lopez ◽  
Mohamed S. Donia ◽  
Ned S. Wingreen

AbstractPlasmids are autonomous genetic elements that can be exchanged between microorganisms via horizontal gene transfer (HGT). Despite the central role they play in antibiotic resistance and modern biotechnology, our understanding of plasmids’ natural ecology is limited. Recent experiments have shown that plasmids can spread even when they are a burden to the cell, suggesting that natural plasmids may exist as parasites. Here, we use mathematical modeling to explore the ecology of such parasitic plasmids. We first develop models of single plasmids and find that a plasmid’s population dynamics and optimal infection strategy are strongly determined by the plasmid’s HGT mechanism. We then analyze models of co-infecting plasmids and show that parasitic plasmids are prone to a “tragedy of the commons” in which runaway plasmid invasion severely reduces host fitness. We propose that this tragedy of the commons is averted by selection between competing populations and demonstrate this effect in a metapopulation model. We derive predicted distributions of unique plasmid types in genomes—comparison to the distribution of plasmids in a collection of 17,725 genomes supports a model of parasitic plasmids with positive plasmid–plasmid interactions that ameliorate plasmid fitness costs or promote the invasion of new plasmids.


Ecology ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oded Berger-Tal ◽  
Keren Embar ◽  
Burt P. Kotler ◽  
David Saltz

1978 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-208
Author(s):  
Dennis A. Rubini

William of Orange tried to be as absolute as possible. Inroads upon the power of the executive were fiercely resisted: indeed, William succeeded in keeping even the judiciary in a precarious state of independence. To maintain the prerogative and gain the needed supplies from parliament, he relied upon a mixed whig-tory ministry to direct court efforts. Following the Glorious Revolution, the whigs had divided into two principle groups. One faction led by Robert Harley and Paul Foley became the standard-bearers of the broadly based Country party, maintained the “old whig” traditions, did not seek office during William's reign, tried to hold the line on supply, and led the drive to limit the prerogative. The “junto,” “court,” or “new” whigs, on the other hand, were led by ministers who, while in opposition during the Exclusion crisis, held court office, aggressively sought greater offices, and wished to replace monarchy with oligarchy. They soon joined tory courtiers in opposing many of the Country party attempts to place additional restrictions upon the executive. To defend the prerogative and gain passage for bills of supply, William also developed techniques employed by Charles II. By expanding the concept and power of the Court party, he sought to bring together the executive and legislative branches of government through a large cadre of crown office-holders (placemen) who sat, voted, and directed the votes of others on behalf of the government when matters of importance arose in the Commons. So too, William claimed the right to dissolve parliament and call new elections not on a fixed date, as was to become the American practice, but at the time deemed most propitious over first a three-year and then (after 1716) a seven year period.


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