Seeking out Epistemic Friction in the Philosophy of Religion

2020 ◽  
pp. 23-46
Author(s):  
Helen De Cruz

Philosophical practice does not take place in an intellectual or social vacuum, hence it is important to consider how we can improve our social environment when engaging in philosophical reflection. In this paper, I recommend that philosophers of religion seek out epistemic friction, by exposing themselves to viewpoints that are in tension with their own. I first provide an overview of work in experimental philosophy of religion that shows that philosophy of religion presents a distorted epistemic landscape that does not reflect the religious and ideological diversity of human reasoners at large and that privileges particular aspects of Christian theism and scientific naturalism. I respond to two potential objections against the call for increased epistemic friction: epistemic partiality and imaginative resistance. The paper concludes by outlining ways in which philosophers of religion can go outside of their comfort zone and engage more with alternative, under-represented points of view.

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaile Pohlhaus

At first glance it might appear that experimental philosophers and feminist philosophers would make good allies. Nonetheless, experimental philosophy has received criticism from feminist fronts, both for its methodology and for some of its guiding assumptions. Adding to this critical literature, I raise questions concerning the ways in which “differences” in intuitions are employed in experimental philosophy. Specifically, I distinguish between two ways in which differences in intuitions might play a role in philosophical practice, one which puts an end to philosophical conversation and the other which provides impetus for beginning one. Insofar as experimental philosophers are engaged in deploying “differences” in intuitions in the former rather than the latter sense, I argue that their approach is antithetical to feminist projects. Moreover, this is even (and perhaps especially) the case when experimental philosophers deploy “differences” in intuitions along lines of gender.


2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-67
Author(s):  
Thuan Thien Nguyen

Cultural personality is not only a diversified and complex issue but also an extensive field of research with many dissimilar opinions. Under the views of most of the researchers from European and North America scholastic philosophy, cultutal personality still focuses on the concept of behaviors, mode of behaviour, which become a style of individuals or groups. This notion is completely different to that of the researchers who advocate that cultural personality can only exist in special and outstanding individuals. Although there are such many different points of view, researchers in this field have something in common. The general agreement is that cultural personality is characreristic of humans and only exists in human society, and man forms his personality in his own social environment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-158
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Lim

Experimental Philosophy is a new and controversial movement that challenges some of the central findings within analytic philosophy by marshalling empirical evidence. The purpose of this short paper is twofold: (i) to introduce some of the work done in experimental philosophy concerning issues in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics and (ii) to connect this work with several debates within the philosophy of religion. The provisional conclusion is that philosophers of religion must critically engage experimental philosophy.


Author(s):  
Robert McKim

This chapter makes a three-part case for a more ambitious, more comprehensive, and richer philosophy of religion than that with which we are currently familiar, at least in the English-speaking world. First, it is unsatisfactory for philosophy of religion to consist mostly in philosophical reflection about issues pertaining to a single religion, or to a single religion and its close relatives. Second, many scholars of religion, irrespective of their field of study or training, would benefit from having more access to philosophical tools. Philosophy of religion could, and should, be of more service in this area. Third, an expanded philosophy of religion can contribute to the future development of religion—that is, to the direction, and forms, that religion will take in the future.


Author(s):  
Tim Bayne

Philosophy of religion is concerned with philosophical questions prompted by religious faith and experience. Some of these questions concern religion generally; others concern particular families of religion; and some concern particular religious traditions. ‘What is the philosophy of religion?’ explains how there is an intimate relationship between philosophy of religion and theology, but that the nature and location of the border between them is of some dispute. Some religions, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Taoism, embrace philosophical reflection, whereas the Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—contain very little in the way of explicit philosophical reflection. Despite this, numerous Abrahamic philosophers have made important contributions to the philosophy of religion.


Author(s):  
Avner Baz

There is little question that experimental philosophy constitutes one of the most significant developments in analytic philosophy in the last couple of decades. What is less clear is what its philosophical significance is, or has been. Whereas its proponents tend to present it as a way of moving forward in philosophy, I would argue that its singular contribution thus far has been that of pressing analytic philosophers to reflect on their favored method of inquiry, thereby helping to bring out fundamental problems with that method. More specifically, the present book argues that the new experimental movement and the responses to it by traditional, “armchair” philosophers have helped to make clear that what is known in contemporary analytic philosophy as “the method of cases”—that is, the widespread philosophical practice of theorizing on the basis of the “application” of terms to “cases”—rests on substantive and challengeable assumptions about language.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
MIKEL BURLEY

Abstract Myths, or sacred narratives, have been underexplored in mainstream philosophy of religion, which has also had little to say about African indigenous religions. These lacunae impoverish the philosophy of religion by diminishing its coverage both of the range of human religious possibilities and of the diverse modes through which religious ideas and world-views are conveyed. With particular attention to Yorùbá religion, this article promotes and exemplifies a pluralistic narrative approach that draws upon mythology to facilitate philosophical reflection upon a wider array of religious traditions, for the dual purpose of doing conceptual justice to those traditions while also furthering the discipline's conceptual enrichment.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 558-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
MOTI MIZRAHI

AbstractIn this article, I argue that, if ‘the overrepresentation of Christian theists in analytic philosophy of religion is unhealthy for the field, since they would be too much influenced by prior beliefs when evaluating religious arguments’ (De Cruz & De Smedt (2016), 119), then a first step towards a potential remedy is this: analytic philosophers of religion need to restructure their analytical tasks. For one way to mitigate the effects of confirmation bias, which may be influencing how analytic philosophers of religion evaluate arguments in Analytical Philosophy of Religion (APR), is to consider other points of view. Applied to APR, this means considering religious beliefs, questions, and arguments couched in non-Christian terms. In this article, I focus on Islam in particular. My aim is to show that Islam is a fertile ground of philosophical questions and arguments for analytic philosophers of religion to engage with. Engaging with questions and arguments couched in non-Christian terms would help make work in APR more diverse and inclusive of religions other than Christianity, which in turn would also be a first step towards attracting non-Christians to APR.


2015 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Christopher Hamilton

There are many ways of doing philosophy of religion. No doubt all of them have need of abstract concepts and passages where reflection is more technical than it usually is, say in everyday thought and reflection. But it is well known that, in this area of philosophy, and not only in this area of philosophy, abstract reflection can run the risk of losing contact with the ins and outs, the finer-grained details, of the lived experience of reality. One way to seek to reduce this risk is to approach abstract or general reflection through philosophical reflection on specific cases. This is what I intend to do in this paper. My aim is to explore in detail a specific and, in my view, extraordinarily striking example, in this case, an example of forgiveness in a religious, indeed, Christian context, drawing out where possible general or abstract conclusions, but seeking always to root reflection in the specific case in order to understand better from a philosophical point of view what is at stake, what is important, when thinking about the issue in question. Of course, I shall be seeking primarily to elucidate philosophically the example I shall discuss, but, by implication, I hope that the kinds of questions, worries and concerns I discuss might raise consciousness – philosophical consciousness – of the kinds of questions that we might explore in other examples, specifically those which involve forgiveness in a religious context.


Author(s):  
Ariesan Ramona Nicoleta ◽  

The purpose of this paper is to analyze what can happen to us from a philosophical point of view every time we are face with new situations and every time we have to make another choice that might not be placed into our comfort zone. Despite the fact each individual is different and we have our own personality and our own points of view and despite the fact that there are no two people who think the same one thing is sure: no one likes to be thrown into an unknown context. Throughout this journey called life even though we do not want it to happened we are oh fun faced with the unknown. How we deal with the new experiences that we are encountering Will be what makes us or what breaks us. It is up to us to make the best with what we have or at least that’s what we think or like to think. Maybe not all the questions will be answered with this paper but I hope that I can at least set of common ground and start exploring what lies beneath our choices.


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