Composition

This chapter explores the philosophical and formal issues surrounding mereological composition. It carefully examines the difference between three main types of fusion: algebraic joins, Leśniewski sums, and Goodman fusions. It also examines different views about their conditions of existence (the so-called ‘special composition question’), including the controversial doctrines of mereological universalism, nihilism, and restricted theories of composition. Next it considers whether fusions are unique and how this impacts extensionality, including presenting a detailed analysis of the thesis known as ‘composition as identity’. A number of ‘structural’ conceptions of composition (and related algebraic principles) are then examined. Finally, parallel to questions about a null object, atomism, and ‘atomless gunk’, the existence of a universal object and the ideas of ‘worldless junk’, and coatomism are considered.

Mereological Composition in Analytic and Buddhist Perspective

Comparing Buddhist and contemporary analytic views about mereological composition reveals significant dissimilarities about the purposes that constrain successful answers to mereological questions, the kinds of considerations taken to be probative in justifying those answers, and the value of mereological inquiry. I develop these dissimilarities by examining three questions relevant to those who deny the existence of composite wholes. The first is a question of justification: What justifies denying the existence of composite wholes as more reasonable than affirming their existence? The second is a question of ontology: Under what conditions are many partless individuals arranged composite-wise? The third is a question of reasonableness: Why, if there are no composites available to experience, do “the folk” find it reasonable to believe there are? I motivate each question, sketch some analytic answers for each, develop in more detail answers from the Theravādin Buddhist scholar Buddhaghosa, and extract comparative lessons.

Some remarks on R. Carnap’s concept of construction in Aufbau and E. Hessserl’s concept of constitution

This paper turns to the concept of constitution and some to it more immediately related notions contained in R. Carnap's Aufbau and Husserl's works that might have had some influence there, in order to find similarities and differences between them. It hopefully will contribute to this assessment of the plausible hypothesis, recently raised in the literature, of an influence of the father of phenomenology not explicitly sufficiently credited in Aufbau. The argumentative strategy was to expose, firstly in a separate way, the relevant points in each strand and then to make the comparative examination. This first analysis took place by two general aspects, namely, to address, on the one hand, the very relation of constitution and what is a system of it and, given the implicated foundationalism attributed to such notion, the data which are at the base of system like this. Then I move on to examine the differences and similarities between such expositions. As result, similarities were observed in that the two of them imply a broader thesis of foundationalism; they propose, in this, to an encompassing system. In addition, they contend that the fact that there is a difference between a lower-level object and a higher-level object does not imply between them mereological composition or some necessary commonality of properties. However, there are also differences regarding the kind of relationship that the notions of constituting imply in each case. Distinctions were also found about the role of sensations in each system; but in that sense, there is, in both perspectives, also similarities concerning their status. The paper concludes with the notion that there must be husserlian influences in the Aufbau not sufficiently credited. However, it is unreasonable the diagnosis of extreme importance of Husserl's influence.

Priority Monism Beyond Spacetime

I will defend two claims. First, Schaffer’s priority monism is in tension with many research programs in quantum gravity. Second, priority monism can be modified into a view more amenable to this physics. The first claim is grounded in the fact that promising approaches to quantum gravity such as loop quantum gravity or string theory deny the fundamental reality of spacetime. Since fundamental spacetime plays an important role in Schaffer’s priority monism by being identified with the fundamental structure, namely the cosmos, the disappearance of spacetime in these views might undermine classical priority monism. My second claim is that priority monism can avoid this issue with two moves: first, in dropping one of its core assumption, namely that the fundamental structure is spatio-temporal, second, by identifying the connection between the non-spatio-temporal structure and the derivative spatio-temporal structure with mereological composition.

Mutual Manifestation and Martin’s Two Triangles

When and how do powers manifest themselves? There are two models. The orthodox view has powers standing in need of stimuli, which once received issue in responses. This model portrays powers as passive. The stimuli are powerful, but the powers are disempowered, turning the order of explanation on its head. The second model is more promising: C. B. Martin’s notion of mutual manifestation partnering. Powers exercise when they meet their reciprocal partners and produce something jointly that they could not have produced alone. In his chapter on causation, Martin offers an analogy to explain mutual manifestation: it is like two triangular cards coming together to form a square. The triangles do not cause the square; they become the square. We argue that although mutual manifestation is the right model, Martin’s analogy of the two triangles is misleading. If we look at natural processes in which powers exercise and manifest themselves, we see that three revisions are needed to the analogy. First, the triangles need not become the square immediately. It can take time for a process to unfold. Second, powers compose often in a non-linear fashion. This would mean that the area of the square need not be the sum of the areas of the two triangles. Third, component powers needn’t be found in their resultant powers. This would be like the two triangles sometimes forming a circle rather than a square. Martin’s analogy depicted mereological composition rather than the natural processes issuing from powers and, contrary to his claim, causation is indeed the notion we should be thinking of.