The epistemic demands of friendship: friendship as inherently knowledge-involving

Many recent philosophers have been tempted by epistemic partialism. They hold that epistemic norms and those of friendship constitutively conflict. In this paper, I suggest that underpinning this claim is the assumption that friendship is not an epistemically rich state, an assumption that even opponents of epistemic partiality have not questioned. I argue that there is good reason to question this assumption, and instead regard friendship as essentially involving knowledge of the other. If we accept this account of friendship, the possibility of epistemic partialism does not arise.

Does Friendship Exert Pressure on Belief?

It has been alleged that we should be epistemically partial to our friends, that is, that there are cases in which the demands of friendship would require one to give a friend the benefit of the doubt, and thereby come to believe something in violation of ordinary epistemic standards on justified or responsible belief. The burden of this chapter is to argue against this idea. It argues that the impression of epistemic partiality in friendship dissipates once we acknowledge the sorts of practical and epistemic reasons that are generated by our values: value-reflecting reasons. Unlike other proposals seeking to resist the arguments for epistemic partiality, the present proposal has the virtue of remaining neutral with respect to two controversial epistemic doctrines (Uniqueness and Pragmatic Encroachment); and it has the further virtue of being able to offer a unified account of the various forms of normative pressure in play when we consider information regarding a friend or loved one.

Seeking out Epistemic Friction in the Philosophy of Religion

Philosophical practice does not take place in an intellectual or social vacuum, hence it is important to consider how we can improve our social environment when engaging in philosophical reflection. In this paper, I recommend that philosophers of religion seek out epistemic friction, by exposing themselves to viewpoints that are in tension with their own. I first provide an overview of work in experimental philosophy of religion that shows that philosophy of religion presents a distorted epistemic landscape that does not reflect the religious and ideological diversity of human reasoners at large and that privileges particular aspects of Christian theism and scientific naturalism. I respond to two potential objections against the call for increased epistemic friction: epistemic partiality and imaginative resistance. The paper concludes by outlining ways in which philosophers of religion can go outside of their comfort zone and engage more with alternative, under-represented points of view.

Love and Rationality

Much work has been done in contemporary epistemology to reconcile our epistemic ideals with our human need for healthy relationships with our loved ones. Ryan Preston-Roedder makes an attempt to resolve the tension between these two goals in his paper, “Three Varieties of Faith.” However, his account lacks the clarity necessary to make a thoroughly convincing argument. In this paper, I expand on Preston-Roedder’s ideas, distilling a novel account of epistemic partiality that allows us to maintain epistemic rationality without sacrificing elements of friendship that have a significant impact on our social and emotional well-being.

Love and Rationality

Much work has been done in contemporary epistemology to reconcile our epistemic ideals with our human need for healthy relationships with our loved ones. Ryan Preston-Roedder makes an attempt to resolve the tension between these two goals in his paper, “Three Varieties of Faith.” However, his account lacks the clarity necessary to make a thoroughly convincing argument. In this paper, I expand on Preston-Roedder’s ideas, distilling a novel account of epistemic partiality that allows us to maintain epistemic rationality without sacrificing elements of friendship that have a significant impact on our social and emotional well-being.